Reactionary gender politics are not the preserve only of the far right. Through a comparison between Belgium and Spain, Romain Biesemans and Archibald Gustin show how conservative and far-right parties converge in their opposition to gender equality
We often associate opposition to gender equality with far-right politics. However, far-right parties are far from the only actors guilty of reactionary gender politics. This is particularly true of conservative right-wing parties, which have historically played important roles in opposing feminist and LGBTQ+ reforms such as gender quotas, abortion, or the legalisation of same-sex marriage.
Research has devoted considerable attention to how mainstream actors and parties have adopted far-right views on issues such as migration. Scholarship has paid much less attention, however, to whether similar normalisation dynamics are unfolding in relation to reactionary gender politics. This question is worth asking because it is fundamental to understanding contemporary forms of opposition to gender equality.
Contemporary politics has shamelessly mainstreamed reactionary actors and ideas
Contemporary politics has shamelessly mainstreamed reactionary actors and ideas. The classification of political parties into distinct party families might thus obscure processes of ideological convergence. This is especially true when conservatism is a feature of both far right and some mainstream right-wing parties. Our recent research published in EJPG shows that in Belgium and Spain, for instance, conservative right-wing parties the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) and the Partido Popular (PP) have often competed with far-right parties such as Vlaams Belang (VB) and Vox for the conservative vote. This competition has contributed to growing convergence on migration and securitisation, but also on gender equality policies.
Recent debates on consent and gender-based violence reforms adopted in both countries offer clear examples. In Spain, Vox opposed the 'only yes means yes' solo sí es sí law, which made consent central to the definition of sexual offences. The party rejected the idea of structural violence against women, and portrayed feminism as hostile to men. Vox also linked the issue of consent to broader themes such as insecurity and immigration. Its discourse was direct, opposed to gender equality, and confrontational. The Partido Popular, by contrast, adopted a subtler strategy. Rather than attacking equality head-on, it sought to redefine what gender equality and the protection of women’s rights should mean. Despite these differences in tone and style, both parties expressed opposition to the expansion of gender equality policies.
In Belgium, the gap between the conservative right and the far right was even narrower. During debates on consent reform – which clarified that a person must give consent freely and could withdraw it at any time – N-VA and VB tended to downplay the gendered nature of sexual violence. Rather than treating it as a consequence of gender inequality, the parties framed it as one of public order, punishment, and judicial efficiency. In this case, the conservative right did not merely echo the far right: it shared much of its framing.
Many regard the fight against sexual violence as more consensual than other areas of gender equality policy. Debates on trans rights, however, have triggered sharp opposition. In both countries, trans debates reveal the strongest convergence between conservative and far-right parties. Vox and the PP in Spain portrayed reforms allowing people aged 16 and over to change their legal gender without medical approval as a potential threat to women, children, or protected spaces. Vox used openly exclusionary rhetoric, depicting trans rights as 'privileges' and rejecting broader claims about gender inequality. The PP adopted a more moderate tone, invoking caution and 'common sense'. It did, however, echo many of the same concerns.
Trans issues often mark the point where the line between the conservative right and the far right becomes most blurred
In Belgium, the pattern is similar. Several times, N-VA and VB also directly opposed reforms allowing people to change their registered gender or first name through a simplified administrative procedure. Both parties raised alarmist scenarios about gender fluidity, warning of changes in civil status and supposed consequences for areas such as sport, electoral representation, or emergency medicine. Although their rhetoric differed on tone, the underlying framing was strikingly similar.
This convergence between conservative and far-right parties goes beyond rhetorical overlap. It also highlights the limits of conservative support for gender equality. Opposition to trans rights reveals how conditional and selective that support remains. In this sense, trans issues often mark the point where the line between the conservative right and the far right becomes most blurred.
As the Belgian and Spanish examples show, the relationship between the conservative right and far-right parties is a continuum rather than a stark divide. Parties may differ in tone, degree of radicalism, and targeted adversaries. They often converge, however, in the ways they slow down, undermine, or delegitimise gender equality policies. Thinking primarily in terms of party families – as political science has often done – can therefore obscure these cross-cutting ideological affinities.
The relationship between the conservative right and far-right parties is a continuum rather than a stark divide
At the same time, opposition to gender equality is not a new phenomenon confined to the far right. Long before the rise of contemporary anti-gender campaigns, conservative parties already played prominent roles in resisting feminist and LGBTQ+ reforms. They pushed back on moves to implement on gender quotas, and opposed struggles for sexual and reproductive rights. What is striking today is less the existence of such resistance than the way these older patterns of resistance are being rearticulated through contemporary anti-gender politics, often in ways that blur the line between the conservative right and the far right.
To understand contemporary opposition to gender equality, we therefore need to look beyond the far-right parties alone. We must also pay attention to the broader constellation of political actors that actively articulate, sustain and normalise reactionary gender politics within the mainstream.
