At the end of July, over the space of two days, around 72,000 people crossed from Morocco into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta. The largest such crossing on record, it became the first real-world test of the EU's Pact on Migration and Asylum. Agnese Pacciardi says the crisis resulted in weakened solidarity between member states, rushed deportations, and the neglect of human rights
Between 30 and 31 July 2026, roughly 72,000 Moroccans crossed into Ceuta, Spain. Reports claim that more than 100 people died in the attempt, which had echoes of a similar irregular crossing in 2021. Analysts have linked the episode, variously, to Morocco's instrumentalisation of the border amid tension with Spain over Western Sahara, domestic unrest fuelled by Morocco's Gen-Z 212 protest movement over healthcare, education and youth unemployment, and social-media mobilisation following misinformation. No single explanation, however, is sufficient on its own.
Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish territories on the North African coast, are legacies of Spain's colonial empire, passing to Spanish control in 1640 and 1497, respectively. That history is a large part of why episodes like this one are possible. When Spain joined Schengen in 1991, the enclaves’ geography, easily reachable from Morocco, worried Brussels. Spain and the EU responded by fortifying the area heavily and placing the two cities under a special regime, unique within Schengen: checks apply on exit as well as entry. This means that no one can reach the mainland without officials identifying them. Unauthorised entry into Ceuta or Melilla therefore never, in itself, counts as entry into the wider Schengen area.
What happened in Ceuta serves as the first real-world test case for the EU's Pact on Migration and Asylum, which came into force in June 2026. Presented as the most comprehensive reform of European migration governance in decades, it rests on four pillars: faster asylum and return procedures; mandatory solidarity; harmonised standards; and deeper partnerships with 'third countries'. Its real novelty is not any single mechanism (the EU has tried most before), but the promise of an institutional structure holding them together.
The Ceuta crossings were the first real-world test case for the EU's Pact on Migration and Asylum, the most comprehensive reform of European migration governance in decades
In institutional discourse, Migration Commissioner Brunner called Ceuta a sign that the EU's new approach is starting to work. Yet, that confidence looks premature once we examine the events closely. There is little to no solidarity between member states, the EU increasingly treats migration as diplomatic currency creating dependencies and vulnerabilities, and there is scant regard for the rights of people on the move.
Under the Pact, member states can fast-track applicants from certain third countries through accelerated asylum procedures. Under the Return Border Procedure Regulation, the burden of proof shifted onto applicants. Morocco is among these countries, after the EU recently added it to the 'safe third country' list. Returns in Ceuta were swift, almost immediate, and mostly described as voluntary. Yet, scholars have long contested the concept of voluntariness, since giving consent inside a fast-track process of this kind is rarely free or genuine.
Under the Pact, member states can fast-track applicants through accelerated asylum procedures, but there is little public information on how many people officials properly identified in Ceuta
In the case of Ceuta, there is little public information on how many people officials properly identified or gave a formal decision to. While Spanish authorities maintained that people chose to return voluntarily, reports describe officers physically preventing attempts to escape deportation, and ignoring direct requests to not be returned. Deportees included Moroccans, but also people from other African countries, despite well-documented concerns about the treatment in Morocco of migrants from West, Central and East Africa.
The Pact's mandatory solidarity mechanism was meant to answer a question that has shadowed EU migration governance since the Dublin Regulation: how to fairly redistribute responsibility. Ceuta tested it, and what followed looked like the opposite. Italy was first to call for Spain's suspension from Schengen, swiftly backed by many other countries. Rome and Copenhagen then presented a letter signed by 22 countries, endorsed by Commissioner Magnus Brunner. The letter pushed for an emergency meeting aimed less at the humanitarian emergency than at attacking Spain's recent regularisation policy, cast without evidence as a 'pull factor' for what happened. The political crisis was contained; only Italy suspended Schengen. The European Commission later praised Spain's 'swift response' and promised financial help. The pattern, however, is hard to ignore: an EU in which member states put national interest ahead of anything else.
While the Pact’s promise of solidarity failed its first major test, events in Ceuta have accelerated another of its priorities: deepening migration partnerships with third countries. Interest in 'return hubs' has since grown, with Italy, Denmark, Austria, and the Netherlands reportedly weighing proposals involving Rwanda, Ghana, and Uganda, despite warnings that such hubs risk becoming human rights black holes. As Ceuta has shown, while agreements with third counties can momentarily reduce pressure on a specific border, they also create political dependencies when diplomatic ties break down. A migration policy that relies increasingly, and sometimes almost exclusively, on these agreements is unlikely to be sustainable in the long run.
Ceuta is not an isolated failure but a preview of what the Pact makes structurally likely. The outlook is bleak for all those involved.
For people on the move, this means more border deaths, faster returns, thinner procedural safeguards, and growing reliance on countries where their treatment remains largely unmonitored. The expansion of securitised approaches leaves the EU even more vulnerable to external political pressures. For member states, particularly those on the EU’s external borders, it means a 'solidarity mechanism' that continues to exist only in name. The consequences are also tangible for EU citizens, not because mobility is inherently destabilising, but because its politicised management can generate insecurity and fear, which political actors may exploit for electoral purposes.
Migrants are not passive instruments of state strategy, but people who move for reasons that a focus on border control alone can never address
None of this is inevitable. It is the cumulative result of questionable political choices, reproduced by EU institutions and member states over decades. Reducing the events in Ceuta to mass disinformation or geopolitical manoeuvring obscures that responsibility. It also obscures the fact that migrants are not passive instruments of state strategy, but people who move for reasons that a focus on border control alone can never address. Unless EU policy confronts its own role in producing the conditions for such events, the Pact’s next test is likely to end as this one did.
