David Pimenta argues that the logic behind the 'broken windows' theory – that visible disorder encourages crime – is still with us. Today, however, it has been transformed and absorbed into contemporary illiberal populism, where cultural breakdown plays a central role in mobilising support and reshaping debates about authority and liberal democracy
Originally developed by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling, the 'broken windows' theory holds that street disorder like graffiti, vandalism and incivility encourages more serious crime. Whether or not that's the case, the underlying intuition remains powerful: disorder sends a message. It tells citizens that the authorities are not enforcing norms, and that institutions may be failing. That message matters politically, even when crime itself is stable.
Scholars often treat broken windows theory as a relic of 1990s policing. This framing, however, may obscure its continued relevance. Its core idea – that visible disorder signals loss of control – has not disappeared. It has simply moved from the streets into politics.
The strength of broken windows logic lies in perception. People do not respond only to crime statistics. They respond to what they see in everyday life.
Research on collective efficacy and perceived disorder shows that visible signs of neglect shape how communities interpret safety and trust. As disorder becomes more salient, residents withdraw from public life, trust declines, and spaces feel less secure – even when crime levels remain stable.
Visible signs of neglect shape how communities interpret safety and trust. Merely the perception of disorder, rather than a real increase in crime, is enough to generate political consequences
Importantly, this process does not require a real increase in crime. The perception of disorder is enough to generate political consequences. This is where contemporary politics enters the picture.
Present-day illiberal populism often relies on a logic that resembles the original broken windows framework.
Today, populists often frame disorder in cultural terms, particularly when they talk about immigration and demographic change, visible religious or linguistic diversity, and shifts in social norms and values.
Across Europe, parties from different countries, such as the Sweden Democrats in Sweden and Chega in Portugal, offer these developments as evidence that the state has lost control of immigration. They present developments not as isolated changes, but as signals of a deeper breakdown in social cohesion.
But the mechanism works differently from the original concept. According to broken windows theory, physical signs of neglect invite further deviance. In the cultural variant, visible demographic or normative change is evidence that institutions have already failed – that they are failing to enforce the boundaries of belonging. The signal does not cause breakdown; it announces it. And that announcement is enough to mobilise.
Visible demographic or normative change is evidence that institutions have already failed. Illiberal actors frame this cultural disorder, which helps explain why identity has become so politically charged
In this narrative, small changes point to larger threats. The structure mirrors the original broken windows argument: minor deviations suggest that something more serious is unfolding. This shift, from material disorder to what illiberal actors frame as cultural disorder, helps explain why identity has become so politically charged.
In its original formulation, the broken windows approach was not only about enforcement. It also emphasised prevention and cooperation between citizens, communities, and institutions. That dimension is largely absent from its political afterlife.
Populist narratives tend to frame disorder in more confrontational terms. They attribute it not to shared responsibility but to specific actors or groups, portraying political elites as weak, institutions as ineffective, and various political and ethnocultural out-groups as sources of disruption.
This shift has practical consequences. Research on community policing suggests that order depends on citizens feeling invested in shared norms, not merely subject to enforcement. Illiberal narratives reverse this logic, framing order as something imposed from above rather than negotiated from within.
This creates a challenge for liberal democracies.
Ignoring visible disorder – social or cultural – can erode trust in institutions and create space for populist mobilisation. But overly aggressive responses risk undermining civil liberties and democratic norms, potentially edging towards authoritarian practices.
If liberal democracies ignore visible disorder, this can erode trust in institutions, but if they respond too aggressively, they risk undermining civil liberties and democratic norms
Across Europe, debates over cultural visibility are no longer about pluralism but tests of control. Populist actors cast liberal institutions as passive, their measured responses proof of failure. This creates a structural trap: acting appears to validate the populist diagnosis, while restraint feeds the narrative of inaction.
The real legacy of broken windows is not a policing strategy. It is a way of interpreting the world. Disorder is not a neutral category. What counts as a problem depends on who has the authority to name it and to claim that it signals something larger.
Is the broken windows theory still empirically correct? That's no longer the salient question. Instead, we should ask who gets to decide what counts as disorder, and what we should do about it. In contemporary politics, the most powerful signal is not a broken window; it is the claim that society itself is breaking.
No.48 in a thread on the 'illiberal wave' 🌊 sweeping world politics
