Taylan Utku Düzgün argues that Turkish-Russian coordination in Syria has never reflected a true strategic alliance. Instead, both sides have developed limited forms of cooperation to contain escalation while pursuing fundamentally incompatible goals. The Syrian conflict shows how rivalry and coordination increasingly coexist in contemporary international politics
In November 2015, Türkiye shot down a Russian Su-24 fighter jet near the Syrian border, triggering one of the most serious crises in Turkish–Russian relations in decades. Russia imposed sanctions, suspended economic projects, and escalated its rhetoric against Ankara. Yet within a year, the two countries were coordinating military activity in Syria.
Many observers saw this as evidence of a new Turkish-Russian alignment. Others viewed it as a temporary arrangement between historic rivals. Both interpretations missed the central dynamic that emerged during the Syrian Civil War. Türkiye and Russia were not becoming allies. They were managing escalation under conditions of strategic rivalry.
Despite coordinating military activity in Syria in 2016, Türkiye and Russia have not become allies; they manage escalation under conditions of strategic rivalry
The distinction matters because during the Syria conflict, multiple powers backed opposing actors while operating in the same battlespace. Under these conditions, direct confrontation carried serious risks for both Ankara and Moscow. Limited coordination thus emerged not from trust, but from mutual recognition of the costs of uncontrolled escalation.
From the beginning of the war, Türkiye and Russia supported opposing sides. Ankara became one of the strongest critics of the Assad government and prioritised limiting Kurdish militant influence near its borders, particularly groups linked to the YPG. Russia, in contrast, intervened militarily to preserve the Assad regime and viewed Kurdish actors as potential instruments of regional influence.
Despite these differences, both sides gradually developed mechanisms of tactical coordination. The reason was not convergence, but operational necessity.
Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016 illustrates this clearly. Turkey launched the operation to secure its border from ISIS and contain Kurdish territorial expansion in northern Syria. Russia remained focused on stabilising the Syrian government and preserving its regional position. Although their objectives diverged, both sides recognised that direct confrontation between Turkish and Russian-backed forces could destabilise the conflict further.
Operational necessity has driven Türkiye and Russia to coordinate on matters such as airspace deconfliction, military communication channels, and diplomatic engagement
Limited coordination therefore emerged through practical mechanisms such as airspace deconfliction, military communication channels, and diplomatic engagement. Cooperation did not eliminate rivalry. It contained it.
Even during periods of coordination, the relationship remained fragile. In 2017, Russian airstrikes near al-Bab killed Turkish soldiers during ongoing operations in northern Syria. The incident intensified suspicions and underscored how easily tactical coordination could slide back into confrontation.
The same pattern appeared during Operation Olive Branch in 2018. Türkiye sought to remove YPG forces from Afrin, viewing them as a direct national security threat. Russia did not share this objective and had previously maintained pragmatic ties with Kurdish groups in the region. Nevertheless, Moscow effectively allowed the operation to proceed by withdrawing personnel from Afrin and avoiding direct obstruction.
This was not an alliance in any strategic sense. Russia did not adopt Türkiye's security priorities, nor did Türkiye align with Moscow’s broader regional agenda. Instead, both sides made limited accommodations to avoid wider confrontation while protecting their core interests.
The relationship was therefore defined less by alignment than by mutual recognition of strategic limits. Neither side could fully impose its preferred outcome without risking escalation beyond its control. Tactical coordination became a method of managing competition rather than overcoming it.
Describing Turkish-Russian relations in Syria as either a stable partnership or a purely adversarial rivalry obscures more than it explains. The relationship functioned through selective cooperation within a persistent environment of geopolitical tension. Military coordination never erased underlying disagreements over Assad, Kurdish forces, regional influence, or Syria’s long-term political future.
States with conflicting interests now frequently cooperate tactically to prevent escalation in conflicts where direct confrontation would be too costly
What emerged instead was a form of managed rivalry that is increasingly visible in contemporary international politics. States with conflicting interests now frequently cooperate tactically to prevent escalation in conflicts where direct confrontation would be too costly. Coordination does not necessarily signal alignment, just as rivalry does not preclude cooperation.
Türkiye and Russia have never resolved their differences in Syria. In many ways, those differences remain as sharp as ever. But both sides have recognised that direct confrontation carried risks neither could fully control.
Syria has therefore revealed something larger about contemporary international politics. Rival powers no longer fit neatly into categories of ally or adversary. Increasingly, states compete, negotiate, deter, and cooperate at the same time. The Turkish–Russian relationship in Syria was not an exception to this new reality – it was one of its clearest examples.
