Nuclear energy is back at the centre of politics, but a nuclear revival is not guaranteed. Jan Nathrath shows why political enthusiasm alone cannot deliver new reactors, and how geopolitical competition is reshaping access to international nuclear cooperation. For Western countries pursuing nuclear power for the first time, near-term prospects depend on whether alternative suppliers can deliver projects reliably
On 10 March 2026, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen addressed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Energy Summit. She described Europe’s decision to reduce nuclear power's share of electricity generation as a 'strategic mistake'. Her endorsement exemplifies the renewed political legitimacy of nuclear energy.
This resurgence has been driven by recent geopolitical shocks and the growing value attached to energy autonomy. Russia’s disruption of European gas supplies exposed the continent’s dependence on imported fossil fuels. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz during the US-Iran war revealed the vulnerability of supply chains centred on the Arabian Peninsula. Nuclear power has consequently been presented as improving energy security through domestic electricity generation.
This framing is not new. The 1973 Arab oil embargo elevated import dependence to a strategic vulnerability and, in several states, strengthened support for nuclear energy as a route towards greater self-sufficiency. Nuclear energy’s political appeal is not confined to energy security. Advocates have long linked it to wider benefits. Today, these include presenting it as a low-carbon source of reliable electricity alongside weather-dependent renewables.
Rising geopolitical volatility has therefore revived one of nuclear energy’s oldest promises. These pressures strengthen rather than fundamentally alter the case for nuclear power.
Stronger motivation does not necessarily produce deployment. It can mobilise resources but cannot substitute for the capabilities required to construct and operate a nuclear programme. The IAEA’s Milestones framework illustrates the point. Nuclear development requires matching political ambition with financial, institutional, regulatory, technical and project-delivery capacity.
Nuclear development requires matching political ambition with financial, institutional, regulatory, technical and project-delivery capacity
Green hydrogen shows why we shouldn't conflate political support with deployment. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, governments issued ambitious declarations of intent for green hydrogen. Yet high costs, uncertain demand, financing difficulties, and regulatory uncertainty have kept many announced projects from reaching final investment decisions.
The contrasting nuclear trajectories of Jordan and the UAE illustrate the gap between political ambition and capacity to deliver. Jordan’s near-total dependence on costly imported energy and repeated gas-supply disruptions created exceptionally strong incentives for nuclear power. Yet conventional reactors were poorly suited to Jordan’s comparatively small electricity system and required substantial financing. Attention therefore shifted towards small modular reactors (SMRs). The UAE’s energy-security rationale was less existential, but its ambitions were supported by greater capacity and international cooperation. This enabled it to bring all four reactors at Barakah, in the west of the country, into commercial operation.
Nuclear deployment therefore depends not only on motivation, but on whether states possess or can acquire the necessary capacity. For many newcomer states, international nuclear cooperation provides access to otherwise unavailable capacity. Yet such arrangements also create new long-term dependencies.
Egypt and Türkiye illustrate this trade-off. Russian cooperation supplies much of the capacity required to realise El Dabaa and Akkuyu, although through different models. El Dabaa combines Egyptian ownership with Russian financing, construction, fuel supply, training, and operational assistance. At Akkuyu, the build-own-operate model offered by the Russian state-owned nuclear energy conglomerate Rosatom gives Russia an even larger role in plant construction and operation. Although these projects may reduce exposure to fossil-fuel imports, they create reliance on Rosatom throughout the plant life cycle. Nuclear cooperation therefore reconfigures rather than eliminates external dependence.
Access to nuclear energy capacity is increasingly shaped by geopolitics and vendor acceptability. But for Western and Western-aligned states, cooperation with Russia or China is politically unacceptable
Geopolitics therefore increasingly determines which foreign suppliers governments are willing to work with. States willing to cooperate with Russia retain access to Rosatom. For many Western and Western-aligned states, however, the long-term dependence created by Russian cooperation is politically unacceptable. Chinese vendors may face similar political constraints. This creates a paradox in contemporary international nuclear cooperation. Geopolitical insecurity strengthens demand for nuclear self-sufficiency, but can also restrict the partnerships newcomers need to realise it.
Western and Western-aligned newcomer states thus increasingly depend on politically acceptable vendors to turn nuclear ambitions into operational infrastructure. This remains true despite Rosatom retaining a residual foothold in the EU through Hungary’s increasingly uncertain Paks II project.
Rosatom’s comparative advantage does not lie primarily in on-time delivery. Projects at Akkuyu in Türkiye and Rooppur in Bangladesh have moved beyond their commissioning targets. At Akkuyu, the withholding of key German equipment also disrupted procurement and created delays. Its advantage instead lies in extensive experience delivering integrated, state-backed packages combining financing, construction, and operational support.
The advantage of the nuclear reactor project in Akkuyu, Türkiye, lies in extensive experience of delivering integrated, state-backed packages combining financing, construction, and operational support
Western and allied vendors have offered comparable packages. Yet large-reactor projects at Olkiluoto, Flamanville, Vogtle, and Hinkley Point have exceeded initial schedules and cost projections. These projects are located in established nuclear states, leaving Western suppliers largely untested in countries building their first nuclear programme. Poland provides the most advanced prospective Western-supported newcomer project, but reactor construction has not begun. Possible Western or allied participation in Estonia, Ghana, the Philippines, and Saudi Arabia remains at earlier stages. There is therefore little recent evidence that Western and allied vendors can reliably deliver integrated nuclear packages in newcomer states.
The Barakah nuclear power project offers a hopeful signal that an alternative is possible. Korean-led cooperation delivered it through an integrated package on time and within budget. Yet the project benefited from extensive state-backed financing. It also relied on nuclear-specific institutional capacity developed through international cooperation and sustained domestic political commitment. Barakah therefore demonstrates that an alternative delivery model is viable under favourable conditions. It does not, however, show that the same model will work in newcomer countries with fewer financial and institutional resources. Construction and financing risks remain substantial for newcomer programmes. Until alternative suppliers demonstrate they can deliver projects reliably, on time and within budget, the current revival is unlikely to produce widespread reactor construction in Western newcomer states. Nuclear power may therefore return more strongly in political debate than in new reactors.
