European elections are traditionally seen as less significant than national elections. But Ugur Tekiner argues that the recent challenges facing the EU force us to rethink this classification. Recent European elections accurately reflect the national political mood in Member States, and reveal the growing polarisation around Europe
Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt first labelled European Parliament (EP) elections ‘second-order elections’ in 1980. For Reif and Schmitt, there is less at stake in these elections than in ‘first-order’ parliamentary and presidential elections. EP elections have no binding national consequences, which explains the limited public interest in election campaigns. If voters are not motivated to cast their votes to punish the governing party or support ‘small’ parties, they are unlikely to show up at the ballot box.
This argument has long been influential in making sense of EP elections. Recent events and developments, however, have radically transformed the European political landscape. Over the past few decades, the EU has transformed from a success story (single market, euro, Eastern enlargement) into the one troubled by a polycrisis (financial crisis, refugee crisis, Brexit, Russia-Ukraine War).
This makes it necessary to reconsider the status of EP elections as ‘second-order’. European elections have recently become more significant than expected – for several reasons.
The latest European elections emerged as a strong indicator – even predictor – of national political tendencies. The 2024 EP elections, for instance, saw a clear shift to the right. The pro-European socialist, liberal, and green blocs suffered losses, while anti-EU radical-right parties performed strongly and gained seats. With the formation of two far-right blocs in the EP, around 25% of MEPs now belong to the Eurosceptic camp.
The radical-right surge was confirmed by the general elections held before, during and after the EP elections. In Italy, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy won the general elections in 2022, and continued its rise last year. In the Netherlands, the veteran anti-European Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) was the surprise winner of the 2023 general elections. PVV repeated its strong performance in the European elections.
The latest European elections emerged as a strong indicator – even predictor – of national political tendencies. The 2024 EP elections, for instance, saw a clear shift to the right
In 2024, the Belgian federal elections were held on the same day as the EP elections. After suffering a heavy defeat to right-wing parties (Vlaams Belang and New Flemish Alliance) in both elections, Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo resigned.
But it was in France that last year’s European elections produced the most dramatic outcome. In reaction to the anti-EU Rassemblement National (RN)’s victory in the EP elections, French President Emmanuel Macron gambled on a snap parliamentary election. Although ultimately defeated by the left-wing New Popular Front, RN won the first round to become the largest single party in parliament.
In Germany, the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) pushed Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD) into third place in the last European elections. The party repeated its strong performance in the federal elections this year, finishing in second place behind Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democrats (CDU).
These results tell us an important thing: beyond reflecting the political mood, EP elections may have direct national consequences. The last European elections prompted changes at the highest political levels in Belgium and France.
These elections also call into question some assumptions about different voting patterns in national and European contests. Voters now increasingly favour small ‘protest’ parties in both types of elections. In recent decades, such parties have entered government in member states including Hungary, Poland, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland, and Austria. This even led some mainstream parties to adopt Eurosceptic rhetoric; the Danish Social Democrats’ tougher approach to migration is one such example. The solid link between European and national elections points to the blurring distinctions between ‘mainstream’ and ‘niche’ parties.
EU-linked political polarisation is another factor explaining the increasing importance of European elections. The domestic salience of the European project has risen progressively since the 1986 Single European Act, placing it at the heart of national politics. Recent challenges – including the financial crisis, refugee crisis, and Brexit – have further transformed Europe into a political cleavage.
In a polarised Europe, EP elections have become fiercely contested battles in which voters, politicians, and the media debate key European and national issues
In this polarised environment, EP election campaigns are no longer subdued affairs in which ‘fewer voters learn that elections are being held’. Now, they are fiercely contested battles in which voters, politicians, and the media debate key European and national issues.
The rise of Eurosceptic radical-right parties on the basis of ideological extremism and democratic backsliding has deepened EU-related polarisation. Their extremist positions have made it difficult to discuss key matters like the European Green Deal and migration within a shrinking mainstream consensus. Instead, conspiracy theories, xenophobia, and disinformation have dominated EP election campaigns.
Radical-right parties also seek to fill the political vacuum left by established parties’ failure to address complex crises. In European election campaigns, they have thus promoted radical solutions: opposing further integration, leaving the eurozone, or even withdrawing from the EU.
Radical-right parties seek to fill the political vacuum left by established parties’ failure to address complex crises
Ironically, the strategic use of European elections by the radical right as a pathway to national political dominance has only increased the significance of these elections. The side effect, however, is the diminution of the political centre. This poses a challenge to the EP as well as to some founding member states like Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. The main concern is that mainstream strategies employed against the radical right – such as the cordon sanitaire or political firewall – may, in the not-too-distant-future, cease to work.
European elections accurately reflect domestic political trends and growing EU-linked polarisation. They deserve to be taken seriously. More importantly, the risks and challenges confronting the EU demand such a reassessment. The consistent rise in voter turnout in European elections since 2019 may be good news. But as it becomes harder to secure a pro-European majority in the EP from one election to the next, this could be a hollow victory.
