Europe’s support for the US-Israeli war on Iran, in the hope of securing American backing for Ukraine, was a strategic mistake, argues Shamsoddin Shariati. Rather than buying goodwill in Washington, European leaders undermined their own security, credibility, and strategic autonomy
On 28 February, the US and Israel launched an illegal, unprovoked war against Iran. This war has had devastating consequences for the Iranian people and the wider Middle East. It has also constituted a grave violation of fundamental human rights and international law.
The attacks began with the killing of more than 165 primary school children in Minab. They continued with strikes on residential buildings, hospitals, emergency facilities, cultural sites, sports complexes, and oil storage facilities. Despite this, most European leaders failed to condemn the invasion. Instead, many chose to support America’s war of choice politically and, in some cases, militarily. For example, on 7 April, France and Denmark backed the Bahrain-drafted UN Security Council resolution on the Strait of Hormuz. In doing so, they aligned closely with Washington’s coercive approach than with an immediate ceasefire.
This raises an unavoidable question: why did some key European governments, especially in France and Germany, back this war when they had opposed the Iraq war in 2003 and were then willing to stand up to Washington?
Why did key European governments back this war when they stood up to Washington over the Iraq war in 2003?
The answer lies largely in Europe’s overriding concern: war in Ukraine. European calculations appear to have been shaped first and foremost by that conflict. It seems that many in Europe hoped to secure greater American support for the fight against Russia by backing Trump’s campaign against Iran. This was evident, for example, in the press conference between US President Donald Trump and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Merz moved immediately from endorsing the war to raising the issue of Ukraine. European leaders also had a more tactical motive: by supporting attacks on Iran, they may have believed they could weaken Russia indirectly by degrading Iran’s drone-production capacity.
That calculation is deeply flawed. In fact, it is backfiring against Europe.
First, this war drained precisely the military resources Europe needs to support Ukraine. A recent Payne Institute analysis shows that in the first four days alone, the US used 16% of its THAAD and 15% of its Patriot interceptors. In just three days of fighting in west Asia, the US used more than 800 Patriot missiles. According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, that is more than Ukraine has received in the four years since Russia’s invasion.
Reports also suggest that the US redeployed Patriot systems from South Korea to the Middle East because stocks were running low. That, in turn, risks weakening deterrence in the Pacific, leaving Taiwan more vulnerable to China, and South Korea more exposed to North Korea.
Iran, meanwhile, has the capability to produce around 10,000 drones per month. Throughout the war, up to 8 April 2026, Iran used fewer than 4,000 drones. Far from helping Ukraine, this war has depleted US interceptor reserves essential to Europe’s most urgent security challenge.
| Munition type | Side | Quantity expended (96 hours) | Pre-operative inventory | % of stock consumed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US – Offensive | ||||
| BGM-109 Tomahawk TLAM (Blk IV/V) | US | 375 | 3,200 | 11.7 |
| AGM-158 JASSM / JASSM-ER | US | 135 | 3,500 | 3.9 |
| AGM-88 HARM / AARGM-ER | US | 160 | 4,000 | 4.0 |
| ATACMS + PrSM | US | 225 | 700 | 32.1 |
| GMLRS / GMLRS-ER (HIMARS) | US | 210 | 60,000 | 0.4 |
| Low-cost OWA drones (LUCAS / Scorpion) | US | 200 | 5,000 | 4.0 |
| AGM-114 Hellfire (MQ-9 Reaper) | US | 105 | 25,000 | 0.4 |
| GBU-31/32/38 JDAM (various) | US | 532 | 115,000 | 0.5 |
| GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb | US | 160 | 30,000 | 0.5 |
| GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator | US | 8 | 25 | 32.0 |
| Mk48 Torpedo (US Submarine) | US | 1 | 3,000 | 0.0 |
| AGM-154 JSOW | US | 90 | 5,000 | 1.8 |
| Israel – Offensive | ||||
| Rampage supersonic missile | Israel | 130 | 500 | 26.0 |
| Delilah cruise / loitering missile | Israel | 90 | 500 | 18.0 |
| Popeye Turbo / Crystal Maze II | Israel | 65 | 300 | 21.7 |
| Python / Derby derivatives (SEAD) | Israel | 115 | 2,000 | 5.8 |
| Spice-2000/1000 guided bombs | Israel | 460 | 4,000 | 11.5 |
| Israeli JDAM / smart bombs | Israel | 230 | 8,000 | 2.9 |
| Israel – Defensive | ||||
| Arrow 2 / Arrow 3 | Israel | 80 | 150 | 53.3 |
| David's Sling Stunner | Israel | 65 | 250 | 26.0 |
| Iron Dome Tamir | Israel | 135 | 3,000 | 4.5 |
| Air-to-Air (Python-5/Derby) | Israel | 60 | 2,000 | 3.0 |
| US – Defensive | ||||
| SM-2/SM-3/SM-6 (Navy Aegis) | US | 310 | 2,500 | 12.4 |
| Patriot PAC-2/PAC-3 (US) | US | 325 | 2,500 | 13.0 |
| THAAD (US-operated) | US | 80 | 500 | 16.0 |
| Air-to-Air (AIM-120/AIM-9X) | US | 43 | 14,000 | 0.3 |
| Allied – Defensive | ||||
| Patriot PAC-e (Gulf partners) | Allied | 618 | 4,000 | 15.5 |
| THAAD (Partner-operated) | Allied | 65 | 200 | 32.5 |
| A2A - Kuwait (AIM-120 AMRAAM) | Allied | 3 | 500 | 0.6 |
| A2A - Jordan (AIM-120/AIM-9) | Allied | 12 | 800 | 1.5 |
| A2A - Qatar/Bahrain/UAE (partner fighters) | Allied | 8 | 1,500 | 0.5 |
| Aster (Qatar Navy) interceptors | Allied | 11 | 300 | 3.7 |
| A2A - RAF Typhoon/F-35 (AIM-120/AIM-9X) | Allied | 6 | 5,000 | 0.1 |
| Saudi Patriot (PAC-3/PAC-2 mix) | Allied | 60 | 2,000 | 3.0 |
| Saudi SHORAD / point-defence (Skyguard, etc) | Allied | 25 | 1,000 | 2.5 |
| Total munitions expended (96 hours) | 5,197 |
System | Days left at sustained operational intensity | Status | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arrow 2 / Arrow 3 | 8 | Critical | 53% of stock consumed; 32 months to replenish; no Western equivalent |
| ATACMS + PrSM | 12 | Critical | ATACMS; zero production; PrSM; 120 per year; 32% consumed |
| GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator | 13 | Critical | ~25 ever built; 32% consumed; Boeing sole assembler |
| THAAD (Partner-operated) | 12 | Critical | 32.5% consumed; 96 per year shared line; partner stock thinnest |
| David's Sling Stunner | 15 | Critical | 26% consumed; Rafael expanding from low base; ~$1M+/rd |
| Rampage supersonic missile | 15 | Critical | 26% consumed; newer system; limited production data |
| Popeye Turbo / Crystal Maze II | 18 | Critical | Legacy; being replaced; drawing finite stock |
| Delilah cruise / loitering missile | 22 | Strained | 18% consumed; no export volume for surge |
| THAAD (US-operated) | 25 | Strained | 16% consumed; 96 per year; DACS thruster sole source |
| Patriot PAC-3 (Gulf partners) | 26 | Strained | 15.4% consumed; 618 fired - largest defensive line; FMS queue |
| Patriot PAC-2/PAC-3 (US) | 31 | Strained | 13% consumed; Boeing seeker bottleneck; 620 per year |
| SM-2/SM-3/SM-6 (Navy Aegis) | 32 | Strained | SM-6: ~500 ever built; 63 hrs / unit seeker |
| Spice-2000/1000 guided bombs | 35 | Strained | 11.5% consumed; Israel's primary PGM kit |
| BGM-109 Tomahawk TLAM (Blk IV/V) | 34 | Strained | 11.7% consumed but 52.9 months to replenish at 85 per year |
Europe’s support for this war normalised Trump’s contempt for international law. The two-week ceasefire shows clearly that Trump failed to achieve his objectives in Iran. He may therefore seek another dramatic foreign-policy confrontation to present to the American public as a ‘major achievement’ ahead of the November midterm elections. Despite that failure, he is still presenting the outcome to his supporters as a 'victory'. That narrative of triumph may also embolden him to repeat the pattern elsewhere, including over Greenland. In that sense, both defeat and claimed victory now push in the same direction.
After failing in Iran, Trump may seek another foreign-policy confrontation to present to the American public as a ‘major achievement’ ahead of the midterms
Either way, Europe has lost the moral and legal ground from which to object. In backing this war, Europe has not only undermined international law. It has also weakened its own case on Greenland’s sovereignty, Russia’s territorial aggression, and any future Chinese move on Taiwan.
This war could become not just an oil shock, but a gas shock for Europe. The Strait of Hormuz carries roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply, and Iran’s blockade has driven energy prices sharply higher. Despite the US-Iran ceasefire announced on 8 April, regional stability has not yet been restored. Tensions in the Persian Gulf remain high, and traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is still far below normal levels.
Damage to Iranian gas facilities, and Tehran’s retaliation against Persian Gulf infrastructure, widened the crisis. Qatar halted production of liquid natural gas (LNG) in March. Iranian strikes knocked out 17% of Qatar’s LNG export capacity for three to five years. For a Europe that relies on LNG for 45% of its gas imports, this has led to dearer electricity, greater strain on industry, and greater energy insecurity.
Russia, meanwhile, stands to gain from the turmoil, profiting from higher prices and stronger demand for its energy exports in Asian markets. Trump eased pressure on Russian as well as Iranian oil to contain price spikes. This has eroded European sanctions and given Moscow more revenue for its war in Ukraine. At the same time, Iran is managing traffic through the Strait of Hormuz in a way that preserves China-linked shipping. This allows Beijing to avoid the disruption while its rivals absorb the cost. Even during the war, Iran continued exporting oil to China and elsewhere at higher than normal levels.
Europe must confront a hard truth: the United States no longer sees Europe as an ally. Trump has shown no respect for historic alliances and international commitments. His recent remarks indicate that he is likely to withdraw the US from NATO soon. Trump and his administration resent what they describe as 'bailing Europe out' and routinely accuse Europeans of freeloading. Europe is not buying goodwill in Washington. It is indulging a president and an administration that hold it in open contempt, dismissing Europe’s support as too little and too late.
It is dangerously naïve to imagine that supporting his war against Iran will persuade Trump to defend Europe more firmly against Russia
It is dangerously naïve to imagine that supporting his war against Iran will persuade Trump to defend Europe more firmly against Russia. Nor will it make him abandon his ambitions to annex Greenland. This war has significantly assisted Russia financially, strategically, and politically. And it has drained American air-defence stocks, while showing little sign of degrading Iran’s overall drone capacity.
Trump does not respond to loyalty, gratitude, or appeals to principle. He responds to leverage and power. Europe will not protect its interests by flattering him, endorsing an illegal war, or displaying weakness. It will do so by acting independently and asserting its own political strength.
