The 2026 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) revealed a treaty still alive, but under strain. Yet the real danger, argues Leonardo Bandarra, may be less dramatic than collapse. States may keep praising the NPT, while trusting it less. The myth of Orpheus offers a simple warning about what may be at stake

Between 27 April and 22 May 2026, diplomats, experts, and civil society representatives gathered at the United Nations in New York for the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, often described as the cornerstone of the global nuclear order. This year’s conference opened under an unusually pessimistic cloud.

After one long day of side events and meetings, I went with a friend to see a Broadway musical: a modern retelling of the Greek myth of Orpheus and Eurydice. Sitting there, I found myself thinking about the NPT. The connection may seem unlikely. But Orpheus is more than a love story. It is a story about trust when certainty is impossible. That is also the daily condition of nuclear politics.

Walking without seeing: verification and uncertainty

The myth is familiar. Orpheus descends into the underworld to rescue Eurydice, his lost love. Moved by his determination, Hades allows them to leave — but under one condition: Orpheus must walk ahead without turning around. He cannot see Eurydice. He can only hear her footsteps. If he looks back too soon, she will disappear forever.

This was a test of trust under uncertainty. Orpheus had no full proof. He had only signs: footsteps, sounds, fragments. For most of the journey, he keeps going. Then doubt takes over. Just before the end, he turns around. Eurydice was there. Then she was gone.

Nuclear politics operates under similar conditions. The NPT is built around an agreement made under uncertainty. Non-nuclear-weapon states committed to refrain from developing nuclear weapons; nuclear-weapon states committed to pursue disarmament; all parties retained the right to peaceful nuclear technology.

The NPT is built around an agreement made under uncertainty. States do not directly observe one another’s intentions; instead, they rely on institutions and verification for reassurance

But states do not directly observe one another’s intentions. Instead, they rely on institutions and verification for reassurance. IAEA safeguards, arms control reporting and inspection, and the monitoring system linked to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty provide credible evidence of compliance. They cannot eliminate uncertainty, but they can make it manageable. They allow states to keep walking.

A fragile review process

The arrangement has worked better than many early pessimists expected. More than 50 years after entering into force, the NPT remains one of the most widely adhered-to treaties in history. The spread of nuclear weapons has been far more limited than many feared during the Cold War. Yet the 2026 conference revealed how fragile this architecture has become.

The Review Conference showed a familiar pattern: states publicly reaffirmed the importance of the NPT while privately worrying about where it is heading. Delegates worked on a draft outcome document under the presidency of Ambassador Đỗ Hùng Việt of Vietnam. Yet important disagreements remained unresolved, including issues of compliance with safeguards commitments by Iran — the bracketed paragraph 15.

Disagreements, however, went beyond that paragraph. Nuclear-weapon states continue modernising their arsenals, while many non-nuclear-weapon states express frustration over the lack of visible progress on disarmament. Concerns over nuclear risk reduction, threats of renewed nuclear testing, and the collapse of arms control arrangements kept returning during discussions.

At the NPT Review Conference in May, states raised concerns over nuclear risk reduction, threats of renewed nuclear testing, and the collapse of arms control arrangements

There is broad agreement that the NPT matters. There is much less agreement on what success now looks like. The danger may not be a dramatic collapse of the treaty itself. It may instead emerge through something more gradual: a weakening of confidence that the process still works, after 16 years without a consensus agreement.

What would 'looking back' mean?

Orpheus looked back because he needed certainty. The danger for the NPT may be similar.

'Looking back' could take several forms:

• States deciding that multilateral verification is insufficient and relying increasingly on unilateral assessments, as in US accusations of a Chinese nuclear test.
• Countries concluding that others are no longer genuinely committed to disarmament and adjusting their security calculations accordingly, as reflected in the ongoing modernisation of nuclear programmes in all nuclear-weapon states and the fragmentation of European nuclear policy.
• Growing acceptance of nuclear weapons as permanent and necessary instruments of power, potentially leading to further erosion of the non-proliferation norm and an increase in nuclear-armed states.

Some of these developments are already occurring. Like Orpheus, actors may not act with bad intentions. They may act out of fear, doubt, and the suspicion that the footsteps they hear behind them are no longer convincing enough.

Confidence is built, not wished into existence

The lesson of the myth is not blind trust. Trust in international politics does not mean believing that others are honest or benevolent. It means building institutions that allow cooperation despite uncertainty. States and civil society have a role to play.

Three areas discussed throughout the conference could help build resilience in today’s nuclear order:

First, strengthen risk reduction and transparency. Better communication, clearer doctrines, and greater transparency can reduce the space for misunderstanding.

Second, reinforce verification. Continued support for IAEA safeguards, progress toward the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and stronger work on nuclear disarmament verification can help turn suspicion into evidence. Civil society has a useful role here, including through initiatives such as VeSPoTec, Expand, VCDNP, and VERTIC’s regional hubs.

Third, solidify regional approaches, including nuclear-weapon-free zones and efforts toward a Middle East zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Regional initiatives can create political space when global negotiations stall.

To build resilience in today's nuclear order, states and institutions should strengthen risk reduction and transparency, reinforce verification, and solidify regional approaches

These measures do not eliminate uncertainty. They only need to provide enough confidence for states to keep moving. They could also offer a minimum point of agreement in the next review cycle, if pursued from the start.

The NPT will not vanish like Eurydice. But survival is a poor measure of success. Institutions can endure while their purpose fades. The real danger is not uncertainty. It is losing confidence just when confidence is most needed.

☢️ No.37 in a series on the Nuclear Politics Paradox