The European Union is missing a strategic opportunity to expand its northern borders, says Tomas Caprara. Before the August referendum in Iceland, Brussels should show openness towards exceptions on fisheries, the thorniest issue for the Union’s northern neighbours
Under the European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), EU Member States must respect fishing quotas and bans. This framework sits uneasily with the sea-dependent economies of Northern Europe. In Iceland, for example, fishing accounts for almost a quarter of the country's GDP, far above the scale envisaged under EU quotas. Norway, Iceland, Greenland, the UK and the Faroe Islands all have agreements with the EU on shared fish stocks. Yet the Nordic coastal states set their own quotas unilaterally, often allowing intensive fishing of unregulated stocks, particularly mackerel.
Brussels’ approach should reflect the Union’s larger geopolitical interests. Derogations already exist under the EU Cohesion Policy (Art. 349 TFEU), including for the French Overseas Territories, Spain's and Portugal's outermost regions, and the sparsely populated north of Sweden and Finland. Granting Iceland and Norway similar exceptions to the CFP would help smooth their path towards EU membership. The Commission should not surrender to extractivist demands but it could recognise their unique geographic circumstances through higher fishing quotas, making membership more politically attractive.
Iceland and Norway share a strong European and Western orientation. These two NATO members are also part of the European Economic Area (EEA), the single market, Schengen and several EU initiatives. EEA membership requires these countries to follow EU rules, and their domestic legislation reflects EU standards in many fields. Yet they adopt rules without helping shape them. They have no seats in the European Parliament, no Commissioner, and no vote in the institutions whose legislation they implement. Full membership would resolve this democratic deficit. Iceland and Norway behave like members, yet the EU appears content to keep them outside.
The current political alignment offers a rare opportunity to change that. Iceland has its most pro-EU government in decades. In 2015, it unilaterally withdrew its candidacy after six years of negotiations. Since then, Reykjavík has moved closer to EU standards on sustainable fishing practices while politically distancing itself from Brussels.
Iceland and Norway behave like members of the European Union, yet the EU appears content to keep them outside
The current government coalition creates a new opening. The Foreign Minister's Liberal Party campaigned for an August 2026 referendum on resuming negotiations. Greater flexibility on fishing quotas would demonstrate Brussels' willingness to compromise and strengthen the case for renewed engagement. Although Norway has already rejected membership twice, the last vote was more than 30 years ago. Younger Norwegians want to reopen the debate and indeed support for EU integration has risen there too. Norway is tied to several EU defence and security arrangements with the European Defence Agency (EDA), Frontex and the European Defence Fund (EDF). In some policy areas, Norway is already more integrated with the EU than some Member States. At the same time, Oslo has faced repeated pressure from the United States, including over Nobel Peace Prize decisions. Against this backdrop, visible goodwill from Brussels could reinforce pro-European sentiment and encourage Norway to move beyond its current halfway status.
Several contributors to this series have argued that further enlargement will take the form of phased integration, allowing countries to join selected policies before full membership. This approach assumes that traditional enlargement has reached its limits.
Norway and Iceland, however, present a different case. They are already deeply integrated, stable democracies, with a strategic location and rich in natural resources. Their accession would strengthen the Union without substantially increasing concerns about democratic backsliding or institutional capacity. Tensions nevertheless persist.
The accession to the EU of Norway and Iceland would strengthen the Union without substantially increasing concerns about democratic backsliding or institutional capacity
Last November, the EU Trade Commissioner announced that the EU would not exempt Norway and Iceland from import quotas on ferroalloy products. Even if Brussels intends to increase the costs of remaining outside the Union, such decisions weaken pro-European voices in Oslo and Reykjavík. The EU now needs to provide incentives as well as pressure to close the remaining gap between association and membership.
Geopolitics now drives this debate. Russia's war against Ukraine has revived enlargement in the east, while strategic competition in the Arctic has intensified. Norway, Iceland and Greenland have become increasingly important. At the same time, the United States has shown a growing strategic interest in the North Atlantic. Milada Anna Vachudova, in this series, points out that insecurity generated by the United States may be the main catalyst for European integration, as Denmark's experience has shown. Brussels must demonstrate that benefits extend beyond current membership while making it clear that full participation still matters when it comes to security guarantees.
The EU now needs to provide incentives as well as pressure to close the remaining gap between association and membership
Bringing Norway and Iceland into the EU would benefit both sides. It would grant the EU access to new resources, markets and a strategic location, while renewing the legitimacy of enlargement. Norway and Iceland would finally gain representation in the institutions whose rules they already follow.
If European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen aims at a geopolitical Commission, the Arctic cannot remain an afterthought. The Commission should use it while it can. Fishing quotas are only the immediate issue. The larger objective is to strengthen Europe's security, resilience and geopolitical position. If threats increasingly come from both east and west, the EU's strategic horizon lies to the north. If this reunification of Europe comes true, Donald Trump may deserve some credit — not the Nobel Peace Prize, but perhaps the Charlemagne Prize.
No.41 in a Loop series on 🧭 EU enlargement dilemmas
