US-Pakistan ties have repeatedly deepened during geopolitical crises and weakened when the emergency passed. Saima Afzal argues that the latest opening may prove more durable precisely because it is less ambitious: trade, technology, critical minerals and counterterrorism can each sustain cooperation without requiring grand strategic alignment
US-Pakistan relations may become more durable by becoming less ambitious. For decades, Washington and Islamabad built unusually close ties around unusually large crises. The Cold War, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the post-9/11 campaign against terrorism each produced intense cooperation. When the strategic emergency faded, so did much of the relationship.
The emerging model looks different. Instead of depending on one overriding geopolitical bargain, cooperation is spreading across several narrower areas: trade, technology, critical minerals and counterterrorism.
None is likely to transform the relationship on its own. That may be precisely the point. A bilateral relationship with several independent reasons for cooperation may prove more resilient than one built around a single crisis.
The sentencing of ISIS-K operative Mohammad Sharifullah on 16 September 2026 illustrates both the continuing importance and the limitations of the traditional security relationship. A US federal court sentenced Sharifullah to twenty years in prison for supporting ISIS-K operations, including preparations for the 2021 Abbey Gate bombing that killed thirteen US servicemembers and approximately 160 civilians. Pakistani forces apprehended him in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region in 2025 before he was transferred to US custody. Pakistan described the operation as part of longstanding intelligence cooperation between the two countries.
History suggests that cooperation on counterterrorism alone cannot provide a stable foundation for the US-Pakistan relationship
This was consequential cooperation. But history suggests that counterterrorism alone cannot provide a stable foundation for the entire relationship. Washington and Islamabad have repeatedly cooperated when a common threat has been urgent. The harder problem has been sustaining engagement once their priorities begin to diverge.
A more durable relationship therefore requires forms of cooperation that do not depend on both countries perceiving the same threat at the same time.
Trade already provides one such foundation. US goods and services trade with Pakistan reached an estimated $11.5 billion in 2025, an increase of 14% over the previous year. Goods trade accounted for $8.5 billion and services for another $2.9 billion.
These figures remain modest compared with America's largest trading relationships. Their political significance lies elsewhere: commercial exchange does not require Washington and Islamabad to agree on Afghanistan, China, India or the wider regional order.
Technology strengthens this logic. Pakistan's ICT-services exports reached approximately $3.8 billion in fiscal year 2025, with software, consultancy and freelance services increasingly important components of its external economy.
For US companies, Pakistan offers software talent and a growing digital-services market. For Pakistani firms, the United States provides access to capital, technology networks and higher-value markets. This differs from the security bargains that historically dominated bilateral ties. Companies can continue doing business even when governments disagree on geopolitical questions.
For US companies, Pakistan offers software talent and a growing digital-services market. For Pakistani firms, the US provides access to capital, technology networks and higher-value markets
Economics is not immune from politics. Regulatory uncertainty, macroeconomic instability, infrastructure weaknesses and security risks can deter long-term investment. But deeper commercial ties can create incentives for continued engagement that do not disappear automatically when a military crisis ends.
Critical minerals add another layer because they connect commercial interests with economic security.
Pakistan's strongest case is not that it has already become a major critical-minerals supplier. It is that projects such as Reko Diq, one of the world's largest undeveloped copper-gold deposits, could eventually connect Pakistan to supply chains increasingly important for electricity grids, datacentres, and advanced manufacturing.
Yet Reko Diq also demonstrates why strategic potential should not be confused with commercial reality.
In April 2026, Barrick Mining Corporation announced that it would slow development and extend its review of the project amid heightened security risks. The review covers security conditions, financing, capital requirements, project scope and timing.
The lesson extends beyond Pakistan. Geological resources acquire geopolitical significance only when states and companies can provide the infrastructure, financing, regulatory confidence and physical security required to develop them. Minerals could therefore strengthen US-Pakistan ties, but only if commercial viability precedes strategic rhetoric.
Counterterrorism will nevertheless remain important. The two countries continue to share concerns about ISIS-K and other transnational militant networks. Pakistan's intelligence networks, and its proximity to Afghanistan, give it continuing relevance to threats emerging from the region.
But the important change is structural. Counterterrorism no longer needs to carry the entire bilateral relationship. If security cooperation weakens temporarily, trade can continue. If a mineral project stalls, technology ties can still expand. If political disagreements intensify, intelligence cooperation can survive where threat perceptions overlap.
This creates a more modular relationship: disagreement in one area need not derail cooperation in another. That makes the overall relationship potentially more resilient.
The limits to US-Pakistan alignment remain substantial. China will remain central to Pakistan's economic and strategic calculations. India will remain central to US policy in Asia. Pakistan will continue developing relations across the Gulf, Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia. A durable US-Pakistan relationship therefore cannot depend on either country expecting geopolitical exclusivity from the other.
The emerging model is less dramatic than the grand bargains of the past. Trade can grow because firms see commercial opportunity. Technology cooperation can expand because skills and markets complement one another. Mineral projects can proceed when they become bankable. Counterterrorism can continue where threat perceptions overlap.
A durable US-Pakistan relationship cannot depend on either country expecting geopolitical exclusivity from the other
Each pillar is narrower than the strategic partnerships that defined earlier phases of the relationship. Collectively, however, they give Washington and Islamabad several reasons to remain engaged even when they disagree elsewhere.
This does not guarantee durability. Mineral investment can be undermined by insecurity. Technology exports do not create strategic alignment. Counterterrorism cooperation can coexist with serious policy differences.
But that is precisely why the current model may prove sustainable. A more durable relationship requires cooperation that does not depend on both countries perceiving the same threat.
