When the US repeatedly bluffs and backs down, it no longer looks like strategy and starts to look like a pattern. Fubu Ngubu argues that Europe has begun to recognise this pattern of retreat, and is adjusting accordingly
The real question in relation to US international leadership is no longer whether it is consistent, but what happens when others stop believing that it is. This matters for Europe, because for decades, European governments have operated within clear limits set by Washington. Even when they disagreed, they rarely pushed too far. The costs of crossing the United States was simply too high. But what if those costs are no longer as credible as once seemed?
To understand this subtle shift, we must first look at the new US pattern of leadership.
The record under Trump 2.0 suggests a recurring dynamic: escalation followed by retreat when opposition holds firm. A pattern often described informally as TACO or Trump Always Chickens Out, it is less about rhetoric and more about perception.
It is about a growing perception that pressure can be resisted without triggering the full consequences that were once expected.
Take the Greenland episode. What began as an extraordinary proposal to acquire territory from Denmark quickly collapsed when European leaders pushed back. The idea did not evolve into a prolonged standoff. It simply disappeared from serious political discussion.
We see the same pattern in repeated tariff threats against allies, including the European Union, with which the US has trade amounting to around €1.68 trillion.
Announcements were often bold, but implementation was frequently delayed, diluted, or abandoned once resistance became costly for the US.
Trump is prone to bold announcements, but he often delays, dilutes or abandons his stated aims once resistance becomes costly for the US
One could argue this is because Europe is largely democratic and the US is reluctant to go through with the threats on other democracies.
However, even beyond Europe, this pattern has appeared in confrontations where actors refused to immediately bend under US pressure, including tensions involving the Houthis and, more recently, Iran.
While the contexts differ, the broader signal remains the same: threats are not always followed by decisive action.
These are not isolated missteps. They send a signal. And signals matter in international politics.
For European governments, the implication is straightforward. If US threats are not always carried through, the cost of dissent is lower than previously assumed.
This does not mean Europe suddenly becomes independent. But it does mean that the boundaries of acceptable disagreement are shifting.
In international politics, perception shapes behaviour as much as material power. If allies begin to believe that firm resistance is possible without severe punishment, they are more likely to test alternative positions.
This is where Europe’s position on Israel becomes especially revealing.
The shift is becoming visible in Europe’s response to Israel and the war in Gaza, or the response to join the military operations against Iran. Europe remains divided, but there is a noticeable change in tone among some governments.
In several countries, calls for ceasefires have become more direct, and references to international humanitarian law more explicit.
Some governments have shown greater openness to accountability measures that would have been politically sensitive in the past. These include debates over suspending economic ties to Israel, or the recognition of Palestine as a state by many European countries amid strong opposition from both Washington and Tel Aviv.
There are also symbolic political signals. Hungarian prime minister-elect Péter Magyar, for example, said that Hungary would enforce the international arrest warrant against Benjamin Netanyahu if he arrived on Hungarian soil.
European leaders who might previously have avoided public disagreement with Washington are now testing how far they can go
Only a few years ago, such statements would have been far more difficult to imagine politically.
This is not a dramatic break with Washington. But neither is it business as usual.
What we are seeing is a gradual widening of political space. European leaders who might previously have avoided public disagreement are now testing how far they can go. They are doing so in a context where US pressure no longer appears decisive or predictable.
Domestic politics matter. Public protests across European cities, electoral pressures, and sustained mobilisation by civil society have pushed governments to respond more forcefully.
Internal divisions within Europe also play a role. Some states remain closely aligned with Washington, while others see the association with Trump as a political liability.
But ignoring the US dimension would miss an important part of the story. Foreign policy is not just about preferences. It is about constraints. And when a key constraint weakens, behaviour changes.
What emerges is not European autonomy in any full sense, but something more incremental and perhaps more realistic: conditional alignment.
European governments still value the transatlantic relationship, but they are less willing to defer automatically when US positions appear unstable or politically constrained.
European governments are less willing to defer automatically to the US when American positions appear unstable or politically constrained
In this sense, perceived US retreat does not directly produce European assertiveness. It makes it possible.
The case of Israel is therefore more than a regional issue. It is a test of whether Europe is willing to act on its stated commitments when the costs of doing so appear lower and manageable. It is also a test of how far US influence extends when credibility is in question.
The broader implication is uncomfortable but hard to ignore. Power is not only about military strength or economic leverage; it’s about whether others believe you will follow through. And once that belief starts to erode, even slightly, the system begins to adjust.
Europe is not breaking away from the United States. But it is watching more closely, calculating more independently and, in some cases, pushing a little further than before.
That may not look like a dramatic shift. But in international politics, these small recalibrations are often where larger changes begin.
