Most explanations of migrants’ political participation focus on what happens after migration, such as citizenship, institutional access and socioeconomic incorporation. But this is only part of the story. Using data from 23 European countries, Zeynep Menteşoğlu Tardivo and Simona Guglielmi find that origin-country political culture has a lasting influence on political participation
Why do some migrants engage in politics while others do not? Our research, in line with the ‘impressionable years’ argument, suggests that an important part of the answer lies in early political socialisation. Migrants do not arrive in the country of residence as political blank slates. They bring deeply ingrained political attitudes and norms shaped by the political culture of their country of origin. These early experiences may persist long after arrival. They shape how migrants relate to democratic institutions and politics in the new country.
This matters because research often explains migrants’ political participation mainly through what happens after migration. This includes institutional access, citizenship policies, residence-country integration frameworks, and socioeconomic incorporation. These factors clearly matter. But they do not fully explain why some migrants remain politically inactive even after many years of residence or after acquiring citizenship.
We argue that both pre-migration political socialisation and post-migration exposure shape migrants’ political incorporation. To examine this, we use European Social Survey (ESS) data collected between 2010 and 2023 across 23 EU member states. We combine these data with V-Dem democracy scores to capture the political context of migrants’ countries of origin.
The first takeaway is that socioeconomic status matters, but it does not fully explain migrants’ political participation. Native-born respondents report the highest turnout. Second-generation immigrants come next. First-generation immigrants show the lowest participation.
Political participation is not simply a matter of who has more education or more income – at least not for all
Education and income increase voting, but they matter differently across migrant generations. First-generation immigrants remain disadvantaged even when they are highly educated or economically secure. By contrast, second-generation immigrants look much more similar to natives. Education and income work more similarly across those two groups. In other words, resources matter, but they do not close the participation gap for immigrants, especially for the first generation.
That finding already points to the limits of standard resource-based explanations. Political participation is not simply a matter of who has more education or more income, at least not for all.
The most striking result appears when we look at the political culture of origin. Once we account for individual-level differences, immigrants from non-democratic regimes show higher electoral participation than immigrants from democratic origins. At first glance, this may seem counterintuitive.
In raw terms, migrants from democratic origins often appear more likely to vote. But they are also, on average, older, more politically interested, better educated, and more economically secure. Once we take these differences into account, the effect of autocratic origin becomes visible.
Immigrants from non-democratic regimes show higher electoral participation than immigrants from democratic origins. Why?
We interpret this as evidence that migration to a democratic country can open political opportunities that were previously unavailable. Higher participation among immigrants from authoritarian contexts may therefore reflect a release of suppressed political agency rather than an internalisation of undemocratic norms. Migrants may evaluate democratic institutions in the country of residence against weaker or more repressive institutions in the origin context. This can, in turn, make political participation more meaningful, not less.
So, we should not assume that migrants are politically disengaged from the outset. Experiences under autocracy do not necessarily reduce participation after migration. Under some conditions, such experiences may instead make migrants more politically active.
At the same time, what happens after migration also matters. We find that both early arrival and longer residence increase electoral participation. Immigrants who arrive before the age of 13 are more likely to vote than those who arrive later. More years spent in the country of residence also increases participation. This suggests that early socialisation in the country of residence, and longer exposure to democratic institutions, foster political incorporation.
The earlier migrants arrive in the country of residence, and the longer they spend there, the more likely they are to participate in politics
We also find that the role of origin political culture is most evident among first-generation migrants, and that it weakens across later generations. This points to a generational shift. Parental political experiences and intergenerational transmissions may still shape second-generation participation, but over time, the residence-country context matters more. In short, the influence of origin-country political culture persists, but not equally across generations.
We should interpret these findings with caution. The ESS lacks information on migrants’ motivations for moving, so we cannot assess how different migration paths shape participation. Neither does it tell us precisely when the migrants acquired citizenship. Part of the effect of length of stay may thus reflect differences in voting eligibility.
Our results therefore contribute to a broader effort to understand migrants’ political incorporation. They also highlight the importance of further research on this topic.
Still, the broader message is clear. Migrants’ political incorporation, at least in our sample, does not follow a simple linear path. More time, more exposure, and more resources do not automatically produce more participation. What happens before migration matters too.
Understanding migrants’ political incorporation in Europe therefore requires us to look not only at what happens after migration, but also at the political legacies migrants bring with them.
