🧭 The risks of wartime politicisation of enlargement 

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine forced the EU to revive its enlargement agenda, but growing politicisation risks sidelining the Western Balkans yet again. Miruna Butnaru-Troncotă argues that the EU's future credibility and cohesion hinge on treating Western Balkan integration just as urgently as Eastern enlargement 

Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced the EU to revive its long-stalled enlargement agenda. It also exposed the deep-rooted political obstacles that have repeatedly undermined progress. Enlargement debates today are no longer about ‘if’, but about ‘when’ and ‘how’. As Veronica Anghel argues in this series' foundational blog – and as contributions from Maryna Rabinovich and Jelena Džankić affirm – enlargement is now a strategic necessity, not a discretionary policy. Yet the urgency injected by war also spotlights a forgotten corner of the EU’s enlargement map: the Western Balkans. Here, accession processes have languished for more than 15 years, creating a dangerous credibility gap. 

Accession processes have languished in the Western Balkans for more than 15 years, creating a dangerous credibility gap

Beyond the resurgence of solidarity and bold rhetoric, the Russia-Ukraine war has also intensified scepticism among member states. This is fuelling what I call the ‘wartime politicisation’ of enlargement. This emerging dynamic carries profound risks, particularly for Western Balkan countries, where hopes for integration slip further out of reach. How the EU responds will be a litmus test of its ability to turn external threats into internal resilience. The Union’s credibility and cohesion hinge not just on supporting Ukraine and Moldova, but on treating Western Balkan integration as an urgent and equally central priority. 

The new wartime politicisation 

Enlargement has always been politicised, sparking controversies across supranational and national arenas. But after February 2022, debates around enlargement became an even sharper arena for contestation. Wartime politicisation of enlargement has stabilising and destabilising effects, particularly for Western Balkan countries. 

The war unlocked important breakthroughs: Albania and North Macedonia started accession talks in July 2022; Bosnia and Herzegovina gained candidate status and launched negotiations in March 2024. Kosovo applied for membership in December 2022 and secured visa liberalisation by January 2024. 

Wartime politicisation of enlargement had stabilising effects for some countries, but instability worsened in Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia

Yet instability also worsened. Serbia refused to align with EU sanctions against Russia, a new security crisis erupted in Kosovo, and Bosnia faced renewed secession threats

Two major factors fuel wartime politicisation: growing enlargement scepticism among influential member states, and tensions between the EU Council and Commission over the process’s future direction. 

National vetoes make enlargement a battlefield 

Diverging approaches within the EU further complicated efforts to advance Western Balkan integration. Clashes between member states and institutional bodies left the region mired in indefinite waiting. 

The member states that vetoed enlargement in the Council were Greece, France, the Netherlands, and Bulgaria. Greece initially blocked North Macedonia over the name dispute, a veto that was lifted following the Prespa Agreement in 2018. However, France’s veto in November 2019 marked one of the strongest examples of politicising enlargement, as it pushed for a broader reform of the enlargement methodology. This was followed in 2020 by another unexpected veto, this time by Bulgaria, against North Macedonia, citing disputes over historical interpretation and language. In June 2021, the Dutch Parliament also vetoed the start of accession negotiations with Albania, citing concerns over corruption and the rule of law. What began as technical concerns soon escalated into politicised, nationally-driven blockages. 

These vetoes were not just procedural hurdles of a technical nature; they signalled how national politics could hijack EU enlargement. Enlargement turned from a meritocratic process into a battlefield of conflicting interests. Politicisation took centre stage. 

The risks of enlargement scepticism 

Over the past three years, the EU has taken strategic decisions that reshaped its foreign policy trajectory. By 2030, enlargement decisions will become the definitive test of whether the Union can transform external risks into shared responsibilities.

Public scepticism about enlargement varies considerably across EU countries. Overall, however, ECFR data shows that it has risen over the last decade. As of 2024, 54% of respondents in member states favour EU enlargement, while 40% are against it. As recent reports show, in traditionally hesitant countries, such as France, Denmark, Austria, the Netherlands, and Germany, citizens' reservations about enlargement remain high. The lowest support for new countries joining the EU in the near future is in France (37%) and Austria (35%). Member states must try harder to debunk this scepticism and communicate to citizens the benefits of enlargement for EU security. 

Member states must try harder to debunk enlargement scepticism and communicate the benefits of enlargement for EU security  

In today’s security climate, enlargement is strategic, not optional. EU leaders must abandon the view of enlargement as charity and recognise it as a core pillar of geopolitical resilience. Advancing the integration of all candidate countries, including the Western Balkans, must remain a priority in the current institutional cycle. 

Reducing the risks of politicisation 

To reduce politicisation, the EU must address the deep dissatisfaction among Western Balkan candidates. Politicisation has already demotivated reform efforts and, in Serbia’s case, even fostered democratic backsliding. 

The EU needs to move beyond a top-down enlargement model toward a multi-level, bottom-up approach that engages civil society. It must take seriously movements like the ongoing student-led protests in Serbia against President Vučić’s autocratic governance. 

EU credibility and cohesion hinge on treating Western Balkan integration with the same urgency as Eastern enlargement. Offering Western Balkan countries a clear accession timeline is a crucial first step. In 2025’s precarious reality, as the Trump administration threatens transatlantic ties, the stakes for a more unified, strategic EU have never been higher. 

No.16 in a Loop series on 🧭 EU enlargement dilemmas

This article presents the views of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the ECPR or the Editors of The Loop.

Author

photograph of Miruna Butnaru-Troncotă
Miruna Butnaru-Troncotă
Professor and Director of the Centre of European Studies, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest

Miruna is a writer and researcher specialising in EU foreign and security policy.

Her main field of expertise is EU foreign policy, Europeanisation, EU integration, Black Sea politics and the post-conflict reconstruction of the Western Balkans.

She has published numerous academic articles and policy papers in this field.

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