The EU's ambition to strengthen defence cooperation is exposing new tensions at the heart of EU leadership. Maya Ikene argues that the Future Combat Air System reveals the limits of the Franco-German 'engine' of European integration and why future European defence initiatives may require broader coalitions beyond Paris and Berlin
The Future Combat Air System (FCAS) was intended as a flagship next-generation fighter jet programme for European defence cooperation. But the programme has stoked tensions which reveal the changing nature and growing limits of Franco-German leadership in the EU.
When France and Germany disagree, European integration often slows down. Tensions surrounding the FCAS illustrate this dynamic. The project was once presented as a symbol of European defence cooperation and strategic autonomy. Now, it has increasingly become a source of industrial rivalry, political tension and strategic disagreement between Paris and Berlin.
At first glance, the FCAS dispute may appear to be a technical disagreement over defence procurement and industrial leadership. In reality, it reflects a broader question at the heart of European politics: to what extent can the Franco-German partnership still function as the engine of European integration?
Since the early years of European integration, cooperation between France and Germany has often been described as the 'engine' of the EU. The idea is simple: when Paris and Berlin reach a compromise, the rest of the EU usually follows.
After the Second World War, the 1963 Élysée Treaty, which created regular meetings and close cooperation between the two governments, institutionalised this relationship.
Political scientists often describe this relationship as embedded bilateralism, a concept to explain how France and Germany negotiate compromises between themselves before presenting them to the wider EU as joint proposals. This approach has helped shape major milestones of European integration, including the creation of the single market, the euro, and the Schengen area. However, this leadership model has never worked automatically.
Research on the Franco-German partnership shows that it tends to be most effective during moments of crisis, when the costs of political inaction are high, and governments need coordinated responses. Recent European crises illustrate this pattern. During the Eurozone crisis, Brexit negotiations and the Covid-19 recovery plan, joint initiatives by France and Germany helped shape broader European solutions.
The Franco-German partnership is effective during crises such as Covid-19, but it has not produced a unified response on the war in Ukraine
In calmer political situations, however, the Franco-German engine tends to slow down. Even in periods of geopolitical tension, urgency does not always translate into coordination. While the EU faces significant security challenges, from the war in Ukraine to uncertainty in transatlantic relations, these pressures have not produced a unified Franco-German response on long-term initiatives. When urgency fails to generate a common position in Paris and Berlin, national interests and strategic differences tend to re-emerge. The tensions surrounding the FCAS provide a clear illustration of this dynamic.
FCAS is a major European defence project intended to develop a new generation of combat aircraft. The system is expected to replace France’s Rafale and Germany’s Eurofighter fleet by 2040.
Beyond its technological ambition, the EU has framed FCAS as a step toward strengthening its defence capabilities and advancing debates on strategic autonomy. Yet, the project has repeatedly faced delays and disagreements.
One important source of tension concerns industrial competition. The French company Dassault Aviation wants to maintain a leading role in aircraft design. Meanwhile, Airbus Defence & Space, which represents major parts of the German aerospace industry, is pushing for greater control over development and production. Negotiations over intellectual property, industrial leadership and technological responsibilities have repeatedly slowed down the programme.
Progress with FCAS has slowed due to French and German negotiations over intellectual property and industrial leadership, which undermines it as a unified European project
At the same time, the FCAS debate reflects broader strategic differences between France and Germany. France often views European defence cooperation as a means to strengthen strategic autonomy and reduce dependence on the United States. Germany, by contrast, remains strongly committed to the NATO framework and emphasises interoperability with transatlantic partners.
These different perspectives undermine FCAS as a unified European project.
The FCAS conflict shows a broader transformation in European politics. France and Germany remain central actors in EU decision-making, but their ability to drive large initiatives has become more constrained. Researchers studying the Franco-German leadership often highlight several conditions that make cooperation effective. These include strong demand for collective action among member states, high political costs if no agreement is reached, and a clear compromise between France and Germany acceptable to other countries. When these conditions are present, the Franco-German partnership can act as a catalyst for broader European agreement.
France and Germany remain central actors in EU decision-making, but their ability to drive large initiatives has become more constrained
In the case of FCAS, these conditions are only partly present. Although the project reflects long-term ambitions, there is no perception of an existential crisis requiring immediate European action. As a result, the political pressure needed to overcome disagreements and mobilise wider support across the EU remains limited.
The FCAS dispute highlights an important shift in the Franco-German leadership. France and Germany still play a crucial role in shaping EU policy, particularly during crises. However, in long-term projects such as defence industry cooperation, national interests and strategic differences tend to re-emerge more quickly. Rather than signalling the end of the Franco-German engine, the FCAS conflict reveals its new operating conditions. France and Germany remain central to the EU, but their leadership increasingly depends on broader coalitions among member states.
The fragmentation surrounding FCAS illustrates this dynamic. France has strongly promoted European strategic autonomy through projects such as FCAS. Other states, however, are increasingly participating in alternative partnerships such as the Global Combat Air Programme. Rather than forming a single integrated defence bloc, European cooperation is evolving toward flexible coalitions of the willing shaped by different strategic cultures and threat perceptions.
In that sense, the Franco-German engine still matters, but it increasingly depends on broader coalitions across the EU to move European defence initiatives forward.
