Sweden's recent election defeated the right-wing Tidö bloc and blocked the populist Sweden Democrats' route into government. Yet the restrictive political settlement they helped construct may endure. Vera Tika argues that far-right normalisation is not automatically reversed by electoral defeat: once institutionalised, illiberal change can acquire a political life of its own
Sweden's election interrupted Europe's wider rightward movement. The final count gave the opposition parties 176 seats, against 173 for the right-wing Tidö bloc. The Sweden Democrats fell to 17.5% and 62 seats, dropping from second to third place. Their anticipated transition from external support to cabinet participation was therefore blocked. But the election did not return Sweden to the political landscape that preceded their rise.
Since 2022, the Sweden Democrats have supported Ulf Kristersson's minority government through the Tidö Agreement. From outside the cabinet, they helped move migration, citizenship, policing and criminal justice towards a more restrictive settlement. Kristersson has resigned, but forming a new government will require negotiations among opposition parties with substantial policy differences. The Social Democrats have also adapted to demands for tighter migration controls. Electoral defeat has weakened the Sweden Democrats' parliamentary leverage, but it has not removed the political assumptions they helped normalise.
Political scientists distinguish the populist radical right from the extreme right. The former combines nativism – the belief that the state belongs to a culturally homogeneous native group – with authoritarianism and, often, populism. It challenges liberal pluralism but ordinarily competes through elections. Its power therefore cannot be measured only through votes, seats or ministerial office.
Mainstreaming and normalisation describe different stages of that power. Mainstreaming concerns what established parties and media do: adopt positions, repeat frames, cooperate or treat former pariahs as legitimate competitors. Normalisation is the outcome; a shifted threshold of acceptability. Institutionalisation follows when these ideas shape legislation, administrative routines and policy instruments.
Far-right parties exercise issue ownership: they make migration, security and identity the terrain on which others feel compelled to compete
Far-right parties also exercise issue ownership: they make migration, security and identity the terrain on which others feel compelled to compete. Accommodation can therefore strengthen rather than displace them. Once mainstream actors preserve the same problem definitions, influence survives electoral defeat. Sweden reveals this political sedimentation: the party loses ground, while the policy settlement remains.
Italy demonstrates the same process from inside government. Its radical-right Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, has cultivated an image of institutional reliability. Her government has remained anchored in NATO and EU fiscal constraints, while continuing to support Ukraine. These choices are often presented as evidence that responsibility moderates the radical right.
Meloni's goverment may remain anchored in NATO and EU fiscal constraints, yet it has proposed banning face veils in schools and limiting the number of foreign pupils per classroom
Yet moderation is not a single movement affecting every policy field equally. International pragmatism can coexist with illiberal change at home. In September, Meloni proposed banning face veils in schools and limiting foreign pupils per classroom. The European Commission's 2026 Rule of Law Report also records concerns involving media pluralism, institutional checks and civic space in Italy.
Meloni's trajectory is better understood as differentiated normalisation. Radical-right actors may moderate where credibility with markets, allies or EU institutions is indispensable. At the same time, they can retain exclusionary conceptions of membership and expand executive discretion at home. Respectability in one domain can make transformation in another less visible.
Germany illustrates both the reach and the limits of electoral containment. The Federal Republic's postwar order combined militant-democratic safeguards with a party-system norm excluding the far right. The Brandmauer is today's cordon sanitaire: it denies the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) coalition partners. Yet after winning almost 44% in Saxony-Anhalt, AfD came first in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania with 38.3%, while the Christian Democratic Union fell below the 5% threshold for the first time in a state election. Together, these results mark a rupture in postwar containment: the AfD is now the largest party in several Länder even while excluded from office. Berlin qualifies, but does not reverse, this pattern. Die Linke won by centring housing, while AfD achieved its best result in the capital, with 16.3%. The firewall still blocks office. But it no longer contains electoral growth, issue ownership or pressure on mainstream competitors.
In France, Rassemblement National's long strategy of normalisation has made it appear increasingly plausible as a governing party
France faces a related process ahead of its 2027 presidential election. Rassemblement National's long strategy of normalisation has made it appear increasingly plausible as a governing party. This affects competitors before it wins executive power. Policies and rhetoric are adjusted in anticipation of its strength, narrowing the distance between exclusion from office and influence over the political field.
These cases represent different configurations: external support in Sweden, direct government in Italy, electoral containment in Germany and anticipatory accommodation in France. What connects them is that far-right influence travels beyond the organisational boundaries of far-right parties.
Sweden's election remains significant. It ended the Tidö bloc's mandate, prevented the Sweden Democrats from converting policy influence into ministerial authority, and showed that far-right advance is not inevitable. Yet a change of government is not the same as a reversal of the policy and administrative changes made since 2022.
Democratic resilience must therefore be assessed at two levels. The first is whether radical-right parties gain office. The second is whether their definitions of belonging, threat and legitimate exclusion continue to organise public policy after they lose. Elections can remove parties from power. They do not automatically remove the political world those parties helped to build.
No.50 in a thread on the 'illiberal wave' 🌊 sweeping world politics
