Support for European integration and satisfaction with the European Union are not the same thing. Alexander Kossev argues that Bulgaria reveals a politically important group of frustrated Europeans. They value integration but remain disappointed by its results – creating frustration that political parties can redirect towards very different visions of Europe
In spring 2026, only 57% of Bulgarians said their country had benefited from EU membership. This was the lowest share in the Union, against an EU average of 74%. France and Austria came next, both at 62%.
Yet this does not automatically make Bulgaria the EU’s most Eurosceptic country. Dissatisfaction with the European Union and opposition to European integration are different political attitudes. Treating them as points on a single spectrum between Europhilia and Euroscepticism misses an important group of Europeans.
I call this frustrated Europeanism: continued attachment to European integration combined with dissatisfaction with its performance, responsiveness or ability to fulfil the expectations associated with membership.
A Eurosceptic questions the desirability, direction or extent of integration itself. A frustrated European can reach a different conclusion: Europe is worth keeping, but it should work better.
For Bulgaria, accession in 2007 meant more than joining another international organisation. It became associated with economic convergence, functioning institutions, greater opportunities and the prospect of 'catching up' with Western Europe.
The results have been substantial. Bulgarian GDP per capita, measured in purchasing power standards, rose from 38.4% of the EU average in 2006 to 68% in 2025. Bulgaria has since joined Schengen and adopted the euro.
This is remarkable convergence. But it is also incomplete convergence.
Nearly two decades after accession, Bulgaria remains considerably poorer than much of Western Europe. The benchmark has changed too. Bulgarians need not compare their lives today with Bulgaria before accession. Freedom of movement and deeper integration allow them to compare their opportunities, institutions and public services directly with those elsewhere in Europe.
EU membership may have delivered change, but the promise many attached to 'becoming European' was larger than membership itself
European integration therefore creates the benchmark against which its own success can be judged insufficient. Membership delivered change, but the promise many attached to 'becoming European' was larger than membership itself.
Bulgarians still recognise practical advantages of membership. In the same 2026 survey, 49% identified new employment opportunities as a major benefit. Peace and security followed at 29%, and cooperation between member states at 27%.
A citizen can therefore recognise what membership provides while believing that the EU has failed to deliver enough prosperity, equality or political responsiveness.
Political scientists already make a similar distinction when analysing democracy. Kiran Auerbach and Bilyana Petrova show that citizens can support democracy as an ideal while being deeply dissatisfied with its performance. High expectations can even deepen disappointment when reality falls short.
A citizen can recognise what membership provides while believing that the EU has failed to deliver enough prosperity, equality or political responsiveness.
European integration can produce the same tension. Frustration may also concern voice and recognition. EU decisions can appear distant from national circumstances, while different political histories, cultures and social conditions can seem insufficiently recognised.
Wanting Europe to recognise those differences is not necessarily a demand for less Europe. But frustration does not remain politically neutral.
Bulgaria’s Revival party shows how grievances about integration can be given a Eurosceptic interpretation. The party spearheaded opposition to euro adoption, framing it around national sovereignty. Its leader, Kostadin Kostadinov, has also argued that Bulgaria should leave the EU if the Union cannot be fundamentally reformed. The political move is important. A grievance about how Bulgaria is treated within the EU becomes an argument about integration itself.
France shows a different version of the same process. Only 62% of French respondents say EU membership has benefited their country – a mere five percentage points more than Bulgarian respondents. Yet France is a founding member and architect of integration, while Bulgaria joined an already developed Union with expectations of convergence.
Pro-European actors interpret 'frustrated Europeanism' as a demand for more effective integration. Eurosceptic actors use it as evidence that integration has already gone too far
The National Rally (Rassemblement National) no longer campaigns for Frexit. Instead, it channels dissatisfaction towards a radically different Europe: stronger national sovereignty, weaker supranational institutions, and fewer powers for Brussels.
The sources of French and Bulgarian frustration are therefore not identical. But political actors in both countries offer a similar diagnosis: Europe does not adequately serve the nation.
This reveals why frustrated Europeanism matters. Political competition can determine where dissatisfaction leads. Pro-European actors interpret it as a demand for more effective and responsive integration. Eurosceptic actors use the same frustration as evidence that integration has already gone too far.
Frustrated Europeanism is therefore not simply a midpoint between Europhilia and Euroscepticism. It is a politically unstable form of support for Europe.
Its importance lies precisely in the fact that frustrated Europeans have not necessarily rejected integration. Their disappointment reflects how much they expected from it: prosperity, institutional improvement, political voice or equality with other Europeans.
Ignoring that distinction carries a political cost. If pro-European leaders dismiss dissatisfaction as Euroscepticism, they leave others to explain why Europe has disappointed. Parties hostile to further integration are more than willing to provide the answer.
The Eurosceptic asks whether European integration has gone too far. The frustrated European asks why it has not worked better. European politics may determine which question they ask next.
