Across Europe, far-right parties continue to flourish. Walker Winslow-Stephenson argues that Europe’s future rests less on appeals to a pan-European identity or federalist structure than on Europe’s ability to produce tangible, localised benefits for citizens and communities
A political 'earthquake'. A 'shock'. A candidate whose party portrays immigrants as a 'mortal danger', and advocates leaving the European Union. This may sound like a description of Europe’s recent far-right advances (see Alternative für Deutschland in Sachsen-Anhalt, or Rassemblement National in the French Senate). Instead, it describes events of 2002, when Jean-Marie Le Pen reached the second round of the French presidential election. The more moderate candidate Jacques Chirac eventually won the runoff. Yet the underlying sentiment that propelled Le Pen into the runoff in 2002 has only grown in influence in French and European politics.
Throughout Europe, the far right and right-wing populism are gaining ground. Many such parties, and their leaders, are calling for nationalistic, go-it-alone solutions to current issues. Far from disappearing since Chirac’s victory in 2002, such views have attracted support from a new generation.
Today, many voters feel disconnected from and disenfranchised by the current system. Increasingly, they are turning towards right-wing parties to address their concerns. These growing calls for disunity and appeals to 'traditional' values or ideologies warrant policy responses, not just moral condemnation. The EU must demonstrate that closer cooperation can produce tangible benefits for citizens.
Over recent decades, right-wing parties have sought to forge connections in the public consciousness between national identity and technocratic dealings in Brussels. As Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks noted, European integration slowed from the early 1990s, following the Maastricht Treaty. This was not because of any singular policy announcement, but because people began to see the effects of the EU on top of their national governmental institutions. They then interpreted the EU through their national/social frameworks and politics, which imbued formerly technocratic proceedings with national and identity cues.
Citizens rarely assess European integration (or economic policies) through detailed analysis. Instead, they evaluate it through visible outcomes. When the benefits of integration appear distant, technocratic, or unevenly distributed, identity-based narratives become a far more accessible way of understanding political and economic change.
This movement from highly technical, specialised issues to those tied to national and identity frames manifests in several ways. For example, the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote was a major success for right-wing Eurosceptics, who linked economic and bureaucratic strategy in Brussels to issues of domestic identity. Scholars noted a strong correlation between support for leaving the EU and lower levels of education and income.
Voters who benefited from increased globalisation and interconnectedness, meanwhile, were more likely to support EU membership and economic integration. Thus, although Brexit nominally played out in terms of salient, exclusionary identity cues and anxiety over the erosion of national culture, voters’ underlying concerns often centred on whether globalisation and integration improved their material circumstances.
Recent research by previous contributors to this series has found that citizens with lower levels of education are more likely to view favourably a strong leader who bypasses parliament and elections. Education may help people access the benefits of Europeanisation and integration, and understand the advantages of the often slow, technical, pan-European institutions.
Many populist parties and leaders around Europe have harnessed these notions of national identity, strong and consolidated leadership, and anti-Brussels sentiment. Through them, they channel discontent with the status quo into support for nationalist ideals that are easily communicable to disgruntled voters.
Europe's challenge, then, is one of legitimacy and perceived benefit, not identity alone. The solution may not simply be greater centralisation, but making cooperation valuable while preserving local autonomy.
Right-wing groups have sought to define Europe in nationalist, exclusionary terms. But European leaders must resist the urge to fight on the terrain of identity politics. Instead, they must lean into what Kalypso Nicolaïdis termed 'European Demoicracy' (demoi is the plural form of the Greek demos). This transnational framework values local and community distinctions, while offering space to pool resources and to progressively enmesh governments with each other. Rather than drawing closer politically, governments build linkages through economics, security, and other shared interests.
Some have noted that local governments and place-based policies may improve economic outcomes. Others in this 🎈 series have proposed ways to accomplish this, including Valesca Lima, who argued that genuine, early participation in local decision-making can strengthen trust.
This focus on practical forms of cooperation appears in Mario Draghi’s 2024 report. It proposed pooling resources and developing and investing further in energy and shared industrial resources. It also emphasised cohesion policy as a way to support the economically vulnerable and those hit hardest by globalisation (policies that have worked before).
A multi-pronged approach is needed to improve perception and deliver tangible benefits. First, the EU could strengthen local and regional institutions and involve local officials in decision-making. This would help communities see the impact of EU-funded projects. For example, the role of the European Committee of the Regions could be expanded in shaping policy and assessing territorial impact. Additionally, the EU could expand support for research institutions in lower-performing member states and regions through Horizon Europe’s Widening Participation and Spreading Excellence programme. Moreover, the EU ought to continue investing in regional economic development through initiatives like the Just Transition Fund.
Localising governance structures, increasing cooperation to protect rather than override local communities, and ensuring that integration produces visible benefits are essential to preventing further political fracture. Nearly a quarter-century after Le Pen's breakthrough, Europe's challenge remains fundamentally the same. The alternative to exclusionary nationalism is not an increased focus on European identity or federalism. Europe’s future depends less on persuading citizens of the idealistic benefits of integration and more on demonstrating that cooperation can ensure opportunity, security, and prosperity.
