Enlargement’s symbolic revival after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine risks repeating past failures. Magdalena König warns that without credible timelines and reform momentum, the EU may trap candidates — old and new — in an ‘eternal waiting room’. Frustration, backsliding, and geopolitical drift are likely unless promises are matched by progress
The EU’s offer of membership to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia is symbolically powerful and strategically significant. But the experience of South East Europe offers a cautionary tale. Overpromising and underdelivering risks locking these new candidates into a prolonged state of limbo — a strategy that has already produced frustration, disillusionment, and geopolitical vulnerabilities in South East Europe.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has revived the long-stalled enlargement agenda. The EU now counts ten (potential) candidates in its waiting room, which is remarkable given the prior stagnation of South East European accession processes. Since the full-scale invasion, Albania and North Macedonia have opened accession talks, Bosnia and Herzegovina has gained candidate status, and Kosovo has secured visa liberalisation. These are the most significant developments in enlargement since 2013.
Even more striking are the rapid candidacies of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, countries once seen as peripheral to the enlargement process. As Veronica Anghel noted in this series' foundational blog piece, the symbolic power of enlargement has become indispensable in this new geopolitical landscape. But symbolism alone cannot carry the process. If enlargement remains aspirational without being operational, the credibility of the EU itself may erode. The deadlock of the past decades and the persistent obstacles to enlargement in South East Europe should be a warning to EU leaders not to promise too much and deliver too little.
In South East Europe, the lack of real accession prospects has bred deep frustration on both sides. The EU often presents the process as meritocratic, but EU decisions did not always follow significant reforms. North Macedonia changed its constitutional name to resolve a bilateral dispute with Greece, only to face a French veto, justified by the need to first reform the enlargement methodology. Albania, too, has seen years of delay despite progress on reforms.
Public support for EU accession is eroding. Disillusionment is no longer peripheral, it is mainstream
Meanwhile, democratic backsliding has taken root in other candidate countries. Serbia and Turkey have demonstrated increasingly autocratic tendencies. The EU has often failed to respond meaningfully. In Serbia, democratic decline has proceeded largely unchecked. As recent events illustrate, even large-scale domestic protests against President Aleksandar Vučić were met with EU silence or, worse, normalisation. EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos’s description of a ‘constructive meeting’ with Vučić, while protests unfolded, has reinforced perceptions of double standards.
This credibility gap has real consequences. External actors, including Russia, China and Saudi Arabia, have seized on the EU’s hesitation, and are expanding their influence through diplomacy, investment, and disinformation. Public support for EU accession is eroding. In 2022, polls showed that for the first time, a majority of Serbs opposed joining the EU. Disillusionment is no longer peripheral, it is mainstream.
Can the new candidates expect a different experience? A closer look at current dynamics suggests caution.
First, security concerns remain unresolved. The Serbia–Kosovo conflict continues to block progress in the Western Balkans. Likewise, member states may hesitate to admit Ukraine while it remains at war. The precedent of Cyprus, which joined the EU while divided, looms large — and not favourably.
Second, bilateral disputes are already emerging. Poland’s demands for restrictions on Ukrainian agricultural imports show how quickly domestic pressures in member states can obstruct accession paths.
Many member states insist that institutional reform is a precondition for enlargement, yet consensus on such reform is unlikely
Third, institutional fragility and corruption remain more pronounced in Eastern European candidates. Rule of law challenges persist, and the acquis communautaire continues to grow, raising the bar for compliance.
Fourth, internal EU dynamics remain unfavourable. The longstanding debate between widening and deepening has resurfaced. Many member states insist that institutional reform is a precondition for enlargement, yet consensus on such reform is unlikely. Political will is fading even as the enlargement agenda appears revitalised on paper.
Finally, credibility is at stake. SEE countries have lingered in the waiting room for so long that few now believe in timely accession. Without visible progress for older candidates, the EU cannot convincingly promise new ones a faster path.
The waiting room for EU enlargement is getting crowded, and claustrophobic. Enlargement’s symbolic renaissance, triggered by war, cannot substitute for structured, credible progress. If the EU fails to follow through, it risks fuelling disillusionment across multiple regions simultaneously.
Two decades since the 'big bang' enlargement, the geopolitical context is more complex, candidate countries more diverse, and EU divisions deeper
The idea of a ‘big bang’ enlargement akin to 2004 may seem appealing, but it is misleading under current conditions. The context today is more complex: the candidate countries are more diverse, the acquis is more demanding, the internal divisions within the EU are deeper.
To avoid repeating past mistakes, the EU must ensure that enlargement is not just a geopolitical signal, but a functional policy with tangible milestones. Otherwise, the Union risks filling its waiting room with countries it cannot admit, and publics it cannot convince.
The transformative power of EU accession depends on one thing above all: credibility. Conditionality only works when both sides believe in the outcome. Without trust in the destination, reforms lose their political momentum and rival narratives gain strength.
In a world of renewed geopolitical competition, enlargement remains one of the EU’s most powerful tools. But it will only be effective if promises are matched by progress. Symbolism must be backed by substance. Candidates, old and new, must see a path forward that is not endlessly deferred.
