Sonja Priebus argues that the key to Péter Magyar’s landslide victory lay in the incumbent regime’s vulnerability. Magyar’s emergence on the political scene in 2024 caused a crack in the system, and triggered a shift in expectations that enabled Tisza’s victory
The 12 April 2026 parliamentary elections in Hungary brought a landslide victory for Péter Magyar and his Tisza party, unseating Viktor Orbán after 16 years in power. With 141 of 199 seats, Tisza secured a constitutional majority, despite a highly uneven playing field. It is the largest victory by a single party since the 1989/90 regime change.
How did he manage this breakthrough under such unfavourable conditions? The key lies in the incumbent regime’s vulnerability. Drawing on Henry Hale’s concept of patronal politics, I argue that Magyar’s emergence in 2024 caused a crack in the system, and triggered a shift in expectations that enabled Tisza’s victory.
According to the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, Viktor Orbán transformed Hungary from a liberal democracy into an electoral autocracy. A constitutional majority enabled his government to centralise power and govern with few constraints. The system became characterised by state capture: incumbents controlled key institutions and channelled resources to loyalists and allied oligarchs. All this created a highly uneven electoral playing field that made government turnover increasingly unlikely.
Under Orbán, the state controlled key institutions and channelled resources to loyalists and allied oligarchs
Hale’s patronal politics concept holds that politics is organised around personalised exchanges of loyalty, rewards, and punishments rather than impersonal rules. Power takes the form of a hierarchical network of clients dependent on a patron who controls resources. Orbán built such a system through political and economic restructuring. Loyalty to him was crucial for access to positions, funding, and public procurement.
The stability of patronal regimes hinges on the expectations of their elites and clients. Such regimes 'become vulnerable when the elites they rely upon to carry out their orders start expecting them to fall'. Public dissatisfaction, driven by economic stagnation, inflation, and corruption, had been widespread. Yet no credible opposition force emerged to channel it. Apathy and fear prevailed, and most clients continued to comply with the system.
Magyar’s groundbreaking interview in February 2024 marked a turning point. As a former Fidesz insider and ex-husband of the justice minister, he spoke openly about the regime. While he said nothing entirely new, his interview represented 'one of the most visible and influential elite defections Fidesz has ever witnessed'. This undermined Hungarians' expectation of stability, and triggered a broader shift in expectations among elites and ordinary voters.
The June 2024 elections to the European Parliament (EP) were the first electoral confirmation of this shift. Magyar’s new Respect and Freedom party (Tisza) won 29.6% and seven of 21 seats. Fidesz-KDNP, however, achieved its weakest result since EU accession: just 44.82%. This suggested that the regime was less stable than assumed.
After the EP elections, Magyar’s slogan Don’t be afraid, nothing lasts forever! captured the changing mood. Magyar harnessed his insider knowledge to build an effective campaign. He mobilised supporters by encouraging the establishment of local 'Tisza Islands', which became key for volunteer coordination. Magyar also campaigned intensively nationwide, visiting hundreds of towns and municipalities. He gained backing from influential business figures such as former diplomat Orbán Anita and former Shell executive István Kapitány. These signalled shifting elite expectations.
Magyar’s slogan 'Don’t be afraid, nothing lasts forever!' captured Hungary's changing mood. Growing support for Magyar accelerated defections from Fidesz
Growing support, evidenced by the Tisza Islands, rallies, and elite endorsements, encouraged others to follow. This, in turn, reduced the fear of reprisals, and accelerated further defections.
At the same time, the incumbents weakened. Internal tensions surfaced, and the government struggled to develop a counter-strategy. Instead, it began to prepare for possible defeat. In December 2025, parliament granted the Constitutional Court the power to review decisions on the temporary removal of the President of the State. Observers saw this as an attempt to maintain influence after a government change, reinforcing perceptions of regime instability.
Favourable opinion polls forecasting Tisza’s victory were also crucial in shaping expectations. From autumn 2024, Tisza led the polls, ahead of Fidesz – initially only narrowly, then by around at least 10%. By early 2026, all major Hungarian pollsters confirmed this trend, some even showing a 20% Tisza lead. In a patronal system, such polls are crucial for testing the waters. In the run-up to the election, these helped coordinate expectations around the likely winner, Magyar.
A strong showing for Tisza in the polls, along with a wave of elite Fidesz defections in the weeks before the elections, revealed how Orbán's network had fragmented
Finally, the last weeks before the elections saw a new wave of elite defections. Former officials exposed malpractice in state institutions. An investigation by Bence Szabó found evidence of a state-led operation meant to bring down Tisza’s IT system. Former army captain Szilveszter Pálinkás criticised the defence minister’s leadership, and claimed that within the military, there was appetite for polticial change. All of which indicated that, by election day, the incumbent’s network had fragmented.
Hungary’s 2026 election shows how even entrenched patronal systems can unravel. Magyar’s defection triggered a cascade of shifting expectations among elites and voters, leading to a rapid reorientation. Voters and elites gradually turned their expectations towards the new and increasingly powerful challenger.
Magyar’s victory is a window of opportunity for genuine change and redemocratisation akin to the 1989/90 regime change. What will follow, however, remains uncertain. Will Magyar restore democratic institutions? Or will he use his majority to build a new patronal system?
