The crushing defeat of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in Hungary’s 2026 elections gives the EU a rare opportunity to reform its enlargement policy. Iveri Kekenadze Gustafsson argues that this moment can accelerate candidates’ path to membership and prevent single states from derailing the process for domestic or bilateral political gain
The landslide victory of the pro-European Tisza party over Hungary’s increasingly autocratic ruling Fidesz has triggered visible relief in Brussels. Viktor Orbán will no longer be in a position to derail decisions in the Council through vetoes or threats – a tactic he used repeatedly over more than two decades in power.
His most recent moves illustrate that obstructionist pattern. Orbán blocked a previously agreed €90 billion loan for Ukraine. He also stalled progress on Ukraine’s accession, citing an alleged politically motivated disruption of oil transfers via the Druzhba pipeline. Péter Magyar, the incoming prime minister, has already signalled that he will not oppose the release of the loan, and has committed to a more stable position on enlargement. Magyar's first post-election statements suggest a government determined to break away from Orbán-era decision-making.
This change reduces immediate friction in the Council. It also creates a political opening. The EU can unblock pending decisions and move forward incrementally. Alternatively, it can address the structural condition that allowed obstruction to become routine in the first place.
Removing the unanimity requirement for most steps in accession negotiations would accelerate Ukraine's path to membership
A more decisive option is available. Removing the unanimity requirement for most steps in accession negotiations would accelerate Ukraine’s path to membership and reduce the risk of future blockages by individual member states acting unilaterally.
Member states have long used enlargement to advance bilateral disputes and politicise decisions. This pattern of ‘nationalisation’ of EU enlargement decisions runs through current accession processes and earlier rounds.
Bulgaria continues to block the opening of negotiation chapters with North Macedonia over disputes on national identity and minority rights, including demands for constitutional changes. Hungary has raised concerns about its ethnic minorities in Ukraine. More recently, Hungary invoked narratives about potential spillover from the war to slow Ukraine’s progress.
It is only a matter of time before another EU member state expresses dissatisfaction over a politically sensitive historical issue and blocks a candidate country’s accession progress
The current decision-making framework enables this behaviour. Member states can veto decisions at multiple stages: granting candidate status, opening negotiations, adopting the framework, opening six clusters, closing 35 chapters, and approving the accession treaty – followed by national ratification. In total, they hold at least 75 opportunities to block progress.
Under these conditions, it is only a matter of time before another member state expresses dissatisfaction over a politically sensitive historical issue and blocks a candidate country’s accession progress.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has pushed enlargement back to the top of the EU agenda. Four frontrunners now lead the queue: Montenegro, Albania, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine.
Montenegro has closed negotiation chapters at speed in recent months, though questions remain about the depth of reforms. Moldova and Ukraine have pushed ahead with reforms, despite political obstacles, effectively frontloading their accession process.
The EU Commission also proposed a faster 'reverse enlargement' path – a staged model in which membership comes before full compliance. Countries would join earlier, with accession treaties setting out transitional arrangements, longer adjustment periods, and stricter post-accession benchmarks. Governments would then complete these reforms after accession.
The EU Commission has proposed a staged accession model in which membership comes before full compliance
This approach does not represent a turn from a strictly merit-based model. Rather, it offers a compromise between those advocating for flexibility based on strategic and security considerations, and those insisting on full compliance with reform criteria prior to membership. However, it proved risky for the EU, and was preliminarily rejected by EU ambassadors.
Hungary has made a promising U-turn toward Brussels, and there are no major elections this year in two of the Union’s most influential actors, France and Germany. The coming months could therefore prove decisive if the European Council is willing to advance reform of the enlargement policy.
The stakes of another wave of enlargement fatigue are high. Recent research on EU enlargement increasingly links new member states' accession with the security of the continent. In her foundational piece for this series, Veronica Anghel argues that 'failing to embrace enlargement risks ceding influence to external powers, undermining the EU’s strategic autonomy, and perpetuating instability at its borders'.
Inconsistency, where procedural progress stalls while candidates continue implementing reforms, can trigger fading credibility on the EU side in candidate countries, leading to stagnation in the accession process.
At every stage of accession, the unanimity rule creates 'forever waiting rooms'. To avoid this, the EU should act swiftly. Yet this moment calls for calibration as much as ambition. The window is unlikely to remain open for long. Magyar’s victory falls short of a broader pro-EU, integrationist turn. And just a week later, this was underscored by the election of pro-Russian Rumen Radev as Bulgaria’s prime minister.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently emphasised the need for decision-making reform in the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This should also extend to enlargement policy. A realistic option would be to build on the 2020 revised methodology by limiting the number of decisions requiring unanimity. The EU Council could step back from decision-making in technocratic negotiations and delegate this exclusively to the European Commission. At the same time, it could retain unanimity only for political milestones, such as granting candidate status, opening and closing negotiations, and adopting the accession treaty. This could depoliticise and denationalise the technical process of acquis transfer, and commit to a merit-based approach in which progress in reforms directly advances accession.
Ireland's EU Council Presidency from June 2026 should seize this window to translate it into concrete reform and prevent the re-emergence enlargement obstruction by rogue member states.
