Italy’s new electoral reform, the Stabilicum, promises voters greater choice by bringing back preference voting. But allowing voters to choose individual candidates does not automatically make politics more representative. Alice Sanarico and Federico Taddei argue that the reform could make it harder for younger candidates to compete, reinforcing the very political exclusion that democracies need to overcome
Since 2000, Italy has repeatedly changed its electoral rules in pursuit of stable majorities. 1993's Mattarellum had relied heavily on single-member constituencies; in 2005, the controversial Porcellum introduced blocked lists and a majority bonus, before being struck down in part by the Constitutional Court. In 2015, the Italicum, designed for the Chamber of Deputies, failed to come into force as originally intended. 2017's Rosatellum, a mixed electoral system, then ruled the 2018 and 2022 elections.
On 8 October 2026, the Stabilicum passed the Chamber of Deputies. This reform proposed a new system based on proportional representation, a majority bonus tied to a 42% vote threshold, the abolition of single-member constituencies, party-selected lead candidates, and the return of preference voting. The reform also introduces permanent voting arrangements for Italians living away from their registered municipality.
Supporters present preference voting as a democratic breakthrough. By allowing voters to choose individual candidates rather than simply a party, as Luca Verzichelli points out in this series' inaugural post, the Stabilicum could strengthen the link between representatives and citizens. But there is a catch: greater choice for voters could mean greater inequality among candidates.
Under preference voting, candidates from the same party compete for personal votes. Winning therefore requires more than a party label: candidates must build visibility, campaign actively and persuade voters to choose them over their own running mates.
Research by Daniel Stockemer and Anna Lopatina shows that young candidates face disadvantages in open-list electoral systems. Two barriers are especially important: money and social connections.
First, as Jana Belschner’s research shows, candidates under 35 tend to have fewer personal financial resources and wealthy supporters. Effective personal campaigns require advertising, staff and travel. For young people entering an often precarious labour market, these costs can be prohibitive.
For young people entering an often precarious labour market, funding costs for effective personal campaigns can be prohibitive
Second, preference voting rewards established local reputations and extensive networks. Senior politicians have often spent years cultivating relationships with local organisations, influential supporters and voters. Younger candidates have had less time to build comparable connections.
The result may be a selection process that favours those who already possess money, visibility and political influence. Some young people may consequently decide not to run at all, anticipating that they would not be able to compete on equal terms.
The consequences extend beyond candidate selection. When younger people struggle to enter parliament, voters lose opportunities to elect representatives from their own generation. Research suggests that shared characteristics between representatives and citizens, including age, can matter for political representation.
Shared characteristics between representatives and citizens, including age, can matter for political representation
This creates a potential vicious cycle. Fewer young candidates mean fewer opportunities for young voters to see their concerns represented. That absence can reinforce perceptions that political institutions are closed to newcomers. This weakens political attachment and may contribute to disengagement.
The Stabilicum also combines preference voting with a structural advantage for party leadership. The first candidate on each party list (the so-called capolista) is predetermined. Party leaders can therefore protect established figures in favourable positions, leaving younger candidates to compete for the remaining seats through personal votes.
The debate over young people’s political representation did not begin with the Stabilicum. In September 2020, almost 70% of voters backed a constitutional referendum reducing the number of MPs from 945 to 600. As Mauro Volpi estimated, the reform reduced the probability of election by 36.5%, further narrowing access to parliamentary office.
Fewer seats also mean fiercer competition for nominations and election. When parliamentary positions become scarcer, party leaderships have greater incentives to prioritise established politicians, loyalists and influential internal factions. This can reinforce 'party discipline' by increasing MPs’ dependence on those who control candidate selection and list placement, while making it harder for newcomers to establish themselves. For younger candidates, who often have less political capital and weaker internal networks, these dynamics can create additional barriers to entry.
When parliamentary positions become scarcer, party leaderships have greater incentives to prioritise established politicians, loyalists and influential internal factions over young candidates
The referendum also revealed concerns about representation among younger voters. As Linkiesta reported, Generation Z and voters under 30 stood out among those who opposed the reduction, amid concerns that a smaller Parliament could leave less room for emerging generations and the issues they bring into politics.
The lesson for the Stabilicum is therefore broader than the number of seats available. When parliamentary representation contracts and parties retain substantial control over candidate selection, formal opportunities to choose representatives do not necessarily translate into greater opportunities to become one. The return of preference voting may give voters more choice at the ballot box, but it does not, by itself, resolve the structural barriers facing younger candidates.
The Italian case offers a broader lesson for European democracies seeking to reconnect with younger generations. Giving voters more choice does not automatically make political representation more inclusive. Without safeguards, preference voting can reward mostly candidates who already have the resources and networks needed to win.
Campaign-spending limits, accessible public support for candidates, and measures encouraging generational renewal could help reduce these barriers. The challenge is not simply to give voters a greater say over who gets elected, but to ensure that a wider range of people can realistically compete for election in the first place.
As the humanist maxim reminds us, Minime contemnenda iuventus: 'youth should never be underestimated'. Electoral systems should reflect that principle, not make it harder for the next generation to enter political life.
