Governments spend millions on sporting events, scholarships and broadcasting in the name of soft power. But, argues Sabal S. Almadi, the metrics they use count what a state owns rather than what it achieves, and so cannot show whether any of that spending has changed a single mind
When Joseph Nye introduced the concept of soft power around 1990, he defined it as the ability to get others to want the outcomes you want, through attraction rather than coercion or payment. The definition is about effects, not about owning things others might admire.
Yet that is how governments now treat it. My unpublished research on how policymakers use the concept shows that most states adopt Nye’s definition but ignore his account of how soft power works. They list the assets they think make them attractive, such as universities, broadcasters, heritage and sporting triumphs, and measure those. Whether any of them changed anyone’s behaviour goes unasked. The result is a performance of soft power, not evidence of it.
Nye was explicit that culture, political values and foreign policy are resources that may produce soft power, not soft power itself. Turning resources into outcomes is the hard part, and current measurement skips it.
Favourable polling shows that foreign publics like a country. It does not show that a partner government backed its position in a multilateral vote, opened its market, or softened its stance in a dispute. Attraction is, at most, a precondition for influence.
Culture, political values and foreign policy are resources that may produce soft power. They are not soft power in themselves. Turning resources into outcomes is the hard part
The same confusion runs through public diplomacy. Channels to lobby foreign governments secure access, but access is not persuasion: a government can grant a hearing and remain unmoved. Presenting access as influence borrows the term’s prestige for activity whose effects are untested.
Türkiye’s scholarship programme, Türkiye Bursları, shows the gap. Research found it increased international students’ familiarity with Türkiye and made the country more appealing to them. But that measures sentiment, not outcome. Whether those graduates went on to shape policy, trade or diplomacy in Türkiye’s favour remains unanswered.
As Nicholas Cull argues, in public diplomacy what a country does counts for more than what it says. During the Second World War, the BBC reported Allied defeats alongside victories, and audiences across occupied Europe trusted it because it did not hide bad news. A state broadcaster that reports only good news forfeits the one thing it most needs: being believed when it matters.
Mega-events carry the opposite risk. A World Cup or Olympic Games puts a host in front of billions, but the cameras do not stay inside the stadium. A state that set out to showcase itself may expose what it hoped to hide, from labour conditions to civil liberties. Scholars call this soft disempowerment.
International sports events put a host nation in front of billions, but the cameras do not stay inside the stadium. A state that set out to showcase itself may inadvertently expose what it hoped to hide
Catalunya Internacional, a public-private consortium established in 2024 to promote Catalonia abroad, published its first evaluation in June 2026. With an annual budget of around €1 million, it tracks 28 indicators, such as visitors hosted, scholarships awarded and participant satisfaction. The report acknowledges that these measure activity, not impact. Outcome indicators have been deferred to the next planning period, and a forthcoming international poll will measure perceptions, not behaviour.
Indices have made the confusion official. Portland’s Soft Power 30, launched in 2015, scored countries partly on inputs such as the size of their diplomatic networks and the standing of their universities. The Global Soft Power Index, launched in 2020, ranks all 193 UN member states using annual polling of around 170,000 people.
In 2025, the UK set up a Soft Power Council with a mandate to propose a strategy, shape promotional campaigns and identify global events to harness. Measurement appears nowhere in that remit. The Council met four times in 2025, but no strategy followed. The most substantial output so far is an evidence review commissioned by the culture department and published in October 2026. Its authors conclude that available data tracks operational outputs, not shifts in audience behaviour, so claims of real-world impact remain largely theoretical.
Soft power rankings don’t measure influence. An index that can be bought tells you what a country can afford, not what it has achieved
None of these tools measures influence. Embassy counts record investment; favourability records perception. Neither shows that anyone acted differently as a result. Such rankings reward spending for its own sake: a state can open a cultural centre abroad and climb the table without persuading anyone. An index that can be bought tells you what a country can afford, not what it has achieved.
Meaningful measurement starts with strategy, not assets. Before spending a euro, a state should be able to answer three questions:
| Level | What it measures | Examples | What it tells you |
|---|---|---|---|
| Activity | Outputs | Broadcasts aired, scholarships awarded, events hosted | What the state did |
| Access | Openings | Meetings secured, lobbying rights, overseas press contacts | Who will listen |
| Reception | Attitudes | Polls, focus groups, media sentiment | Who finds the state appealing |
| Results | Behaviour | Votes cast, positions shifted, agreements reached | Whether minds changed, and whether soft power was the cause |
Current rankings work almost entirely in the first and third rows. The fourth, the only one that captures soft power as Nye defined it, is the one they leave out.
The Swedish Institute shows the alternative. For two decades after the Cold War, it ran academic exchanges with Central and Eastern European institutions. The aim was not to make the region fond of Sweden, but to support post-communist transition and build networks that would later underpin trade and cooperation. Because the goal was specific, success could be judged against it.
A state can host the world’s biggest events, top the indices and secure a seat in every forum that matters. None of that proves it has changed a single decision. Until governments measure results rather than resources, soft power will remain an inventory dressed up as influence. Assets can be bought. Nobody has yet found the price of a changed mind.