Relations between the EU and US are undergoing tumultuous change. Based on what we know from previous existential crises, the EU will coordinate its response to changing transatlantic relations using informal mechanisms and a pragmatic approach. Stella Ladi argues the EU must now develop a strategy for navigating this unfamiliar environment
The EU coordinated its response to previous global crises quite successfully. In response to the rapid recent changes in transatlantic relations, we should expect the same. The turning point for decisive member state coordination was the Covid-19 crisis. When the pandemic hit, the EU agreed on a Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). The RRF, funded by joint debt issuance, ensured the quick opening of internal borders for EU citizens, and a common vaccination strategy that ensured 84.87% of its adult population were vaccinated by August 2023.
The same pattern was evident in the EU's response to the war on Ukraine and the subsequent energy crisis. Indeed, coordination between EU institutions and member states during crisis has often been informal and pragmatic. Such coordination is quick, and intended to devise solutions that guarantee easier implementation and resolution of a crisis' most imminent repercussions.
Coordination is not easy, because it involves 27 member states and the EU institutions. When the Union and all member states perceive a crisis as existential and universal, the incentive for coordination is greater. This is not least because policy-makers and citizens alike recognise that a national response alone would most likely fall short.
When the Union and all member states perceive a crisis as existential and universal, the incentive for coordination is greater
Mobilisation initially takes place via the European Council where the Heads of States meet. The European Commission also plays a key role, facilitating coordination and taking responsibility for implementation. The Commission often relies on ready solutions that have previously been crafted but never put into practice.
Agreement between France and Germany has been crucial for all path-breaking decisions during recent EU crises. The motto about the Franco-German alliance being the engine of Europe still holds true. If not for Germany and France, the RRF would never have come about. Similarly, every time there is a hiccup in French or German tactics in the Ukraine war, the world is watching. What happens domestically in these two countries is crucial for the EU’s response to crisis. That’s why the election of Friedrich Merz in Germany and the prospect of a quick centrist coalition has come as a breath of fresh air to Europe.
The need for coordination between member states during crises forces the EU to leap forward and act in ambitious ways often beyond the scope of the treaties. But this can create difficulties for more Eurosceptic governments such as those in Hungary, Slovakia and Italy, which only occasionally try to diversify their policies and discourse. This is an undeniable challenge for the EU, but new coordinative reflexes since 2021 have, until now, allowed it to keep moving. Such coordination is likely to continue, and Eurosceptic governments will feel pushed to follow. If they don't, they have much to lose – including crucial funding – so they rarely adopt such positions.
Will the EU manage to coordinate its actions in light of changing transatlantic relations? Given what we know from previous crises, the most likely answer is yes.
Informality, agility, pragmatism and innovation have been key in EU coordination during crises up to now. They remain the way to respond to an even more complex and uncertain environment.
Informality, agility, pragmatism and innovation remain the way for the EU to respond to an even more complex and uncertain environment
The first month of the second Trump administration has given Europe a clear signal that the next four years will not be business as usual, particularly when it comes to defence and the war on Ukraine. Trade, too, was also a field of confrontation during the previous Trump and Biden administrations. But we have never been as close as we are now to an EU-US trade war.
Since declaring its independence in 1776, the US has been a beacon of, and often a pioneer in, common Western values of liberalism, democracy, human rights, judicial independence and respect for international law. We can no longer take this for granted.
Now, economic deals advantageous for the US seem to be driving US policy, irrespective of their political implications. If this is not an existential crisis for Europe, what is? This new crisis is multifaceted, universal and existential. And it is precisely because of this, I argue, that the EU will eventually be forced to coordinate its action.
Amid this new multifaceted, universal and existential crisis, the EU will eventually be forced to coordinate its action
When it comes to defence and the war on Ukraine, recent summits in Paris and London show how the EU is cooperating closely with the UK under Keir Starmer's leadership. On 24 February, we also saw evidence of cooperation in the EU's coordinated response at the UN General Assembly, during which it supported Ukraine’s resolution over the competing resolution from the US. European countries have made it clear that they intend to step up and provide security guarantees to Ukraine (if possible, with the US), and to increase defence spending. What a common EU defence policy – or a European army – might look like remain undecided.
When it comes to trade and a response to aggressive US tariffs, coordination is easier because the competence lies with the EU. Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič visited Washington DC on 19 February to initiate the discussion. EU member states adopted an anti-coercion instrument in 2023, designed to act as a deterrent. If coercion does take place, however, the Council with a majority vote can decide on whether to impose tariffs, or to implement restrictions on trade in services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights. The Council can also impose restrictions on access to foreign direct investment and public procurement.
Rather than asking whether Europe can coordinate, we should start discussing a holistic and pragmatic strategy for Europe to navigate these uncharted waters, and for peace to prevail over war. Channels with the US should remain open. Coordination alone is certainly not enough.
