The European Commission has proposed a new system for returning third-country nationals staying illegally in the EU: sending them to designated holding areas before deportation. Zeynep Şahin Mencütek and Soner Barthoma explain why its plan will not work
On 11 March 2025, the European Commission introduced a new proposal for establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the European Union. This legislation-in-progress is an outcome of political pressure on the Commission, following the 17 member states' submission of a non-paper to the Commission calling for a new proposal to achieve ‘more effective returns’ and innovative solutions.
A contentious element of this proposal is the creation, through bilateral agreements, of so-called 'return hubs' outside the EU. The idea is that migrants are transferred to third-country holding areas before a country, or Frontex, deports them.
The European Commission proposal notes that states can only reach agreement with a third country if that country adheres to international human rights standards, including non-refoulement. The agreements should outline transfer modalities and conditions for the third-country nationals' short- or long-term stay. They should also include a monitoring mechanism to evaluate implementation and address any changes in the third country's circumstances.
But enforcing these return hubs is likely to prove problematic. First, monitoring difficulties mean that there is a heightened risk of human rights violations. Second, some countries have already tried — unsuccessfully — to externalise asylum processing and detention systems. Finally, there is likely to be a significant gap between the high costs of the scheme and its low effectiveness in deterring irregular migration and ensuring individuals’ compliance with return orders.
The human rights-related preconditions mentioned in the proposal only partly comply with those stressed by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights' position paper on the legal review of the planned return hubs. These conditions include a valid decision for return or entry refusal, a clear legal framework for transfer, and some others.
There are also practical elements to consider. Who will carry out the monitoring? How long will people have to stay? These questions are decided by bilateral agreements and therefore remain in legal limbo.
The return hubs proposal fails to address how member states would enforce safeguarding and monitor human rights violations
The proposal also fails to address how member states would enforce safeguards in practice, particularly given the EU's inconsistent track record of upholding human rights conditionality in migration partnerships. According to the proposal, member states and Frontex will be responsible for rights violations once they have transferred returnees to hubs. However, whether facilities are open or closed, they may enforce strict control and confining measures, which often violate human rights. Without clear accountability, the preconditions risk being mere formalities, not meaningful protection.
The main purpose of the return hub proposal seems to be deterrence. Examining a similar policy of Australia's offshore asylum processing sites may therefore provide some insights.
Since September 2012, the Australian Government has processed the asylum applications of people arriving by boat not on its own territory, but in third countries or islands such as Nauru and Papua New Guinea. Its policy is designed to deter irregular migration by penalising those seeking protection.
Reports consistently document that asylum seekers and refugees in these facilities face torture, degrading treatment, and indefinite confinement. Australia continues to evade accountability.
The deal between Albania and Italy is a similar effort to externalise asylum processing arrangements. In November 2023, Albania agreed to Italy's request to establish an asylum processing facility. The Albanian parliament ratified the agreement on 22 February 2024, and a few transfers did indeed happen — until the European Court of Justice intervened in February 2025.
The proposal builds on the assumption of 'a significant expansion of the possible countries to which third-country nationals can be returned against their will beyond their country of origin'.
Some analysts dismiss this as impractical, arguing that few states would accept hosting return hubs. But some countries might agree to these arrangements when offered sufficient financial incentives or strategic concessions, known as 'migration rentierism'. In extreme cases, states rely heavily on the income generated from managing transferred populations and accepting returns. The tiny island of Nauru, for example, has become dependent on 'managing humans for profit from Australia'.
Countries offered financial incentives to deport illegal migrants can become dependent on the income generated from managing transferred populations
Externalising migration control imposes significant financial burdens on destination countries. These arrangements may allow third governments to use migration control as a negotiating tool. This, in turn, leads to instrumentalisation and potential profits or concessions. Such arrangements also undermine the EU’s credibility.
Our extensive research on migrant returns indicates that third-country deals may create adverse side effects. These effects include bolstering corruption or becoming revenue-generating opportunities for multiple state and non-state actors. In recent years, we have seen this in return/migration governance in Albania, Kosovo, Iraq, Turkey and elsewhere.
The Commission’s pursuit of innovative migration management solutions, such as return hubs, is partially in response to political pressures from member states. It is also to show that the Commission is at least trying to produce effective deterrence instruments against illegal migration.
Return hubs may force population transfers — often through coercion. But they may not necessarily discourage people from pursuing their migration aspirations
However, return hubs plans represent a trend of outsourcing asylum processes. Such plans shift responsibility without ensuring effective returns. Past efforts to externalise asylum processing and detention have failed, raising doubts about the viability of this approach. The difficulty of effective monitoring means that there is a high risk of human rights violations in such facilities. Logistical complexities, including tough negotiations, along with potentially high costs, also threaten the feasibility of such initiatives.
Return hubs may lead to involuntary and forced population transfers — often implemented through coercion. But they may not necessarily discourage people from pursuing their migration aspirations.
Empirical research on the aspirations of migrants in Turkey, Greece and Poland reveals that detention often fails to deter migrants — nor does it diminish their desire to migrate. There is no evidence that detentions stop irregular migration, but plenty of evidence that third-country return hubs jeopardise migrants' fundamental rights and human dignity.
