Pro-EU MEPs have long pursued a logic of democratisation based on institutional mimicry. But as Jan Pieter Beetz, Gilles Pittoors and Wouter Wolfs argue, this path has become ideologically entrenched at the expense of alternative models that might better connect with European citizens
Since the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, pro-European MEPs have pursued a vision of EU democracy rooted in familiar terrain: electoral representation, party competition, and parliamentary power. The theory has been that by reproducing the institutional trappings of national democracy at the EU level, citizen support for the European Union will follow.
We refer to this logic as trickle-down democracy. Borrowing its name from the much-debated theory of trickle-down economics, the idea is that democratically legitimate institutions 'at the top' will eventually 'trickle down', translating into citizens’ support. By establishing direct elections, creating EU-wide party lists, and linking the selection of the Commission President to parliamentary majorities, pro-EU actors aim to replicate the democratic mechanisms of nation-states on a continental scale.
Pro-European MEPs have long reproduced the institutional trappings of national democracy at EU level, in the assumption that citizen support for European integration will follow
The expectation is that citizens, when confronted with these familiar institutional forms, will come to identify with and support the European Union in the same way they do with national democracies. In this view, the path to legitimacy runs through institutional and procedural legibility, with little need to tailor democratic innovation to the EU’s unique political context.
The logic has clear appeal. It offers a tidy solution to the EU’s oft-cited democratic deficit and gives the European Parliament a central role in building legitimacy. It also fits with the political experiences of MEPs themselves, who overwhelmingly arrive in Brussels from national political systems. The historical development of this logic, however, tells a different story.
Despite repeated treaty reforms and an expanding role for the European Parliament, public support for the EU has remained tepid. At the same time, Euroscepticism has become a defining feature of the political landscape, from referenda failures in France and the Netherlands, to Brexit and an increasing number of openly Eurosceptic MEPs. These developments challenge the assumption that citizen support for the EU will follow from reproducing the institutional trappings of national democracy at the European level.
Rising Euroscepticism is evidence that merely reproducing the institutional trappings of national democracy at the EU level has failed to translate into citizen support for European integration
And yet, the institutional logic persists. The commitment to trickle-down democracy became entrenched as early as the 1970s when it was still a choice. At a critical juncture ahead of the first EP elections in 1979, alternative visions (including those grounded in national parliamentary involvement) were actively debated. But once the trickle-down logic took hold, it became self-reinforcing. In the decades since, the European Parliament has continued to promote initiatives like transnational lists, the Spitzenkandidaten system, and direct executive elections – all aiming to deepen EU-level democracy through institutional reform. But tellingly, Parliament has rarely revisited the foundational assumptions behind this model, even as public disengagement grew.
Why the reluctance to reconsider? The answer lies possibly less in institutional constraints than in ideational lock-in. Trickle-down democracy logic has become not just a strategy, but a paradigm – a dominant way of thinking about EU democracy that narrows the field of imaginable alternatives.
Once established during the formative years ahead of the 1979 EP elections, this paradigm set the terms of what counted as democratic innovation at the EU level. Over time, it became self-reinforcing: each perceived failure of EU democratisation prompted calls for more of the same (stronger Europarties, more prominent Spitzenkandidaten, deeper integration) rather than an examination of whether the underlying model itself was flawed. This cycle constitutes a path-dependent process, in which ideas become institutionally embedded and difficult to dislodge.
Several mechanisms are likely behind this persistence. One is that pro-EU MEPs, having internalised domestic democratic norms, struggle to imagine democracy that does not mirror national structures. Another is that trickle-down reforms enhance the institutional power and relevance of Parliament itself, creating incentives for pro-EU MEPs to stay the course.
Despite mounting evidence that the trickle-down model has not delivered the popular support it promised, its grip on institutional imagination remains largely intact
Crucially, there seems to be a 'poverty of ideas' among MEPs: a lack of viable, well-developed alternatives in the current debate. The dominance of the trickle-down model helps explain why even periods of intense public contestation failed to produce true critical junctures in MEPs' democratic thinking. Despite mounting evidence that the model has not delivered the popular support it promised, its grip on institutional imagination remains largely intact.
This matters because alternative and potentially more fruitful paths are closed off. For instance, models of democratic confederacy or transnational federalism, where national parliaments play a stronger role, have largely been sidelined. And yet, in a Union marked by deep diversity and persistent national attachments, such approaches might offer a more realistic basis for popular support.
As the EU is facing an increasingly hostile and unstable world, there is an opportunity – and perhaps a necessity – to rethink the foundations of its democratic strategy. Trickle-down democracy may be more of a cul-de-sac than a cure.
