International pressure has led to the release of some political prisoners in Belarus. However, these cases may reflect not a weakening of the country's repressive regime, but its transformation. Aleh Baradzin argues that these 'releases' are, in fact, a mechanism for forced expulsion from Belarus
Alexander Lukashenko, Europe's 'last dictator', has been the first and only president of Belarus since establishment of the office in 1994. In the lead-up to the country's 2020 presidential election, there were widespread allegations of vote-rigging. When Lukashenko emerged the winner, large-scale protests erupted across the country.
The authorities responded with systematic violence, mass arrests, torture, and criminal prosecution. The regime convicted thousands as political prisoners, and threw them in jail. Those imprisoned included many foreign nationals – including US citizens. Reports by the UN Human Rights Council and OHCHR documented repression, torture, and other systematic human rights violations.
In the wake of the fraudulent 2020 elections, Lukashenko's regime became critically dependent on the Kremlin. And since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Belarus has increasingly become a Russian military platform.
Last year, under international pressure, Belarus began releasing its political prisoners. But the regime has not simply granted these prisoners their liberty. Instead, it has been transferring many of them, under state control, to the Belarus border, and expelling them from the country.
While Lukashenko's regime has begun releasing its political prisoners, many are in fact transferred to the Belarus border and expelled from the country
Ending these prisoners' incarceration, however, does not mean that the government has legally 'released' them. Lukashenko's regime has not revoked the repressive policies that forced the original convictions. While they may have been expelled, the sentence imposed upon these prisoners remains in force.
Since last summer, human rights defenders have documented four waves of expulsion from Belarus. The first wave, on 21 June 2025, affected 14 people. The second, on 11 September 2025, affected 52 people, including 14 foreign nationals. In response, the US announced a partial easing of sanctions. The third, on 13 December 2025, affected 123 people. Of these, nine were deported to Lithuania, a safe state, and 114 to Ukraine, a war zone. Those sent to Lithuania included the best-known representatives of the Belarusian opposition, whose release quickly became an international media event.
Following new negotiations between Lukashenko and US special representative John Coale, the fourth wave of releases, on 19 March 2026, affected around 250 people. 15 of these the regime forcibly expelled while they were still under criminal sentence.
By this point, it had become clear that the regime was using two different models. The most prominent political dissenters it expelled. The rest received pardons, were given right to remain in Belarus, and had their sentences quashed.
By the fourth wave of releases, the regime was clearly using two different models: expelling only the most prominent dissenters and awarding others pardons
Media outlets and human rights organisations usually describe the former cases as 'release', 'deportation', 'exile', or 'forced removal', but the people 'released' remain convicted criminals. Extraction and expulsion of political prisoners are often treated as separate actions rather than a unified mechanism of forced expulsion.
Despite differences in scale, the structure of all cases remains nearly identical: a reproducible state mechanism.
Following a US-brokered deal, prominent Belarusian opposition figure Mikola Statkevich, imprisoned since 2020, was freed from jail on 11 September 2025. The regime attempted to expel him to Lithuania, but Statkevich refused to leave his native country, and was returned to a Belarusian penal colony.
Back in prison, evidence suggests that the governing body replaced Statkevich’s essential blood-thinning medication with aspirin. As a result, he suffered a severe stroke in January 2026. The following month, authorities handed him over to his wife for treatment at home.
Despite his release, however, Statkevich’s legal status remains unclear.
I'm using the term 'forced expulsion through "release"', previously used in this article. The term describes a state mechanism in which extracting a person from detention becomes a stage of expulsion from the country, even though the government does not formalise expulsion through legal procedures.
We cannot consider such a mechanism 'release', because the person's criminal status remains. Nor can we consider it official deportation, since the expulsion is not formalised as an independent legal decision.
Neither can we regard it as voluntary departure, because if the person refuses to leave the country, the state will probably put them back in prison.
The consequences of forced expulsion extend far beyond removing a person from the country. Ex-prisoners find themselves abroad with uncertain legal status. They often lack documents confirming their identity, education, qualifications, and employment history. This, of course, complicates legalisation, employment, and integration in receiving countries.
Expelled ex-prisoners often lack documents confirming their identity and qualifications. This complicates legalisation, employment, and integration in receiving countries
For receiving states, such cases create an additional administrative burden. Authorities must identify people, verify their data, and provide basic right-to-remain conditions outside standard migration mechanisms and asylum procedures.
The expulsion of political prisoners also affects public perception of what is happening. People may see such cases as genuine prisoner releases. This creates the false impression that, despite continuing repression, Lukashenko's regime is softening under international pressure, particularly from Washington.
As a result, the consequences of the government's repressive mechanism continue to affect people even after they leave the country.
These 'releases', then, are not humanitarian gestures by a regime that is softening. Rather, they allow Lukashenko’s government to reduce external pressure, and make itself appear ready to make concessions. In so doing, it preserves the repressive system.
In Belarus, political prisoners have become not only objects of persecution but also a managed political resource. The government can keep them in detention, release them, expel them, or use them in negotiations without stopping the broader Belarussian flow of criminal prosecution.
This is why the correct qualification of such cases matters – and not only for describing individual episodes. It allows us to see that 'release' is not the end of repression, but merely its adaptation to external political pressure.
