International relations theory would predict strong opposition from China and Russia to Israel’s attack on Iranian military and nuclear sites. In practice, says Jonathan Roll, other considerations got in the way, and the role of both powers has been so far minimal. This suggests US influence may be more durable than expected
Events in the Middle East are still unfolding, warranting caution in drawing even preliminary conclusions. The Israel-Iran ceasefire, which came into effect on 24 June (Middle East time), remains in place at the time of writing, and offers hope for a more durable pause in hostilities. This provides an opportunity to assess recent developments from a broader perspective than has so far been possible.
Russia and China are two of the world’s three great powers. Yet a striking and largely overlooked aspect of the Israel-Iran conflict has been the near-total absence of both Eurasian powers from the scene. This absence has not been absolute: a few days into the fighting, China condemned Israel for initiating the attack. Russia, geographically closer to the region and traditionally deeply involved in its geopolitics, also condemned Israel and offered to mediate between Jerusalem and Tehran. No party took up its offer.
Later, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, was asked why Russia was not supporting Iran more forcefully. He replied that Israel is 'almost a Russian-speaking country', referring to the large diaspora of mostly-Jewish former USSR citizens and their descendants living in Israel today. Overall, Beijing and Moscow have barely made their influence felt throughout the conflict – at least so far.
Given Moscow and Beijing’s historical partnership with Tehran, one would expect both powers to be exceptionally concerned that their partner was weakening while US ally Israel gained ground
From the perspective of International Relations balance-of-power theory, mild reactions by Russia and China represent a 'dog that didn’t bark' moment. This is especially striking because the US has played a major role throughout the conflict and its mediation. After all, given the strategic importance of the Middle East, and Moscow and Beijing’s historical partnership with Tehran, one would expect both powers to be exceptionally concerned that their partner was weakening while a US ally, Israel, gained ground.
When China brokered the Saudi-Iranian normalisation agreement in March 2023, many interpreted it as a sign of waning US influence. In hindsight, those concerns now appear premature. Since Israel’s attack on Iranian military and nuclear sites began on 13 June, China has largely remained on the sidelines, watching one of its closest regional allies, Iran, suffer a series of military setbacks.
Part of the explanation lies in China’s ambivalent acceptance of the nuclear non-proliferation regime’s principles, and reservations regarding Iran’s programme. Therefore, for strategic and political reasons, China does not necessarily have major stakes in helping Iran keep its nuclear infrastructure.
On the other hand, China could have been more apprehensive at the spectre of growing Israeli, pro-Westen military and strategic successes. The potential for regime change in Iran has been widely discussed throughout the conflict. China could have put more diplomatic weight into trying to end hostilities earlier, opposing US participation or making clear it would support Iran materially during or after the conflict. It has done none of it.
China could have decided to cast a larger shadow. But it perceives the region’s overall balance of power to have a less immediate effect on its priorities
Such actions would, in fact, have broken patterns of Chinese behaviour in the region, and contradicted China’s priorities. While China may interfere in Middle East diplomacy to guarantee the flow of Middle Eastern energy supplies and keep diplomatic visibility, it does not, at present, see the region as holding core security importance. Beijing is focusing attention on its East Asian objectives, and it has no intention of committing more of them to a region it views as less critical. This is not a function of limited resources. With a real GDP of more than two-thirds of the US’ and impressive military clout, China could have decided to cast a larger shadow. But it perceives the region’s overall balance of power to have a less immediate effect on its priorities.
Unlike China, Russia has, from a security perspective, viewed the Middle East as a crucial region. But Russia, even more strongly than China, finds itself compelled to prioritise another front: its war in Ukraine.
According to current assessments, almost 700,000 Russian troops are stationed in Ukraine. Russia keeps another 120,000 active reserves. Since its war in Ukraine began, more than three years ago, Russia has suffered more than a million casualties. Its economy – although it has shown considerable resilience – is burdened with heavy Western sanctions. It may thus face long-term difficulties against which it must decisively hedge.
Amid ongoing war in Ukraine, and burdened with heavy Western sanctions, Moscow’s understanding of the limitations it currently faces has informed its restrained response to the Israel-Iran conflict
Syria’s President Bashar Al-Assad was a longstanding Russian ally. Tellingly, when Assad was ousted earlier this year, rather than back his regime, as it had done in the past, the Kremlin pulled its assets out of Syria. Clearly, Russia's freedom of manoeuvre has narrowed significantly. Now, it must calculate its geostrategic investments, and prioritise carefully.
This strategic action per se does not contradict balance-of-power logic. But prioritising those calculations over the need to protect power interests reveals that the theory itself cannot definitively explain state action. In other words, one cannot use balance of power as an abstract model without knowing a priori many more details about the case. Moscow’s understanding of the limitations it currently faces regarding the Israel-Iran conflict has informed its restrained response.
From the perspective of realist balance-of-power theory, the lack of Chinese and Russian involvement and counter-action throughout the recent conflict require explanation. A regional landscape more favourable to the West should have been antithetical to their interests. In practice, however, Beijing and Moscow have other considerations that affect their will and ability to prioritise involvement. These considerations are not materially or rationally determined, but a product of perceptions and conceptions held by their policy elites.
Moreover – oft-cited warnings about declining US influence notwithstanding – recent events in the Middle East expose a more complex picture of the contemporary configuration of world power. Consequently, the US may enjoy greater freedom of action, at least in some contexts, than previously envisaged.
Could it be that the enduring US influence in the Israel-Iran conflict, despite China and Russia's minimal involvement, is a result of a strategic miscalculation by the policy elites of these nations? If so, what factors are contributing to these miscalculations, and how might they shape the future geopolitical landscape?