Vera Tika argues that Europe’s populist radical right no longer operates only through parties and elections. Its growing influence lies in its ability to shape migration policy, public discourse, digital communication, and the democratic mainstream itself. Now, the populist radical right shapes the very logic through which democratic systems govern, define threats, manage borders, construct belonging, and normalise exclusion
Across Europe, the populist radical right is shaping democratic politics, even in places where radical-right parties are not in power. Its influence now extends far beyond elections, shaping migration governance, security discourse, media agendas, and digital communication ecosystems. The populist radical right, in other words, no longer operates only as an electoral challenger seeking parliamentary breakthrough. Now, it functions as a broader governing ecosystem.
For years, analysts mainly examined the populist radical right through parties, charismatic leaders, and vote shares. That approach made sense when radical-right actors primarily sought electoral legitimacy and parliamentary normalisation. Today, however, this framework is becoming insufficient. The contemporary power of the populist radical right lies not only in how many elections it wins, but in its growing ability to shape the political terrain on which democratic competition itself takes place.
As Mattia Zulianello recently argued here, contemporary European populism does not operate according to a single political model. Rather, it consists of multiple adaptive and ideologically diverse formations. This diversification helps explain why the populist radical right today operates not only through parties, but through broader governing and communicative ecosystems.
Across Europe, themes once associated with the political margins increasingly structure the democratic mainstream. Migration control, border securitisation, demographic anxiety, anti-rights discourse, anti-gender mobilisation, sexual identity politics, and the language of 'national preference' now circulate far beyond traditional radical-right spaces.
In Germany, debates around deportations and border controls are shaping mainstream political competition well beyond its leading far-right party, Alternative für Deutschland. France has experienced a long process of normalisation initiated by Marine Le Pen and now electorally amplified under Jordan Bardella. This has progressively shifted France's broader political conversation on migration, national identity, and sovereignty.
Themes once associated with the political margins now increasingly structure the democratic mainstream
As John Ryan recently noted, the growing legitimacy of France’s Rassemblement National reflects the weakening of the country’s traditional republican barriers against the radical right. Bardella’s normalised public image illustrates how the populist radical right is gaining influence not through overt anti-system rupture, but through institutional adaptation and mainstream legitimacy.
In Italy, Giorgia Meloni has normalised hardline migration discourse at European level, particularly around externalisation and maritime border control. This transformation is visible even where radical-right parties remain outside government. In the Netherlands, migration and asylum restrictions became central political issues beyond Geert Wilders’ own electoral success. In Portugal, Chega has hardened public discourse around corruption, migration, and law-and-order politics, despite the country’s historically limited radical-right tradition.
The success of the populist radical right, therefore, is not solely the result of electoral breakthroughs. Its deeper success lies in its growing ability to redefine what is politically acceptable, institutionally legitimate, and publicly normalised within democratic politics. This transformation reflects what recent scholarship on the populist radical right describes as negative integration. As Mattia Zulianello notes, this is the construction of political cohesion through common threats, exclusionary boundaries, and opposition to perceived outsiders.
Yet events in contemporary Europe suggest that a further development may be underway. The populist radical right doesn't operate only through exclusionary mobilisation, but through what we might call boundary governing integration. It is gradually embedding political boundary-making within governance itself.
The populist radical right’s success lies not just in electoral breakthroughs, but in its ability to redefine political normality — shaping how democratic systems govern and normalise exclusion
This is shaping migration management, security frameworks, sexual identity politics, anti-gender mobilisation, public discourse, and the institutional definition of belonging and exclusion. The notion of boundary governing integration builds on broader traditions of boundary-making associated with Fredrik Barth, Michèle Lamont, and Andreas Wimmer. At the same time, it shifts attention from social boundary construction toward the institutional embedding of boundary-making within governance.
This transformation is especially visible in migration governance. Since the 2015 refugee crisis, most people see migration not simply as a humanitarian issue, but as a matter of security, sovereignty, and civilisational protection. Policies focused on deterrence, border fortification, and externalisation gradually moved from the political margins toward the institutional centre of European policymaking.
The digital sphere has only accelerated this process. On TikTok, X, Telegram, and YouTube, anti-migrant narratives, conspiracy theories, and nationalist resentment circulate rapidly across borders. Algorithms reward outrage, emotional intensity, and polarisation.
These days, populist radical-right politics circulates not just through traditional party communication, but via aesthetics, humour, and algorithmic virality
As Federico Taddei recently showed, even seemingly apolitical online memes such as the viral ‘nihilist penguin’, once absorbed into radical-right digital ecosystems, rapidly become vehicles for nationalist and exclusionary narratives. Contemporary populist radical-right politics circulates through aesthetics, humour, and algorithmic virality rather than traditional party communication alone.
The populist radical right has thus become more than a party family. Now, it is a broader communicative environment embedded within democratic life itself.
Historically, the populist radical right largely operated as an outsider force seeking electoral legitimacy and political normalisation. Contemporary Europe, however, points toward another phase of development. The populist radical right increasingly operates less as a discrete political actor and more as a diffuse governing ecosystem. It is increasingly embedded within institutions, policy agendas, media systems, and digital communication environments.
Can radical-right parties fully capture democratic institutions? This is no longer the most pressing concern. The deeper worry lies in the gradual embedding of radical-right governing logics within democratic systems themselves.
The future of the populist radical right may therefore not involve dramatic democratic breakdown. Rather, it may materialise as the normalisation of exclusionary politics within the everyday machinery of democracy.
