The European Commission has proposed letting member states drop the ‘connection requirement’ from the ‘safe third country’ concept in asylum cases. Gaia Romeo and Frowin Rausis argue this seemingly technical tweak marks a major shift — toward an ‘(un)safe fourth country’ approach that some countries have repeatedly tried, and failed
Across Europe, governments are increasingly distancing themselves from their responsibility to protect refugees. Until now, only non-EU countries or those with opt-outs from EU asylum rules have considered the idea of outsourcing asylum. But a new proposal by the Commission could soon shift this dynamic, potentially paving the way for agreements similar to the UK-Rwanda deal.
At first glance, the Commission’s new proposal on asylum appears technical: a refinement to facilitate the application of the ‘safe third country’ concept, which allows states to transfer responsibility for asylum seekers to another country under certain conditions. But behind this technical language lies a major political shift — and a sharp U-turn.
The New Pact on Migration and Asylum had already lowered the human rights and procedural guarantees to use the safe third country concept. The new proposal goes further, by dropping the suspensive effect of an appeal against a decision based on this concept. In particular, it allows EU member states to send asylum seekers to countries deemed ‘safe’ in the absence of any personal connection between the individual and that country. But in practice, the Commission is opening the door to what we can best describe as an ‘(un)safe fourth country’ policy.
By allowing member states to send asylum seekers to countries deemed ‘safe’ in the absence of any personal connection, the EU is effectively opening up an 'unsafe fourth country' policy
The idea behind the (un)safe fourth country policy is not new. Versions of it have circulated since the 1980s. And yet, outside a handful of cases overseas — most notably Australia, Israel, and the US — such schemes have rarely taken root. European countries, by contrast, have toyed with the idea of externalising refugee protection for decades. However, they have so far failed to put it into practice.
Only a few years ago, in 2021, the European Commission was openly critical when Denmark, operating outside the EU framework because it had opted out from EU asylum policy, passed legislation to enable the transfer of people for asylum processing and refugee protection to other countries. At that time, the Commission warned that such moves raised fundamental concerns about access to protection. The legislation also clashed with the spirit and the letter of EU law.
Today, the tone has changed. Now the Commission claims that allowing member states to externalise asylum will ease pressure on national systems, accelerate procedures, and maintain legal safeguards. Furthermore, the Commission's proposal even argues that such policies could lead to ‘increased responsibility sharing’ and ‘expand the global protection space’.
The European Commission claims that allowing member states to externalise asylum will ease pressure on national systems, accelerate procedures, and maintain legal safeguards
Besides pointing to human rights violations, commentators' concerns have focused primarily on the legality of such externalisation policies. The Commission, in contrast, presents the (un)safe fourth country approach as fully aligned with EU law. In so doing, it has not only bowed to member state pressure, but legitimised a policy marked by enduring appeal and continuous failure.
The implementation history of such policies in Europe has revealed three main problems: limited applicability, reverse effects, and potential for weaponisation.
First, implementation, when not altogether impossible, has proven extremely limited. Externalisation depends on bilateral cooperation with countries that have little incentive to cooperate. Under the 2016 EU-Turkey statement, Greece managed to return only 44 asylum seekers to Turkey under the ‘safe country’ rule. Despite repeated attempts, the United Kingdom has not sent one asylum seeker to Rwanda. The pattern is consistent: grand announcements, little follow-through.
Second, instead of accelerating asylum procedures and ‘fighting irregular migration’, deterrence policies tend to slow down asylum processing and increase the number of ‘irregularised migrants’. In Greece, thousands of asylum seekers were denied access to a full examination of their claims on the assumption that Turkey was ‘safe’ for them, even years after Turkey had stopped cooperating on returns. Only recently the Court of Justice of the EU ruled this approach unlawful. In the UK, the Rwanda plan absorbed political and administrative attention while creating massive backlogs. After reversing course, the Home Office resumed processing the previously stalled asylum claims — though now burdened with a much heavier caseload.
Third, the externalisation of asylum responsibility often entails handing power to authoritarian or unstable regimes. These arrangements are frequently informal, opaque, and lack effective mechanisms for oversight. Countries such as Turkey and Libya have shown how quickly migration cooperation can become a tool of leverage, used to extract political or financial concessions from Europe. Once the incentives are delivered, cooperation tends to fade. European states, for their part, remain bound by agreements they cannot enforce. This may expose them to political manipulation by regimes with limited regard for human rights.
What is now taking shape is not merely a technical reinterpretation of asylum rules. It is also a political concession to member states eager to avoid responsibility. Overall, the Commission has accepted a vision of solidarity that is transactional and evasive. The aim of the Common European Asylum System is to create a fair and efficient system based on shared responsibility. This aim now risks being hollowed out by a logic that allows states to shift burdens rather than share them.
The new EU asylum proposal is not merely a technical reinterpretation of asylum rules; it is also a political concession to member states eager to avoid responsibility
In legitimising the (un)safe fourth country policy, the Commission has not simply softened its tone or taken a more technocratic stance on a pressing issue. It has moved from critic to facilitator of offshoring refugee protection. However, given the legal, practical, and political challenges, it nevertheless remains unclear why future efforts would not reproduce past failures and pitfalls.
