Maya Ikene argues that the Iran war is not just disrupting gas markets, but redrawing Europe's energy alliances. As Italy and Spain both rushed to buy Algerian gas, the scramble reveals an uncomfortable truth: the green transition is underway, but not fast enough to prevent the next crisis
When the Iran war sent shockwaves through global energy markets in late February 2026, Europe's response was swift and geographically telling. Gas prices surged by over 50% within weeks. Storage levels, already unusually low for the season, offered little buffer. And within 24 hours of each other, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares both landed in Algiers.
Whatever their domestic political differences, Rome and Madrid converged on the same address when the gas ran short. That convergence reveals something important about where European energy geopolitics is heading.
The immediate trigger was the disruption to Qatari liquid natural gas (LNG) flows through the Strait of Hormuz, after QatarEnergy said it needed to declare force majeure on some LNG contracts. For Europe, the consequences were real but unevenly distributed.
Italy bore the brunt. Qatari LNG had accounted for roughly 10% of Italy's annual gas needs, a significant exposure for a country that also relies heavily on gas-fired power generation. The macroeconomic consequences are not trivial: rising energy costs could push Italian inflation up by close to a percentage point by year-end. Spain entered the crisis in a relatively stronger position, with a more diversified supply and higher reserves than many peers.
Spain and Italy are looking at the same external energy shock through very different structural lenses. Heavily reliant on Middle Eastern gas, Italy is bearing the brunt
This divergence is visible in electricity markets too. So far in 2026, gas has influenced the price of electricity in Spain during only around 15% of hours; in Italy, that figure has been closer to 89%. The two countries are looking at the same external shock through very different structural lenses.
What makes this moment geopolitically significant is not the emergency diplomacy itself, but what it reveals about Algeria's growing centrality to southern European energy security and the layered politics surrounding it.
Algeria is already a major supplier to both countries. It delivered around 20 billion cubic metres to Italy in 2024, approximately 30% of Italian consumption, with flows running through the Transmed pipeline via Tunisia. For Spain, Algeria is the primary pipeline supplier via the Medgaz, the direct submarine link to Almería. Both governments went to Algiers seeking more.
Meloni's visit produced commitments to deepen cooperation between Italy’s Eni and Algeria’s Sonatrach, including in offshore and shale gas exploration. The optics were clear: Italy, facing the steeper cliff, needed fast reassurance of supply. Albares arrived the following day with a slightly different posture. Spain, less exposed, was consolidating a strategic advantage — and a diplomatic relationship that had been badly frayed.
The Western Sahara dispute between Spain and Algeria has not been resolved. But energy urgency is quietly reshuffling its diplomatic weight
That diplomatic subtext matters. Spain and Algeria had fallen out sharply in 2022, after Madrid backed a Moroccan autonomy plan for the Western Sahara, a position Algiers views as support for its regional rival. The relationship cooled sharply, and energy ties became politically strained. The current crisis has accelerated a thaw that was already underway. During Albares' visit, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune confirmed he would reactivate the 2002 Treaty of Friendship between the two countries, suspended during those years of strain. The Western Sahara dispute has not been resolved. But energy urgency is quietly reshuffling its diplomatic weight.
The physical picture deserves some nuance. The Medgaz pipeline, Algeria’s direct submarine link to Spain, has limited headroom; talks are focused on an increase of up to 10%. A second route, the old Maghreb-Europe pipeline, which once carried Algerian gas through Morocco to Spain, has sat idle since 2021 when Algeria shut it down after its diplomatic rupture with Rabat. That route is not coming back anytime soon.
On the Italian side, the Transmed corridor via Tunisia has been more stable, and Algeria has signalled willingness to increase volumes. But whether Sonatrach can deliver substantially more gas in the near term remains uncertain.
Algeria is also planning larger infrastructure plays, including the long-discussed Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline designed to eventually channel Nigerian gas northward through existing Algerian corridors to Europe. It is part of Algeria's attempt to position itself not just as a supplier but as a continental transit hub. Even if revived, the pipeline remains a long-term ambition rather than a solution for Europe’s immediate gas shortages.
There is an uncomfortable pattern here. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Europe scrambled to reduce its dependence on Russian gas, pivoting toward US LNG, Norwegian pipeline flows, and North African suppliers, including Algeria. Now, with Qatari LNG disrupted, the same logic is playing out again, pushing harder into the same Algerian corridors. The geography shifts; the underlying dependency does not.
Spain's faster renewable deployment and diversified energy mix have strengthened the country's resilience to current energy shocks
Spain's relative resilience to this shock is partly a product of deliberate policy: faster renewable deployment and a more diversified electricity mix have reduced the country's structural exposure to gas price volatility. Italy's acute vulnerability reflects the cost of moving more slowly down the same path. That contrast is not incidental; it is the structural argument that EU energy policy has been making for years, now illustrated in real time.
The diplomatic choreography around Algiers was necessary. Algeria is a serious partner, and the Medgaz and Transmed pipelines are real infrastructure delivering real volumes. But Europe has now absorbed multiple energy shocks in four years. Each time, the emergency response is the same: find a new supplier, deepen bilateral ties, and defer the structural reckoning. Algeria is a serious partner, but so was Qatar, until it wasn't. At some point, Europe's real pivot will have to be away from this cycle of reactive pivots altogether.
