Vera Tika argues that contemporary illiberalism rarely arrives through dramatic democratic rupture. Instead, it advances quietly through routine governance and administrative practices that normalise exclusion. Examining Greece’s regulation of civil society, she shows how democratic erosion can occur incrementally — through law, procedure, and bureaucratic control
Illiberalism is often imagined as a rupture: a dramatic authoritarian turn, a constitutional coup, or an electoral landslide that openly dismantles liberal democracy. Yet much of contemporary democratic erosion does not look like rupture at all. It looks procedural, technical, even administrative.
In the mid-2020s, democratic backsliding increasingly unfolds not through the suspension of institutions, but through their recalibration. Elections continue. Courts function. Parliaments sit. Yet pluralism, civic space, and rights protections gradually narrow. Illiberalism becomes sustainable precisely because it is rendered lawful and routine.
Global assessments underscore this broader trend. The V-Dem Democracy Report documents a continuing wave of autocratisation across regime types. Freedom House’s Freedom in the World similarly records ongoing democratic decline worldwide. Increasingly, erosion takes place within the boundaries of legality rather than through regime collapse.
Several contributions to this series — including Gianfranco Baldini and Hugo Canihac’s discussion of the institutional dimensions of illiberalism and Marlene Laruelle’s analysis of its broader social transformation — have argued that illiberalism must be understood beyond leadership style or electoral outcomes. I extend that argument by focusing on administrative illiberalism: the use of regulatory frameworks, procedural requirements, and bureaucratic discretion to reshape democratic space without formally abolishing it.
Administrative illiberalism operates through friction rather than force. It raises compliance costs, increases discretionary power, and produces legal uncertainty. And it does so in ways that are formally defensible as governance, transparency, or security.
Greece provides a telling example.
Greece remains a formally liberal democracy within the European Union. It has competitive elections, an independent judiciary, and constitutional protections for rights. Yet in recent years, civil society organisations — particularly those working on migration, asylum, and human rights — have faced expanding administrative requirements.
In 2020–2022, the Greek government introduced mandatory NGO registries for organisations active in migration and asylum, requiring extensive documentation on funding sources, personnel, and operational plans, alongside approval procedures subject to ministerial discretion. While framed as measures to enhance transparency, coordination, and accountability in a high-pressure migration context, these frameworks significantly altered the operational environment for civil society actors.
Independent observers warned that the regulatory architecture, rather than merely organising the civic space, risked constraining it. Domestic watchdogs, including the Greek National Commission for Human Rights, also raised concerns that the cumulative effect risked being disproportionate, potentially deterring participation and narrowing civic space.
Since 2020, expanding administrative requirements for civil society organisations in Greece have recalibrated the balance between state oversight and associational autonomy
None of these measures abolished NGOs. None suspended elections. Nor did the measures dismantle constitutional guarantees. Instead, they recalibrated the conditions under which civil society could function, shifting the balance between administrative control and associational autonomy.
This is precisely how administrative illiberalism operates.
Regulation here does not eliminate pluralism outright. It restructures it. By increasing reporting obligations, tightening eligibility criteria, and expanding executive discretion, governance tools subtly redefine which actors are legitimate, which are suspect, and which must constantly prove their compliance.
A defining feature of this process is legalism. Illiberal governance does not abandon law; it instrumentalises it. Procedures, reporting requirements, and compliance rules constrain pluralism while preserving the appearance of rule-based order.
Illiberal governance does not abandon law; it instrumentalises it. When change unfolds within formal legality, it becomes difficult to recognise as democratic crisis
Because these changes unfold within formal legality, they are difficult to frame as democratic crisis. They are debated as policy choices, administrative reforms, or technical adjustments. Yet cumulatively, they alter the balance between state and society.
Civil society actors operate under greater scrutiny and uncertainty. Public narratives increasingly frame humanitarian work in securitised terms. Administrative oversight expands into areas previously governed by trust and association rights.
The effect is gradual narrowing, not dramatic collapse.
If democratic erosion occurred only through overt authoritarian rupture, it would be easier to identify and resist. Administrative illiberalism is more durable precisely because it feels procedural.
Citizens adapt. In contexts marked by economic strain, migration pressures, and prolonged crisis, regulatory expansion can appear reasonable. Calls for oversight and transparency resonate. Security arguments gain traction.
Over time, however, cumulative administrative pressure reshapes expectations. Narrowed rights become normal. Heightened oversight becomes routine. Civic participation becomes conditional.
Illiberalism, in this sense, is not simply an ideology. It is a governing technique.
Illiberalism in early 2026 is not primarily a politics of rupture. It is a politics of routine. Its strength lies in making democratic erosion appear lawful, technical, and administratively justified.
Illiberalism’s strength lies in making democratic erosion appear lawful, technical, and administratively justified
The Greek case illustrates how democratic backsliding can occur not through institutional collapse, but through incremental regulatory recalibration. When governance tools subtly redefine the boundaries of civic legitimacy, democracy does not disappear. It contracts.
Understanding illiberalism as administrative normalisation clarifies why democratic erosion can advance within formally liberal systems — and why defending democracy requires attention not only to elections and leaders, but to the everyday practices through which power is exercised and civic space is quietly restructured.
No.45 a thread on the 'illiberal wave' 🌊 sweeping world politics
