A new layer of deterrence: the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement

Syeda Saba Batool argues that a new defence agreement between Pakistan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia could diversify regional security options. It may also strengthen collective deterrence, and reshape the security architecture of West and South Asia

The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA) was signed by Pakistan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia on 7 August 2026. The agreement seeks to diversify regional security arrangements and provide greater strategic stability in an increasingly volatile environment spanning West and South Asia.

The MJDA reflects growing concern among its signatories about the reliability and adequacy of existing security guarantees. Yet its ultimate significance will depend on whether the MJDA's collective-defence commitment translates into credible action during a crisis. The question is not whether the agreement is symbolically important, but whether it can meaningfully alter the calculations of potential adversaries.

A new security option

Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait and other Middle Eastern states could eventually join the MJDA. This would raise the prospect of a broader regional security framework. The agreement could significantly reshape the region's deterrence landscape, and provide states with alternatives to existing security arrangements if the membership expands.

However, important questions remain. How would individual members respond if another signatory came under attack? Would political support be sufficient, or would members provide military assistance? These questions become particularly complex when potential conflicts involve states that maintain overlapping alliances and security partnerships.

The Agreement's credibility will depend on whether it can convert collective-defence rhetoric into a practical deterrent capable of influencing state behaviour

Türkiye’s dual role as both an MJDA member and a NATO ally illustrates these challenges. More broadly, the Agreement's credibility will depend on whether it can convert collective-defence rhetoric into a practical deterrent capable of influencing state behaviour.

Collective deterrence

At the heart of the MJDA is the principle of collective deterrence. States seeking greater strategic autonomy, while maintaining existing alliances, may view the MJDA as an additional layer of security rather than a replacement for current arrangements. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has already suggested that Egypt, which he described as a 'natural partner', could join once the agreement's legal and operational details are clarified.

Gaps and opportunities

The MJDA's most significant challenge lies in the ambiguity surrounding its implementation. Türkiye's obligations under NATO, for example, raise questions about how it would respond if an MJDA member became involved in a conflict with a state that maintains close ties with Western allies.

Yet strategic ambiguity can also enhance deterrence. Potential adversaries may be reluctant to test the agreement if the scale of a collective response remains uncertain. By avoiding rigid commitments at this early stage, the signatories preserve flexibility while signalling that aggression against one member could trigger broader regional consequences. In this sense, uncertainty itself may contribute to deterrence.

Potential adversaries may be reluctant to test the agreement if the scale of a collective response remains uncertain

The agreement is 'purely defensive' and not directed against any state. Nor is it intended to replace Western security guarantees. Rather, it seeks to strengthen the Middle Eastern security architecture through collective deterrence against external aggression. Its credibility will therefore depend on the capabilities and relationships that underpin the agreement.

Historically, Pakistan has for decades provided training and technical assistance to Saudi forces. Türkiye and Pakistan have maintained defence cooperation through exchanges of warships, training aircraft and other military capabilities. Saudi Arabia is also a major purchaser of Turkish drones. Pakistan deployed around 8,000 troops, fighter jets, drones and an air-defence system to Saudi Arabia, demonstrating an existing security cooperation.

These established defence links give the MJDA a practical foundation that goes beyond diplomacy. If institutionalised through real strategic and defence cooperation, such an agreement can provide a more credible deterrent and increase the costs of any external attack on a signatory.

Challenging assumptions

The MJDA does not constitute a wholly new security order, nor does it seek to replace existing frameworks. Rather, it reflects a growing desire among regional powers to diversify their security relationships in response to an increasingly uncertain international environment.

The agreement also highlights concerns about the effectiveness of established security mechanisms. As confidence in traditional guarantees becomes less certain, states are exploring alternative partnerships that can supplement, rather than supplant, existing alliances.

For Türkiye, this means balancing its NATO commitments with its obligations under the MJDA. For Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the agreement provides an opportunity to broaden their strategic options while signalling a greater willingness to rely on regional partnerships for security.

Regional perceptions

Some commentators have speculated that the MJDA could evolve into a Sunni-led security bloc aimed at balancing Iranian influence. However, the signatories and Iranian officials have publicly rejected this interpretation.

How regional actors perceive the agreement will play an important role in determining its future effectiveness and ability to attract new members

Türkiye's President Erdoğan has emphasised that the agreement is not directed against any particular state. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei also suggested that the pact reflects broader regional concerns about dependence on external security guarantees rather than hostility towards Iran. How regional actors perceive the agreement will nevertheless play an important role in determining its future effectiveness and ability to attract new members.

The South Asian angle

The agreement may have important implications for South Asia. Türkiye and Pakistan maintain a close defence relationship, with extensive cooperation in military production and defence procurement. Türkiye already supplies Pakistan with unmanned aerial vehicles and military drones. The MJDA institutionalises that cooperation within a broader multilateral framework.

For Pakistan, the agreement could strengthen deterrence by increasing the diplomatic and strategic costs associated with a future crisis. If potential adversaries believe a conflict could draw in additional regional actors, they may become more cautious about military escalation. Whether this translates into tangible deterrent effects remains uncertain, but the agreement is clearly intended to influence strategic calculations beyond its immediate membership.

This article presents the views of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the ECPR or the Editors of The Loop.

Author

Photograph of Syeda Saba Batool
Syeda Saba Batool
Research Officer, Strategic Vision Institute Islamabad

Syeda serves as a board member of the Emerging Voices Network (EVN-Nuclear).

She is also a woman expert at the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN).

An alumna of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Vienna and Hanns Seidel Foundation, she holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.

As an emerging expert on peaceful nuclear applications, nuclear safety, security, and energy security, she has contributed to leading platforms such as SCMP, LSE Blogs, Stimson Center, 9DashLine, Inkstick Media, Pakistan Horizon, British Pugwash, Wavell Room, and BASIC.

@TheSabaShahh

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