Are we nearing a new incarnation of the French vision of a Gaullist Europe? Focusing on strategic autonomy, nuclear deterrence, coalitions of the willing, threat perception, and defence capability, Amélie Jaques-Apke examines the strategic dilemmas, and conceptual and operational deficiencies, in European defence policy
Discussions about transatlantic defence cooperation and security are taking place amid growing geopolitical uncertainty. US priorities regarding Europe's ability to defend itself and respond to territorial threats are changing. Key concerns currently defining policy discussions also include NATO's credibility and new spending goals.
EU institutions should redefine the geographic scope of defence commitments. The current EU approach undermines strategic coherence and makes it easier for adversaries to test the bloc's limits. Moreover, security policy has extended beyond borders for more than twenty years, and is increasingly vulnerable to hybrid attacks. The EU must anticipate new policies for national and collective defence.
The growing uncertainty surrounding US commitments, President Trump's authoritarian drift, and erratic foreign policy, are straining relations with Europe and NATO. The regularly refractured political trust in and credibility of the United States is putting NATO's Article 5, the cornerstone of collective defence, under constant pressure. As a result, transatlanticists in Washington are debating the quest for European strategic autonomy, reevaluating burden-sharing and urgent issues of territorial integrity. 'How can credible deterrence endure in the absence of assured US leadership?'
One of the biggest challenges facing European security and defence is striking a balance between striving for greater independence and maintaining the necessary transatlantic ties. The transatlantic alliance is undergoing a gradual decline, prompting a shift in hemispheric power dynamics between the United States and the European Union within the broader context of global geopolitics. This raises a pressing question: how can the EU effectively counterbalance an increasingly unpredictable and unreliable US partner? Strengthening European defence requires a dual approach, whereby Europe assumes more operational responsibility while maintaining a balanced, albeit redefined partnership with the US and NATO. However, it might become more difficult to sustain this vision, because Republican support for NATO is waning. Continued over-reliance on an impulsive and unstable ally undermines the EU's capacity to maintain strategic stability and tackle emerging threats, particularly given the increasingly strong MAGA alliance. However, the EU is significantly purchasing raw military power from the United States, and this remains unchanged by the new EU-US trade agreement.
European defence policy must now strike a balance between striving for greater independence and maintaining transatlantic ties
As European policy-makers and analysts reiterate, the EU cannot engage and destroy high-value military targets at operational and strategic depth without US support. While some advocate for independent defence structures, others support NATO's capacity-building and a European NATO pillar. Rather than basing policy on the unpredictable US, European actors must take the lead in defining and protecting their interests. This includes new strategic alliances with partners such as the United Kingdom, and a more integrated role for Ukraine in the continent's defence planning.
Anticipating political differences and institutional blocking, European policy-makers are increasingly turning to flexible forms of cooperation, or 'coalitions of the willing and capable'. Such coalitions appear to be the only viable alternative to the status quo, as they enable groups of states to take decisive action. They also offer flexibility by bypassing EU and NATO procedural deadlock. Legal ambiguity and institutional fragmentation, however, cause problems with inconsistency and legitimacy. These result from the absence of a well-defined and politically supported legal basis. Confronted with such challenges, coalitions risk weakening multilateral norms and causing strategic fragmentation.
A forward-looking strategy will require new institutional frameworks that maintain flexibility while establishing minimum requirements for accountability, interoperability, and strategic coherence. These arrangements must be flexible enough to react quickly to changing threats without requiring consensus among EU members. The Defence Readiness Omnibus is a good start.
There is also growing concern about the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella and Europe's autonomous deterrence capability. While the UK and France possess nuclear weapons, Europe lacks a shared doctrine or unified strategy. Proponents of a French-led nuclear umbrella as a backup argue that a more independent European deterrent would reduce reliance, and enhance the strategic credibility of European nations. However, the concept remains controversial.
Uncoordinated nuclear policy could confuse deterrence signalling, and divide European security responsibilities. Non-nuclear EU member states are especially reluctant to reach a political agreement.
There is growing concern about the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella and Europe's autonomous deterrence capability
This impasse reveals a deeper issue: Europe's strategic incoherence. The concept of grand strategy, aligning ends, ways, and means, has proved elusive in the European context. Internal divisions, differing threat assessments, and overlapping institutional mandates prevent the formation of a unified vision. Nevertheless, integrating UK and French capabilities into a broader deterrent, either formally or de facto, may provide a basis for a credible fallback architecture.
An increasing number of hybrid challenges are undermining Europe's security architecture. These include disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, economic coercion, and the sabotage of energy and information infrastructure, alongside conventional threats.
Such violations of international norms exploit democratic openness and institutional ambiguity, making them particularly insidious. Investments in cyber resilience, and infrastructure hardening, are now important pillars for national and EU defence. Governments should integrate them into a new structured policy agenda, and communicate these priorities to a polarised European society.
Meanwhile, the link between economic sovereignty and strategic autonomy must be sharpened, particularly regarding energy dependency and technological supply chains.
What if NATO fails to establish a European pillar, and the EU's new coalitions of the willing prove unreliable? The only feasible strategic horizon for European security and defence integration is Ukraine's battlefield resilience and its growing defence industry.
The unpredictability of US foreign policy is accelerating the fragmentation of the postwar liberal international order
Once considered a deterrent feature by French President Macron, Europe’s reliance on strategic ambiguity could become a heavy burden. Indeed, it may hinder the formation of an explicit EU foreign policy strategy. Security relies not only on capability but on avoiding institutional paralysis and fostering resilience. Europe must, therefore, move swiftly towards a consistent strategic identity.
The unpredictability of US foreign policy is accelerating the fragmentation of the postwar liberal international order. A more pragmatic approach – a 'not-so-grand strategy' – should become the new hot topic in Brussels. The strategy should centre on three actionable priorities: enhancing military readiness, expanding defence industrial capacity, and clarifying command-and-control structures. Such challenges require more than mere rhetorical reaffirmations; they need coherent strategic responses grounded in political will.
