EU enlargement to Ukraine is a strategic necessity, but cannot rest on geopolitics alone. To avoid backlash, the EU must confront policy dilemmas openly, from rule of law to agriculture, and offer realistic compromises. Antoaneta Dimitrova argues that public support depends on political leaders’ ability to offer a credible narrative to counter real challenges and dilemmas
The Russia-Ukraine war has set EU enlargement on a new path. Decisions influenced by urgency and high politics punctuate what is essentially still a merit-based process of negotiations and reforms. Yet the danger of a new deadlock looms from within the EU itself. Domestic political dynamics, the rise of constraining dissensus, and the growing politicisation of European integration threaten to derail the renewed enlargement agenda.
The next wave of enlargement, especially to war-torn Ukraine, cannot rest on geopolitical imperatives alone. As Veronica Anghel argued in this series' foundational blog, enlargement is no longer optional; it is a strategic necessity. But necessity does not erase complex dilemmas. EU policymakers must articulate realistic arguments and offer clear solutions to anticipated challenges, from agriculture to free movement of workers. If they do not, those who focus on potential challenges for citizens and sectors could pre-empt the big geopolitical narrative.
As geopolitical shocks multiply, so too do the stakes for EU foreign policy. US President Trump’s so-called 'peace talks' with President Putin and the disastrous Oval Office meeting with President Zelenskyy on 28 February, exactly three years after Ukraine submitted its EU membership application, have only strengthened the case for enlargement. Trump has made overtures to Moscow, while Putin’s uncompromising rhetoric demands NATO retreat to pre-1997 borders. All this has reintroduced the idea of spheres of influence, a concept in fundamental opposition to the idea of the EU as a project of peace and integration.
Ukraine risks complete disintegration under a potential US-Russia deal. If the EU fails to prevent this, it could represent a severe blow to the European Union's aspirations to be a geopolitical power and the Union's capacity to defend its values
Ukraine risks complete political or economic disintegration under a potential US-Russia deal. If the EU fails to prevent this, it could represent a severe blow to the EU's aspirations to be a geopolitical power, and would call into question the EU’s capacity to defend its values.
The 2013–2014 Revolution of Dignity – the Euromaidan – made clear that Ukrainians chose the EU. Since then, Ukraine’s challenges have forced Brussels to adapt and innovate. Ukraine’s membership application, met by the EU’s confirmation that Ukraine belongs to the European family, remains a test for the credibility of EU policy.
Still, even strategic imperatives must contend with real dilemmas of enlargement. Enlargement driven primarily by geopolitics risks undermining the core principle of merit-based accession, which ensures candidates have completed key reforms. If the EU accepts candidates without credible rule-of-law reforms, accession may later lead to paralysis in decision-making. A case in point are the current struggles to circumvent Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s veto in the European Council. The EU must maintain merit-based progress as the core principle of enlargement negotiations, even if geopolitical pressures shape final decisions.
While mainstream parties have floundered, far-right parties have seized the opportunity to push integration into the spotlight, framing it as a Bad Thing
There is also the broader issue of politicisation. Over the past two decades, European integration has become deeply politicised. Far-right parties have pushed integration into the spotlight, framing it as a Bad Thing. Mainstream parties, meanwhile, have floundered. As the 2016 Dutch referendum on Ukraine’s Association Agreement revealed, even the mere prospect of enlargement can become a lightning rod for Eurosceptics. A recent letter from Nordic and Baltic member states argues the EU should move quickly with enlargement, not just with (easy candidate) Montenegro, but with Ukraine and others. If that is indeed the case, the EU cannot ignore this dynamic.
A geopolitical narrative for enlargement did not previously exist among citizens of enlargement-sceptic member states. Member states must therefore develop alternative narratives. EU policymakers need to craft clear, specific messages that explain why enlargement, particularly to Ukraine, is not a threat. Their messaging should address foreseeable challenges honestly and realistically.
On defence, the argument for EU enlargement is perhaps the clearest. Ukraine is capable of contributing to EU defence through innovation, expertise and experience. More broadly, Anghel rightly stresses that integrating countries targeted by Russian aggression forces the EU to become more cohesive in its own defence posture.
More contentious are questions of redistribution after potential accession of Ukraine: cohesion funds, budgetary contributions, and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Here, creativity and flexibility will be required. Ukraine’s agribusinesses and farmers, globally competitive before the war, may need to be excluded from CAP benefits for an extended transitional period. Such an arrangement would require political courage and goodwill from Kyiv. In addition, capping payments to large-scale farms could mitigate potential policy imbalances.
The real financial burden of Ukrainian EU accession will come not from normal budgetary contributions, but from postwar reconstruction
Michael Emerson’s dynamic analysis of EU budget and cohesion trends adds further nuance. Emerson argues that many of today’s cohesion recipients may, by the time of Ukraine’s accession, be too wealthy to qualify. In other words, the fiscal impact of Ukraine’s accession may be less dramatic than often assumed. Moreover, Ukraine’s educated workforce and innovation potential will likely accelerate its convergence. The real financial burden, Emerson notes, will come not from normal budgetary contributions, but from postwar reconstruction. That challenge lies ahead, but the costs of inaction, from continued regional instability and migration to diminished EU global standing, may prove far greater.
If the EU fails to address these challenges now, it risks a backlash. Making Ukraine empty promises, especially coupled with rhetorical action on both sides, is not an option if the EU wants to keep enlargement policy credible. Without concrete solutions and viable compromises, the impetus for enlargement will be lost.
The EU must frame enlargement to Ukraine as both a geopolitical imperative and a manageable policy change. That requires investments in communication, in transparency, and in designing transition regimes that can bridge the gap between solidarity and sustainability.
Crucially, this debate should not happen behind closed doors. The EU must move enlargement out of the realm of elite discourse and into the public sphere. Citizens across the Union, especially in member states wary of enlargement, deserve an honest debate about the stakes and the costs, of enlargement and of deadlock.
