Statehood, referendums, and the plebiscitarian myth 

Marc Sanjaume-Calvet challenges the widespread belief that independence referendums are definitive acts of self-determination. Drawing on cases from Western Sahara to Bougainville, he argues that these votes often serve merely symbolic or strategic functions. Here, he reveals the persistent gap between democratic aspirations and the real politics of statehood 

In Western Sahara, a pledge still echoes: a long-promised referendum on independence, first guaranteed in 1991 by the UN, remains perpetually delayed, out of reach for the Sahrawi people. Thousands of miles away in the archipelago of Bougainville, an overwhelming 97% voted for independence from Papua New Guinea in 2019. Years later, however, the result has yet to be implemented

These cases reveal the often-cruel allure of independence referendum politics: a democratic ritual that kindles hope, signals legitimacy, but doesn't necessarily deliver sovereignty. Here, I explore how referendums, far from being decisive acts of self-determination, are often mere strategic milestones in the long, uncertain path to statehood. 

Independence referendums: who and when? 

When people imagine an independence referendum, they often picture a moment of pure democracy: a community voting freely to decide its own destiny. But in reality, independence referendums rarely function as exact exercises of pure popular self-determination. Most of the time, they serve more strategic and symbolic purposes than deciding who gets to form a new state. 

Few independence referendums have led directly to new states emerging through a simple popular vote

As I explain in a recent article, since 1945, dozens of independence referendums have taken place around the world. Yet very few have led directly to new states emerging through a simple popular vote. Instead, governments have used referendums in different ways. Understanding how these referendums work means paying attention to two crucial factors: who calls the referendum, and when it takes place. 

A typology 

Some regional movements initiate referendums unilaterally, without the consent of the parent state authorities. Others are the result of agreements between the secessionists, the parent state, and sometimes international mediators. Timing matters too: some happen while a region is still under central government control; others occur after a local authority has already established de facto independence. 

Four ideal types of independence referendums, according to actors and timing 

 Before independence After independence 
Unilateral  Leverage  Signalling 
Bilateral / multilateral Decision Ratification 

Depending on these factors, as the table shows, we can group independence referendums into four main (ideal) types. 

Secessionist movements launch leverage referendums, hoping to pressure the parent state into negotiations. One such example is the 2017 Catalan referendum. The goal here is not necessarily to declare (and enforce) independence immediately, but to use the demonstration of popular support as a bargaining tool. 

Signalling referendums occur in places where secessionists already control the territory (they are a de facto authority) and want to show their population and the international community that their claim to independence is serious and legitimate. Examples include the Crimea vote in 2014 in Ukraine. This referendum, which happened prior to Russia's official annexation, took place with Russian support. 

Independence referendums fall into four types; leverage, signalling, decision and ratification

Decision referendums are the rarest. These happen when the parent state and the secessionists agree beforehand to let the people decide their future through a vote. One such was the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. This is the clearest example of a referendum genuinely settling a sovereignty issue by popular vote. 

Lastly, ratification referendums happen following conflicts or peace agreements. Their main purpose is to confirm a new political status that has already been negotiated. An example is the 2011 referendum in South Sudan

A realistic and strategic approach 

The idealistic image of referendums is a pure expression of democracy. Despite this, real-world secession usually depends far more on power struggles, international politics, and strategic calculations than on ballot boxes. Especially since the end of the Cold War, the international community often expects a referendum as part of the 'proper' way to seek independence. But this expectation has not changed the underlying reality: most successful bids for independence have depended on whether the parent state consents, and whether powerful international actors are willing to recognise the new state. 

Most successful bids for independence have depended on whether the parent state consents, and whether powerful international actors are willing to recognise the new state

Sometimes, as in the 2017 Kurdistan Region independence referendum, overwhelming majorities vote for independence. But even in cases such as these, governments often ignore or suppress the results, or they may lead only to temporary political gains without real sovereignty. Some cases are even harder to classify. The Bougainville referendum of 2019, for example, gave a 97% majority for independence to this territory belonging to Papua New Guinea over an autonomy offer. However, unlike the South Sudan case, Bougainville’s peace talks with Papuan authorities did not include an automatic acceptance of the referendum result. Since then, Bougainvilleans have been negotiating their path to statehood without apparent success. 

The gap between appearance and reality 

The gap between the appearance of democracy and the reality of secession shows how difficult true self-determination remains. While the principle that 'the people should decide' is powerful and appealing, it rarely governs how new states are actually created. Understanding this dynamic is essential for anyone who wants to make sense of why some independence movements succeed and why so many do not.

This article presents the views of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the ECPR or the Editors of The Loop.

Author

photograph of Marc Sanjaume-Calvet
Marc Sanjaume-Calvet
Assistant Professor of Political Theory, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona

Formerly, Marc was Assistant Professor at Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Advisor at Self-Government Studies Institute - Institut d’Estudis de l’Autogovern and Visiting Researcher at Edinburgh University in Scotland and Laval University in Quebec.

He was a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre de recherche interdisciplinaire sur la diversité et la démocratie at Université du Québec à Montréal.

Marc's research has been published in the Journal of Politics, Party Politics, Nations and Nationalism, Democratization, Canadian Journal of Political Science and Representation, Global Studies Quarterly, and The Journal of Federalism among others.

Personal website

@marcsanjaume

@msanjaume.bsky.social

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