The study of the populist radical right has recently turned to localism. Elisa Bellè argues that this is related to the distinctly territorial nature of some of its successes
A deeper understanding of the current consolidation of the radical right across countries requires a territorial and context-sensitive approach. Much empirical evidence confirms the importance of the local dimension. During the Brexit referendum, for example, many coastal cities and former industrial centres voted Leave. Looking back in time, the Front National (now Rassemblement National) found its electoral stronghold in the south-east of France, a region with a deep-rooted military and colonial culture. Similarly, Italy's Lega Nord (now Lega) has, since its inception, established its most rooted electoral presence in small to very small municipalities, becoming the voice of the 'deep province'.
A major factor explaining the renewed relevance of local arenas is the structural transformation of the economic system. Globalisation has contributed to the creation of new territorial cleavages, creating 'winners and losers' not only in the labour market but also in territorial terms. One of the main cleavages is the contrast between new 'superstar cities' with service, cultural and financial-based economies and depressed areas of deindustrialisation. Intertwined with this are processes of institutional reform. Since the 1980s, these processes have decentralised decision-making power from the national to the sub-national level in Western democracies.
The issue of places ‘left behind’ and centre/periphery fractures must not, however, tempt us to simplify a complex issue such as the electoral geography of the populist radical right. One key point to note here is the ideological work these parties have done with respect to space and territories. In a framework of structural changes, they intervene by exploiting fractures and territorial tensions for ideological purposes.
The radical right depicts the metropolis as the realm of privileged and morally corrupt elites
Indeed, several studies have recently highlighted the radical right’s emphasis on feelings of local attachment and identity. Localism is the new watchword. It reconfigures the liberalism/traditionalism cleavage, making the ‘little old world’ of the province a place of supposed moral purity. This imagined local community stands in opposition to the metropolis, depicted as the realm of privileged and morally corrupt elites (identities we generally associate with cosmopolitanism). This mix of traditionalism, anti-intellectualism and authoritarianism allows to convey a political and cultural message, concealed within the folds of local sentiment.
This forced folklorisation of the local has proved ideologically effective, binding the populist, the reactionary, and the authoritarian elements. It has exploited one of the most seductive suggestions of radical-right populism: namely, nostalgia for a mythical past, an invented golden age of harmony, order, law, and tradition.
In a recent comparative ethnographic analysis, co-authored with Félicien Faury, we focus on two small to medium-sized towns governed by the Rassemblement National. We show how this celebration of the local reinforces nativism and exclusionary politics. The populist local homeland retains communitarian features. In the sociological sense of Ferdinand Tönnies, this is the community of mechanical solidarity, as opposed to the complexity, fluidity and transience of contemporary social ties. This imagined, idealised and ideologised local community is a place of and for natives. One belongs by blood, soil and 'traditions'.
But what does the empirical study of the radical right in local power tell us? And why is it important to engage more systematically in studying this level of power?
Local arenas are often crucial decision-making spaces, which can have larger-scale repercussions.
First, we should remember that subnational politics is not a less important version of national politics. Local arenas are often crucial decision-making spaces, which can have larger-scale repercussions. One good example is the impact of large infrastructures and energy conversion on climate change. Moreover, access to local government by various populist radical-right parties allows them to gain entrenchment and legitimacy. This aspect can play a vital role in the public and scientific discussion on mainstreaming and normalisation of this political family in liberal democracies. Indeed, governing locally allows the populist radical right to manage power, consolidate electorally, and build networks of socio-political alliances with notable locals.
Local arenas provide the ideal setting to test policies that it can then extend on a larger scale. Some ideologically foundational issues for the populist radical right are particularly expendable at the local level. A key strategy is the implementation of securitarian and law-and-order policies that tend to marginalise the ‘undesirable’ from public spaces. Think, for example, of the 30-year policy of ordinances enacted by Lega Nord mayors in Italy to remove homeless people and beggars, close down ‘ethnic’ shops, but also prevent political processions from passing through historic city centres.
Populists can remodel local welfare policies on an exclusionary and nativist basis
Another major issue is local welfare policies, which radical right populists can remodel on an exclusionary and nativist basis. An example of this ‘localisation of rights’ is, again, provided by the Lega Nord. The party has a longstanding agenda of local welfare chauvinism. This political programme is usually founded on exclusionary criteria, such as the number of years a person has been resident in a place.
Finally, a relevant implication of the populist radical right’s growth in a territorial context is its mainstreaming influence on the social fabric. An increasing body of literature points to the highly polarising effect of populist radical-right parties’ accession, which tends to sharply divide detractors and supporters. These polarising effects are often accompanied by the mobilisation of parts of civil society. To understand them, we need to contextualise the conflict, by relating it to different subcultures and territorial political traditions.
No.84 in a Loop thread on the Future of Populism. Look out for the 🔮 to read more
