Russia-friendly parties are exploiting Europe’s war-torn past to justify Russian aggression and undermine Europe’s support for Ukraine. Polina Zavershinskaia argues that there is evidence in Germany and Italy that the strategy is working
Across Europe, Russia-friendly parties and actors are gaining popular support with their distorted interpretations of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Political parties sympathetic to Russia often focus their pro-Russia arguments on NATO’s so-called eastward expansion. On 24 February 2024, Vladimir Putin gave a speech in which he claimed, among other things, that Russia had a 'moral obligation' to do something about security in Ukraine. His claims have since reverberated around the globe through storytelling by pro-Russian parties and actors.
The storytelling varies. Some parties justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine by suggesting that Russia was forced into the conflict by its clash of interests with the US. Others use whitewashing techniques – such as claiming that Ukraine was artificially created by Soviet leaders – to suggest that Russia is taking back its own territories legitimately.
Behind the storytelling there are strategies at work. Russia-friendly parties and actors make parallels with Europe's traumatic past – and its many destructive wars – to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
This is, paradoxically, a reversal of the way parties usually mobilise stories from Europe’s collective past for political gain. Throughout the 20th century, the various collective traumas of two world wars, Nazism and fascism, the postwar communist influence, and, finally, the Cold War and its legacy, all had a profound effect on the development of European democracies.
European political actors frequently reference Europe's traumatic past in discourse surrounding Russia's invasion of Ukraine
European political actors frequently project this collective trauma into the discourse surrounding Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Referencing past injustices, democratic actors have been encouraging European populations to support policies which facilitate Ukrainian resistance against autocracy.
Now, Russia-friendly parties are using similar techniques for their own ends. This is particularly noticeable in Germany and Italy, which both suffered significant traumas during the World Wars. Russia-friendly parties justify Russian aggression through distorted retrospective storytelling, denying the legitimate existence of Ukraine. They also capitalise on people's fear of a full-scale NATO war with Russia, condemning European and domestic politicians who direct aid to Ukraine, and calling for peace negotiations.
The Russia-friendly parties Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) were both successful in recent elections in eastern Germany.
In their campaign messaging around the Russian invasion, both parties referenced Germany's traumatic past. By linking the current conflict to the two World Wars, AfD and BSW predict another defeat for Germany (and its NATO allies) against Russia. These parties suggest that the current German government's support for Ukraine could escalate the conflict with Russia. They also condemn the German government for having learned nothing from previous defeats. For instance, AfD compared the current German aid to Ukraine with the actions of the German Empire's powermongering Kaiser, which led to the country's defeat during World War I, and also with the Nazi aggression which, eventually, led to Germany's defeat and destruction during World War II.
Russia-friendly parties in Germany urge immediate diplomatic resolution of the conflict in Ukraine
Russia-friendly parties in Germany urge immediate diplomatic resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. They reference Germany's Eastern Policy, Ostpolitik, and its responsibility towards the East European states – including the Soviet Union – in the aftermath of World War II. In doing so, they imply that Russia is the legitimate successor to the Soviet Union.
These parties couple such storytelling with calls to maintain the post-Cold War consensus in Europe. With their pseudo-pacifist strategies, AfD and BSW misattribute the origin of the Russian invasion to Russia-USA 'power games'. They also capitalise on Germany’s role as a peacemaker, and its purported debt to Russia for facilitating German reunification.
‘Italy is not good at war-making … it is good at mediating'. So claimed Arnaldo Lomuti, a senator of the left-wing populist Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S), in 2023. MS5 maintains popularity in several Italian regions.
M5S (in opposition) and Lega (a member of Giorgia Meloni’s right-wing coalition government) argue for immediate peace negotiations with Russia. They oppose weapon deliveries to Ukraine, as agreed by EU members to support Ukraine’s defence against Russia.
M5S and Lega both employ traumatic retrospective storytelling to justify their positions on the Russian invasion. Opposing EU policies towards Ukraine, these parties, especially the Eurosceptic Lega, claim that Western Europe always drags Italy into war against its best interests. They argue that Italy is a facilitator of peace, not a war-maker.
M5S and Lega argue that Italy is a facilitator of peace, not a war-maker
To justify their arguments, both parties often reference the Italian Constitution on which Italy's postwar development was founded. Indeed, they suggest that opting for peace between Russia and Ukraine expresses the Constitution's Italian-Christian values. They also portray the EU as a careless provocateur, invoking the trauma inflicted by Marxist-Leninist Red Brigades terrorism during the 1970s and 1980s.
Finally, historic anti-US bias among some on the Italian left is also apparent in M5S’s framing of the Russian invasion. M5S frequently claims that the conflict in Ukraine is America's responsibility because it provokes conflicts around the world – such as the war in Iraq – to satisfy US interests.
Politicians often reference Europe's historic traumas as part of the democratic discourse that aims to overcome that trauma and create collective consensus. But many political actors are now exploiting and distorting those stories of trauma to justify the Russian invasion, and to undermine support for Ukraine.
All this shows how there is urgent need for a more careful and critical approach to the way we talk about European history and the collective past. This is essential to ensure historical accuracy, and to prevent political actors manipulating history to justify present-day antidemocratic actions and responses.
