Lucas Sudbrack and James F. Downes describe how growing income inequality across Europe has strengthened support for far-right parties. Using decades of national and individual-level data, they find that when the poorest citizens lose a significant share of national income, the far-right vote share rises
Rising inequality is a defining feature of our times, and the rise of Europe’s far-right is part of that trend. Deepening economic divides are fuelling far-right success: parties often promise protective measures for the native population while blaming migrants and refugees for 'stealing jobs' or living off countries' welfare systems.
Most studies on income inequality look at national averages. The Gini Index, for example, shows how income is distributed across a country. But averages can hide what’s really happening within different sectors of society.
Our research examines how income shares have shifted between groups, from poorest to richest, between 1980 and 2020. The results are striking. As the poorest quarter of Europeans' share of national income shrank, support for far-right parties rose. When those at the bottom lose ground, frustration grows, and the far right gains strength.
Between 1980 and 2020, as the poorest quarter of Europeans' share of national income shrank, support for far-right parties rose
To better understand the connection between inequality and personal choices, we also looked at how income levels have affected the voting choices of tens of thousands of Europeans over the past twenty years.
We found that the shrinking incomes of the poorest quarter of the population did indeed boost support for the far right. But it is not necessarily those who are poorest and feel they have no money who turn to these parties.
Rather, among the poorest quarter, far-right voters are more likely to be those who perceive their income to be moderate. But the effect is even stronger among those somewhat better off than the poorest quarter, regardless of their income perceptions.
As incomes within their social class decline, the poorest people feel financially powerless – and explore electoral alternatives. People with limited resources, who believe they have something to lose, are most likely to be drawn to far-right parties.
Immigration often dominates the headlines. Our research suggests, however, that the root of far-right support lies not in fear of immigration, but in the inherent inequalities and social competition of neoliberalism. As inequality increases, and the poorest in society become further disadvantaged, anxiety grows across all income levels. People feel that their social status, and even their livelihoods, are under threat.
The recent rise of European far-right parties may well be a consequence of neoliberalism, rather than simply a direct response to rising immigration
As a result, they are more likely to feel betrayed by the political elite and to distrust culturally or ethnically different groups. Strong anti-establishment rhetoric that emphasises traditional values fosters pride among those who fear they are being left behind.
Europe is facing an increasing threat from the far right, who are no longer on the political fringes. Italy’s Brothers of Italy and France’s Rassemblement National now influence national debates. Such parties have even formed coalition governments. In response, mainstream political parties adopted anti-immigration policies that blur political lines.
In Hungary and Poland, far-right parties have undermined liberal democratic norms from within, challenging the very basis of European democracy. The success of these parties is a sign that liberal values are under increasing threat in many parts of Europe. Economic insecurity is a key reason.
To counter the rise of the far right, governments must address the economic inequality driving insecurity, fear and anger. To diminish the appeal of radical-right rhetoric, policies must address the precarity of the poorest, pledging fair wages, job security, affordable housing and robust social protections.
To diminish the appeal of radical-right rhetoric, policies must address the precarity of the poorest
Anxiety intensifies when people experience poverty, insecurity and precarity. Any policies to tackle these problems must therefore also be effective enough to build trust among those on lower and middle incomes. Rather than blaming cultural differences or identities, governments can heal social divisions by addressing economic struggles.
To reduce the influence of far-right parties – and to protect liberal democratic values – European leaders must therefore make tackling economic anxiety and insecurity their top priority.
