Lucas Sudbrack and James F. Downes describe how growing income inequality across Europe has strengthened support for far-right parties. Using decades of national and individual-level data, they find that when the poorest citizens lose a significant share of national income, the far-right vote share rises
Rising inequality is a defining feature of our times, and the rise of Europe’s far-right is part of that trend. Deepening economic divides are fuelling far-right success: parties often promise protective measures for the native population while blaming migrants and refugees for 'stealing jobs' or living off countries' welfare systems.
Most studies on income inequality look at national averages. The Gini Index, for example, shows how income is distributed across a country. But averages can hide what’s really happening within different sectors of society.
Our research examines how income shares have shifted between groups, from poorest to richest, between 1980 and 2020. The results are striking. As the poorest quarter of Europeans' share of national income shrank, support for far-right parties rose. When those at the bottom lose ground, frustration grows, and the far right gains strength.
Between 1980 and 2020, as the poorest quarter of Europeans' share of national income shrank, support for far-right parties rose
To better understand the connection between inequality and personal choices, we also looked at how income levels have affected the voting choices of tens of thousands of Europeans over the past twenty years.
We found that the shrinking incomes of the poorest quarter of the population did indeed boost support for the far right. But it is not necessarily those who are poorest and feel they have no money who turn to these parties.
Rather, among the poorest quarter, far-right voters are more likely to be those who perceive their income to be moderate. But the effect is even stronger among those somewhat better off than the poorest quarter, regardless of their income perceptions.
As incomes within their social class decline, the poorest people feel financially powerless – and explore electoral alternatives. People with limited resources, who believe they have something to lose, are most likely to be drawn to far-right parties.
Immigration often dominates the headlines. Our research suggests, however, that the root of far-right support lies not in fear of immigration, but in the inherent inequalities and social competition of neoliberalism. As inequality increases, and the poorest in society become further disadvantaged, anxiety grows across all income levels. People feel that their social status, and even their livelihoods, are under threat.
The recent rise of European far-right parties may well be a consequence of neoliberalism, rather than simply a direct response to rising immigration
As a result, they are more likely to feel betrayed by the political elite and to distrust culturally or ethnically different groups. Strong anti-establishment rhetoric that emphasises traditional values fosters pride among those who fear they are being left behind.
Europe is facing an increasing threat from the far right, who are no longer on the political fringes. Italy’s Brothers of Italy and France’s Rassemblement National now influence national debates. Such parties have even formed coalition governments. In response, mainstream political parties adopted anti-immigration policies that blur political lines.
In Hungary and Poland, far-right parties have undermined liberal democratic norms from within, challenging the very basis of European democracy. The success of these parties is a sign that liberal values are under increasing threat in many parts of Europe. Economic insecurity is a key reason.
To counter the rise of the far right, governments must address the economic inequality driving insecurity, fear and anger. To diminish the appeal of radical-right rhetoric, policies must address the precarity of the poorest, pledging fair wages, job security, affordable housing and robust social protections.
To diminish the appeal of radical-right rhetoric, policies must address the precarity of the poorest
Anxiety intensifies when people experience poverty, insecurity and precarity. Any policies to tackle these problems must therefore also be effective enough to build trust among those on lower and middle incomes. Rather than blaming cultural differences or identities, governments can heal social divisions by addressing economic struggles.
To reduce the influence of far-right parties – and to protect liberal democratic values – European leaders must therefore make tackling economic anxiety and insecurity their top priority.
Lucas Sudbrack and James F. Downes is the prime example of why the far right is rising. They have made an entire study on the topic, and haven't once came close to understand why the far right is rising. Let's take a look on this statement: "Our research suggests, however, that the root of far-right support lies not in fear of immigration, but in the inherent inequalities and social competition of neoliberalism. "
As someone that is involved in the far right, the above statement can't be further away from the truth. There isn't a single on of us that joined the far right because of "inequalities and social competition of neoliberalism". Immigration, the crime immigrants make and their push to force Islam into Europe is the reason the far right is rising. To give you an example since the migration crisis in 2015, the biggest parties in the scandinavian countries have started to adopt an anti-immigration policy, and that is in the parties that traditionally have target the middle/higher class. Their statement "As incomes within their social class decline, the poorest people feel financially powerless – and explore electoral alternatives." doesn't reflect the current political standard.
This leads back to my first statement. The reason the far right is rising is because of people like Lucas Sudbrack and James F. Downes. Since they can't understand (or refuse to) see why people are drawn to the far right (immigration) they make falsely conclusions like this "European leaders must therefore make tackling economic anxiety and insecurity their top priority".
If you can't even recognize we join the far right, you will never makes changes that moves people away from it. Lucas Sudbrack and James F. Downes, you need to do better.
In response to 'James' - What your critique reveals is not a hidden truth that scholars have somehow missed, but a confident refusal to interrogate your own premises. You assert that immigration, crime, and “Islam being forced into Europe” are self-evident causes of far-right mobilisation, and then treat that assertion as proof. That is not analysis. It is ideology narrating itself.
Let’s start with the core flaw, you confuse motivations with explanations.
People often experience their political anger through immigration. That does not mean immigration is the root cause of that anger. Social science is not obliged to take self-reported grievance at face value, particularly when those grievances are actively shaped by political entrepreneurs, media ecosystems, and identity framing.
You say “not a single one of us joined because of neoliberal inequality.” That statement alone should give you pause. Political movements rarely recruit by advertising abstract economic structures. They recruit by offering simple culprits for complex losses. Immigration becomes the symbol, not the origin, of deeper insecurities sucah as declining public services, housing scarcity, labour precarity, and the erosion of social trust. These conditions pre-date 2015 and exist regardless of migrant presence.
Your Scandinavian example actually undermines your argument. Those societies experienced rising inequality, welfare retrenchment, housing crises, labour market flexibilisation, before immigration became electorally salient. The far right did not create these problems but it rebranded them, redirecting anger downward instead of upward. That is not accidental, it is strategic.
Which brings us to the most telling contradiction in your critique. You accuse Sudbrack and Downes of misunderstanding “real people”, yet you defend a political movement whose economic programmes consistently oppose wealth taxes, weaken labour protections, resist redistribution, and align with business elites. Trump's authoritarian rule has magnified these issues at present - just look at his interference in markets for his own personal wealth gains.
In other words, you are outraged about material decline while defending a politics that guarantees its continuation. That is not rebellion, it is misdirected loyalty.
Your argument also relies on a familiar sleight of hand, turning cruelty into realism. You frame exclusion, suspicion, and collective punishment as “hard truths,” while dismissing solidarity as naïveté. But politics built on permanent enemies does not restore dignity, it consumes it. Movements organised around fear do not empower the marginalise, they require new scapegoats to survive.
And here is the uncomfortable question you conveniently avoid. If immigration were dramatically reduced tomorrow, would wages rise? Would housing suddenly become affordable? Would public services be rebuilt? Would power shift away from economic elites? And most importantly, which seems to be central to your underlying but evident racism - would crime rates drop.
History, and evidence, says no.
This is why blaming scholars for the far right’s rise is a displacement of responsibility. No one “pulled” you into jingoism. You chose a politics that offers emotional certainty over structural change, identity over justice, punishment over repair.
At some point, democratic adulthood requires more than demanding others validate your anger. It requires asking whether your politics serve your humanity, or merely flatter your resentment.
If you want people to “pull you out,” start by letting go of the comforting lie that someone else caused your cruelty.