Poland's presidential election resulted in surprise defeat for centrist Civic Coalition candidate Rafał Trzaskowski. Renata Mieńkowska-Norkiene describes how Donald Tusk's governing coalition misjudged the public mood – and how the right-wing Karol Nawrocki managed to convince the Polish electorate that he is a 'man of the people'
Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results
Attributed to Albert Einstein
On 1 June 2025, Karol Nawrocki, candidate for the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, narrowly won the Polish presidential election. With 50.89% of the vote, he defeated Rafał Trzaskowski of the centrist Civic Coalition. The result shocked many. Trzaskowski is cosmopolitan, well-educated, and multilingual, with extensive experience in European politics. But these traits made him a target for populist criticism as an out-of-touch member of the elite.
Despite apparently possessing the qualities of a president, Trzaskowski lost to a candidate beleaguered by questionable housing arrangements, links to football hooligans, poor foreign language skills and only a vague understanding of national security. Still, Nawrocki presented himself as a 'man of the people' – the preferred populist narrative.
Trzaskowski's failure echoes the defeats of Bronisław Komorowski in 2015, and his own loss in 2020. Times have changed; mainstream parties' strategies haven’t. Politics today requires not just credentials but emotional resonance with voters. It demands clear, simple narratives, microtargeting, and grassroots outreach. This is where populists excel, and mainstream parties struggle.
Politics today demands clear, simple narratives, microtargeting, and grassroots outreach. This is where populists excel, and mainstream parties struggle
Donald Tusk, Poland’s Prime Minister and leader of the Civic Coalition, misjudged what this election was truly about: a referendum on his own government. After winning the 2023 parliamentary elections, Tusk promised sweeping reforms on widows' pensions, tax changes, and abortion rights. Progress, however, has been slow. Only a fraction of Tusk's 100-day promises were fulfilled, and key reforms, such as overhauling the judiciary, stalled, partly due to President Andrzej Duda’s veto powers – but also government inertia.
Rather than address this, Trzaskowski aligned himself closely with the struggling government. Not daring to critique his own camp, he upheld the status quo. Trzaskowski underestimated the electorate's frustration, and voters punished him at the ballot box.
Almost 50% of Nawrocki’s voters said their choice was driven by opposition to Trzaskowski. Only 33% of Trzaskowski’s voters said the reverse. In the first round, opposition populist parties attracted over 58%; in the second, Trzaskowski failed to consolidate the anti-PiS vote.
This election reaffirms a hard truth: there’s no vaccine against populism. Victories by leaders like Tusk or Joe Biden may decelerate democratic backsliding, but sustaining liberal democracy requires effective communication with a diverse electorate.
Unfortunately, mainstream parties often imitate populist tactics to win over populists' voter base. Trzaskowski did just that, echoing anti-Ukrainian and anti-EU sentiment, opposing the Green Deal and Mercosur, and suggesting benefit cuts for Ukrainian refugees. His concessions alienated progressive voters — but failed to gain populist ones. Only about 13% of those who voted for the ultra-conservative Sławomir Mentzen in the first round supported Trzaskowski in the second. Adopting populist language, Trzaskowski legitimised far-right ideas, elevating Mentzen’s influence.
Trzaskowski's campaign also ignored tools of modern political communication. His social media presence was lacklustre, his messaging abstract and reactive. He avoided campaigning in conservative areas, preferring more politically amenable neighbourhoods. He failed to outline a compelling vision for Poland’s future, or to make the government’s EU funding wins feel tangible.
Populist candidates were bolder and clearer — particularly in their critiques of elites, Ukrainians, and EU policies. (Ukrainians are jumping the queue to see doctors… they have not apologised for wartime massacres of Poles… the European Green Deal forces Polish farmers to bear the costs of ecological transformation while Germany returns to coal… etc.) Though no populist candidate openly supported Putin, the populists did redirect debate from security and values toward pettier grievances.
Young voters played a decisive role. Many young men supported radical, nationalist Mentzen and Grzegorz Braun in the first round, then shifted to Nawrocki in the runoff. Young women leaned more left, but failed to tip the balance. To Poland's youth, Trzaskowski appeared part of the establishment, absent from the platforms with which young people engage. His campaign struggled to connect with this critical demographic.
Poland ranks highest in the EU for societal polarisation. Despite this, the first round of voting showed an appetite for alternatives. Yet both major camps — Tusk’s Civic Coalition and Kaczyński’s PiS — seem to rely on polarisation for political survival. They offer voters little in the way of consensus or unity.
Donald Tusk put too much faith in opinion polls, which failed to capture the strenth of Nawrocki's appeal
Another miscalculation by Tusk was his faith in public opinion polls, which did not capture the strength of Nawrocki’s appeal — especially among voters reluctant to publicly admit their support.
Post-election, questions have emerged about the integrity of the process. Around 53,900 election protests were filed, pointing to potential irregularities. The Supreme Court, now staffed by PiS appointees, will determine the election's validity. Its decision is likely to increase mistrust in an already divided society.
Even if the result stands, the cohabitation of Tusk’s government with a Nawrocki presidency will be fraught. Nawrocki could veto legislation, obstruct foreign policy initiatives, block judicial appointments, and undermine Tusk’s EU ambitions. The 2027 parliamentary elections could easily return PiS to power — this time possibly in coalition with the far-right Confederation.
This election was less about candidates and more about deeper structural problems: the failure of democratic forces to evolve, the power of populist narratives, and the growing disconnection between political elites and ordinary citizens. Unless mainstream parties adapt — communicating clearly, fulfilling promises, and engaging neglected demographics — populism will continue to win, not because it offers better solutions, but because it better understands discontent.
If Tusk stubbornly persists in doing the same things and expecting different results, PiS and Confederation could obtain a constitutional majority. Apparently, it is difficult to be a prophet in one's own country… But Poland today — more than ever before — needs a prophet who will convince the country of himself.