As Europe rethinks its position in a changing world, China has become increasingly important and contested. European actors broadly agree on the need to strengthen Europe’s strategic autonomy and global position, but remain divided over how far Europe should cooperate with China or pursue greater independence. Esther D’haeninck explores how European political parties navigate these differences, and how partisan cooperation contributes to the debate
At the European Council (EUCO) meeting on 18–19 June 2026, EU-China relations were on the agenda. Yet the official European Council conclusions reveal little about the China debate, referring only to 'strategic debate on the issue of global macroeconomic imbalances'. The language is deliberately cautious and vague. At the same time, the discussion took place against growing concerns about economic dependencies, competitiveness, and the changing global economy.
In the days before a European Council summit, national leaders often meet within their European political families. These so-called pre-summits or party summits bring together national party leaders and heads of government, but also European Commissioners and European Parliament representatives from the same political family. They provide an opportunity for political families to informally discuss the issues that will come up at the European Council, including China.
European leaders do not arrive in Brussels with identical views. They belong to different political families, but represent national parties with different economic interests, political traditions and experiences of China
This matters because European leaders do not arrive in Brussels with identical views. They belong to different political families, but represent national parties with different economic interests, political traditions and experiences of China. And this is where a central challenge of European China policy becomes visible: Europe increasingly agrees that it must strengthen its global position, but doesn't necessarily agree what that should mean in practice.
In the past, European debates about China focused primarily on economic cooperation and market opportunities. This has changed in recent years. China is now increasingly discussed in terms of economic competition and geopolitical rivalry.
This shift is also visible in the programmes of European political parties. Comparison of the 2019 and 2024 Europarty manifestos shows that China received more attention and was framed in increasingly strategic terms. Rather than discussing only what China means for Europe, parties are focusing more on what Europe needs to do: strengthen competitiveness, reduce dependencies, protect technology, and build strategic autonomy. The shift is particularly visible in the move from talking about globalisation towards talking about global competition, and from normative values towards strategic autonomy. There is therefore an emerging common starting point: Europe should be able to act more independently in a changing international environment.
Political families and actors have differing visions of what a stronger European position should look like. The European People's Party, for example, explicitly combines trade and cooperation with 'de-risk, not decouple' strategy, while also calling for stronger European competitiveness and protection of strategic sectors. The Party of European Socialists' manifesto focuses on competitiveness, resilience and strategic autonomy; the Greens stress human rights, climate and de-risking; and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe/Renew highlights strategic autonomy and economic security.
Across the European Parliament, debates on China have increasingly connected economic relations to critical infrastructure, technology, economic security and European autonomy
Across the European Parliament, debates on China have increasingly connected economic relations to critical infrastructure, technology, economic security and European autonomy. In January 2024, Parliament adopted a resolution on the security and defence implications of China’s role in European critical infrastructure. National parties can approach China differently depending on their country's economic interests, previous experiences, ideological position and relationship with other global powers. Differences can also emerge between generations, and between politicians with different policy backgrounds.
Most European political actors agree that Europe needs to strengthen its position globally. The harder question is what that position should be, and how far Europe should move from economic partnership with China towards greater independence from it.
This raises an important question about the role of Europarties. Pre-summits bring together politicians who might approach China from very different national perspectives. They create a space in which to compare national positions, develop common language, and identify disagreements before formal negotiations begin. But the same meetings also reveal the limits of partisan coordination. National interests do not disappear when politicians enter a political-family meeting. Nor do ideological differences, different experiences with China or differences between political generations and individual politicians.
Pre-summits reveal the limits of partisan coordination. National interests do not disappear when politicians enter a political-family meeting
In fact, some initiatives on China have also come from individual MEPs. This suggests that China policy is not shaped only from the top by party leaders. Individual MEPs, national parties and Europarties can all bring issues into the European debate. The question, then, is not simply whether Europarties can create unity. It is whether they can provide a political space in which to translate fragmented national and ideological positions into a common European language.
The June European Council meeting therefore provides a useful illustration of a broader process. By the time leaders enter the Council, they have already discussed the issues on the agenda within their political families. The official meeting may produce carefully negotiated conclusions, but the political discussion does not begin there.
Pre-summits allow party leaders to compare positions, identify common ground and communicate priorities before the formal negotiations begin. But we shouldn't understand this coordination as a mechanism that simply produces unified positions. It is also a place where fragmentation becomes visible, showing that partisan coordination is one informal layer through which European leaders develop and negotiate – and before formal EU decision-making takes place.
The June summit therefore leaves an open question. European leaders agreed on the need to strengthen competitiveness, resilience and economic security, while the relationship with China remains part of a much broader debate about Europe's position in the world.
The European Council returns to the issue of competitiveness this month. But how can European actors translate the increasingly shared ambition for a stronger European position into concrete policies? And can political families help bridge the national, ideological and generational differences that make agreement difficult? To understand that process, we should watch not only what happens inside the European Council, but what happens before the leaders take their seats.
