Potential pitfalls of a global international relations

In 2018, the distinguished IR scholar Amitav Acharya proposed a 'global international relations' to challenge Western dominance in the discipline. Since then, Japanese, Indian, Chinese, and Anatolian schools of IR have emerged. But Priya Vijaykumar Poojary warns that these non-Western schools risk merely replacing existing Western ethnocentricity with new forms of hegemonic discourse

Challenges of transcending West-centric IR

International relations has grappled with the belief that it is a Western discipline wherein the problems it addresses, and the solutions it provides, are grounded exclusively within Anglo-American intellectual traditions. Non-Western countries mattered only in the margins, and primarily as an extension to Western academic interests. But non-Western scholars are now challenging this tradition, by developing non-Western conceptions of IR.

Though a non-Western articulation of IR is necessary for the discipline, if premised on cultural exceptionalism, it could prohibit the evolution of a truly global IR

The development of a non-Western articulation of IR is necessary for the discipline. If premised on cultural exceptionalism, however, it could prohibit the evolution of a truly global IR. This diversity trap is a paradox, reducing IR to a cultural-essentialist form. Indeed, given that many countries are sliding towards nationalism and authoritarianism, it could endanger the future of the discipline.

By reifying culture, non-Western theorisation fails to transcend IR's imperial and ethnocentric ‘Western’ origins. On the contrary, it reiterates new forms of identity politics, challenging the process of knowledge production. IR is becoming defined by a cultural exceptionalism that presents certain cultural or ethnic groups as homogenous and unique, and their intellectual tradition as superior to others.

But such exceptionalism undermines a nation's diverse intellectual traditions and thinking. It often risks associating itself with prevailing dominant political agendas. In India, for example, there are growing calls for a Hindu Rashtra – a cultural-nationalist assertion of the modern Indian state. This echoes India's current authoritarian drift.

In India, there are growing calls for a cultural-nationalist assertion of the modern Indian state

India

In Indian IR thinking, there is a growing call for a dharmic IR. But scholars must meet such calls with caution, because dharmic IR often espouses exclusionary Hindutva politics. Hindutva endorses a cultural nationalism that reconstructs India's contemporary identity along religious lines: a Hindu nation. Like domestic political rhetoric, Hindutva increasingly reimagines foreign policy discussions as Bharat – a decolonised modern India.

The making of a global Bharat is captured in the slogan Vasudhaiva Kutumbkam (one earth, one family, one future). Its origin, though culturally indigenous, is universally accommodative, framing India’s foreign policy shift from non- to multi-alignment. The Vasudhaiva Kutumbkam principle, popular in political and now academic rhetoric, illustrates how India’s traditions shape its global outlook, reinforcing Bharat’s claim to compete for global power.

China

The Chinese School of IR increasingly premises Chinese thinking along Confucianist lines, dismissing China's plural tradition. China was once a revolutionary state which challenged the existing global political and economic order. Now, Chinese IR studies portray the country as a rising actor seeking to reorder the world from a Chinese perspective. This gives the Chinese Communist Party legitimacy to promote socialism in scholarly thinking. The Party also denounces the malaise of capitalism, and emphasises the safeguarding of Chinese national security.

Turkey

In Turkey, too, efforts are underway to develop an ‘Anatolian’ School of IR, a tradition that draws essentially from the writings and works of Ibn Khaldun. Seyfi Say’s work on Khaldun’s writings has argued for a more defining place in IR. Say recommends replacing the positivist approach in IR with historicism, which would enable IR scholars to transcend state-centric logic. He presents Khaldun’s idea of umran (civilisation), and suggests that considering civilisation as unit of analysis could free scholars from the state-centric analysis that has gripped IR.

Turkey’s civilisational exceptionalism is best captured by references to dünyanın vicdanı (the world's conscience). The phrase epitomises Turkey as a generous patriarch in the Ottoman empire tradition, reinforcing its civilisational claims.

The civilisation-state narrative in IR...

The civilisation-state narrative, popularly employed in international politics, gives primacy to culture. Civilisation-states claim to represent not just a historical area and ethnolinguistic groups, but also a distinct, exclusive civilisation. By definition, civilisation-states stand in opposition to other sub-national groups. The notion is gaining increasing traction in countries including India, China, Turkey, and Russia.

Civilisation-state arguments help political leaders draw from past traditions to legitimise current political claims. It allows them to present the civilisation-state as an alternative to the traditional Westphalian state model. Such arguments also support policies that help leaders regain a level of power and status in international politics that befits their country’s geographical expanse, demography and historical heritage.

Civilisation-state narratives are being used to legitimise an increasingly authoritarian drift in countries like India, Turkey, and Russia

In IR, such narratives often become legitimising devices for countries' nationalistic domestic and foreign policy. They also legitimise the increasing authoritarian drift in countries like India, Turkey, and Russia. Civilisation-state narratives exemplify a broader phenomenon of rising international actors who seek to challenge existing patterns of influence and status.

…beyond disciplinary identity politics

Any culture-based IR theorising leads to the formation of essentialist theoretical projects. It cannot help IR move beyond its West-centrism. For non-Western thinking to carve out its own niche in the discipline, theorisation must be independent, not influenced by cultural or material reality. Rather than becoming embroiled in disciplinary-identity politics, academic inquiry must question, and critically examine, how culture-centric ideas play out across the world.

This article presents the views of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the ECPR or the Editors of The Loop.

Author

photograph of Priya Vijaykumar Poojary
Priya Vijaykumar Poojary
Lecturer, Manipal Centre for European Studies – Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE)

Priya's teaching and research interests include European politics, policymaking in the European Union, EU foreign policy, India-EU relations, migration governance, and regionalism in higher education.

She co-edited the volume Contours of India-EU Engagements: Multiplicity of Experiences, published in 2021 by Manipal Universal Press.

@PriyaPoojary7

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