Amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, Poland is making an unprecedented push to join NATO’s nuclear sharing programme. Monika Sus argues that, as Poland’s threat perception rises, its defence strategy evolves and NATO’s deterrence posture shifts, the debate over nuclear deterrence is gaining momentum
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Poland has significantly ramped up its defence efforts. The country increased military spending to 4.12% of GDP in 2024, and the proposed 2025 budget includes a record defence allocation of about $48.7 billion – approximately 4.7% of GDP. It has acquired advanced weapon systems, including AH-64E Apache helicopters, M1A2 Abrams tanks, K2 Black Panther tanks, HIMARS rocket systems, and FA-50 fighter jets.
As my article with Łukasz Kulesa for the Nonproliferation Review points out, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki declared in June 2023 that Poland wants to ‘be included as a participant in the NATO nuclear-sharing programme’. Such a statement would have been unthinkable from a Polish prime minister just a few years ago. Historically, Poland has been a staunch advocate of nuclear disarmament in the region. However, the geopolitical reality has shifted, and so has Poland’s perception of security threats.
In response to Russia’s aggressive stance, including nuclear sabre-rattling, Polish leaders have started to argue that participating in NATO’s nuclear sharing would strengthen deterrence and enhance security guarantees. Specifically, they argue that stationing nuclear weapons in Poland – or integrating Polish F-35 fighters into NATO’s nuclear mission without permanently hosting the weapons – would enhance the alliance’s deterrent credibility in the eyes of the Kremlin. It would signal NATO’s commitment to defending the eastern flank, even at the level of nuclear escalation, while also offering operational advantages, such as enabling nuclear missions without requiring in-flight refuelling for aircraft carrying the weapons.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has shifted Poland’s strategic thinking. The possibility of Russia using nuclear coercion or deploying tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus has intensified Warsaw’s security concerns. Indeed, experts close to the Kremlin threatened that Poland might become a nuclear attack target. By seeking a role in NATO’s nuclear deterrence, Poland could signal its commitment to the alliance’s collective defence while deterring potential Russian escalations.
Playing a part in NATO nuclear deterrence would signal Poland's commitment to the alliance's collective defence, while deterring potential Russian escalations
For Poland, nuclear sharing is not just about hosting weapons. It is also about ensuring that it has a direct role in NATO’s nuclear strategy. The Law and Justice-led government of Morawiecki, which governed from 2017 to 2023, began to view this as a way to strengthen the credibility of NATO’s deterrence framework, especially in Eastern Europe, where frontline states feel most vulnerable. Additionally, Poland has seen nuclear sharing as a way to bolster its political standing within NATO. By taking on a more significant role in the alliance’s deterrence efforts, Warsaw has hoped to solidify its position as a key player in European security discussions. This aligns with Poland’s broader ambition to influence NATO’s strategic direction and ensure that Eastern Europe remains at the forefront of the alliance’s defence priorities.
While Poland’s request underscores the shifting security landscape in Europe, it also presents challenges. Historically, NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements have been limited to a select group of allies, including Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Expanding the programme to include Poland would require consensus among NATO members, some of whom may hesitate to escalate tensions with Russia.
Expanding NATO nuclear sharing to Poland would require consensus among NATO members, some of whom fear escalating tensions with Russia
Furthermore, the United States remains central to NATO’s nuclear policy. Washington’s reluctance to endorse Poland’s proposal has meant that the initiative has failed to gain traction. So far, the US has not regarded Poland’s inclusion as a strategic necessity. Concerns over proliferation risks and political pushback from other allies further complicate the decision. Other hurdles to consider include the infrastructure required to support nuclear deployments, and the potential diplomatic fallout with Moscow.
Morawiecki's declaration that Poland is willing to join NATO’s nuclear sharing programme was met with mixed reactions. The government and defence establishment, however, have supported the idea, viewing it as necessary to ensure national security.
In December 2023, Donald Tusk's Civic Coalition-led government assumed power. The new administration adopted an incrementalist course of action, avoiding rocking the nuclear boat publicly. It also implicitly endorsed the idea of nuclear sharing. However, some opposition politicians and civil society groups have expressed worry about the risks of Poland becoming a nuclear target. Deeper NATO integration, they argue, should not come at the cost of escalating regional tensions.
Donald Tusk's administration has implicitly endorsed nuclear sharing, but some warn that it could increase the risk of Poland becoming a nuclear target
Poland’s push for nuclear sharing reflects broader debates within NATO about deterrence and defence in a hostile security environment. The move aligns with European discussions on strengthening collective defence and reducing reliance on US security guarantees. The debate also raises questions about the future of NATO’s nuclear posture. Whether or not Poland joins NATO’s nuclear sharing programme, its efforts highlight the urgent need for NATO to reassess its deterrence strategy in light of Russian aggression.
Poland’s desire to participate in NATO’s nuclear sharing is more than a policy shift – it reflects the new European security reality. Regardless of the outcome, Poland’s initiative signals that Europe’s security architecture is undergoing profound changes in response to Russia’s actions, and NATO should adapt accordingly.
The Polish government is becoming increasingly concerned about the erosion of transatlantic security ties – especially after Trump's comments on NATO's Article 5, and his readiness – contrary to European security interests – to re-engage with Russia. As a result, Poland has begun to consider other options. Specifically, Tusk announced that he would be speaking with President Macron, who proposed a debate on extending France's nuclear deterrence to European allies. Ultimately, Poland’s drive for nuclear deterrence goes beyond security. It is also about securing Poland's place as a key player in Europe’s defence architecture.
