In a rapidly changing political environment, the fate of Kurdistan is now shaping the future of the Middle East. Turkey’s century-long repression of the Kurds, argues Loqman Radpey, is now posing a critical dilemma: either embrace de jure recognition of Kurdistan and Kurdish rights, or risk escalating tensions and instability

Superficial gestures, entrenched repression

Evolving dynamics in the New Middle East put Turkey and Iran in a precarious position regarding the Kurds. Historically, both states have remained staunch in their denial of Kurdish rights and identity. But they must now adjust to a regional landscape in which the Kurdistan problem is no longer confined within their borders.

In the past, both countries have occasionally signalled outreach to Kurds. Yet these gestures were superficial, overshadowed by ongoing repression and political exclusion, notably Turkey’s removal of elected Kurdish mayors in the Bakûr (north) region of Kurdistan.

For Turkey in particular, how to deal with Kurdistan is no longer a domestic issue, but a crossroads decision that could define the country’s future role in the wider region. Turkey faces a choice: engage with the Kurds and their rights with genuine and substantive constitutional reforms, or continue its stance of denial. Each path comes with profound consequences.

Constitutional barriers to Kurdish rights

If Turkey truly wants to address the Kurdistan question, it must first make sweeping constitutional changes. In particular, it must change provisions in its constitution that define Turkey as being exclusively ‘Turkish’.

Turkishness is enshrined in the constitutional preamble, and reinforced by Articles 3, 9, and 70. Article 3, which declares the Turkish language supreme, is constitutionally non-amendable. Article 4 bars any discussion of amending core identity-based provisions. Articles 9 and 70, meanwhile, reserve juridical authority and public service for ‘every Turk’. All this reinforces the primacy of Turkish identity in public and civic life, effectively excluding Kurdish (or any other) identity.

For Turkey to recognise Kurdish identity meaningfully, it must change provisions in its constitution that define Turkey as being exclusively ‘Turkish’

Constitutional reform would need to eliminate these ethnocentric policies, redefining Turkey’s national identity. For Turkey to recognise Kurdish identity meaningfully, these articles would need an overhaul that affirms the Kurdish people as a distinct nation within the state. Such changes would require the Turkish state to discard long-held principles of ethnic homogeneity. This would mean acknowledging Kurdish culture, language, and political rights as an integral part of Turkey’s social fabric. It would not be a simple act of legislative revision, but a cultural shift. Indeed, it would mark a major re-education of Turkish society, and a revision of the century-long erasure of Kurdish history.

Systemic state-sponsored ethnocentrism

Any such shift would face fierce opposition, especially from deeply rooted nationalist factions. Decades of state-sponsored ethnocentrism have created a pervasive mindset that denies Kurdish history and aspirations. Changing this is unlikely in the short term, because the Turkish state has shaped the country’s collective memory through education, media, and official history.

Turkey’s refusal to recognise the Armenian genocide also suggests it will resist confronting its poor treatment of the Kurds. Convincing Turkish society — particularly its nationalist core — to accept such a dramatic transformation would be a formidable challenge. Many Turks would perceive such change as a betrayal of Turkey’s founding principles.

Decades of state-sponsored ethnocentrism have created a pervasive mindset that denies Kurdish history and aspirations

The second option for Turkey is to continue its policy of denial. For decades, even the term ‘Kurd’ was banned from the public lexicon. Kurdish people were instead referred to euphemistically as ‘Mountain Turks’. Only after the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq in 2003 did Turkey acknowledge any Kurdish entity, and even then, it was acknowledged only outside its borders: ‘Kurdistan is in Northern Iraq, Go there!’

This denialist stance allowed Turkey to externalise the Kurdistan issue. By relegating it to another state’s territory, Turkey could continue its domestic policy of repression.

A shifting Middle East

Turkey’s strategy of denial, however, is becoming less tenable as regional dynamics shift. The political landscape in the Middle East has evolved significantly. Kurdish forces (Peshmerga, YPJ, and YPG) are gaining recognition and influence, particularly in the Başûr (south) and Rojava (west) regions of Kurdistan, in Iraq and Syria, respectively. Kurdish entities now play essential roles in combatting extremism and terrorism, advocating for democratic governance, and securing regional stability. As Kurds attract international support, and Kurdish aspirations for self-determination gain visibility, Turkey’s continued refusal to recognise even minimal Kurdish autonomy, if not outright independence, could result in diplomatic isolation.

Turkey’s continued refusal to recognise even minimal Kurdish autonomy risks diplomatic isolation

The Turkish Republic was established on principles of ethno-nationalism, built by suppressing diverse national identities, including the Kurds, Armenians, and Greeks. Turks envisaged a monolithic republic grounded in the singular identity of a ‘Turkish Nation’ (as in the original text of the preamble to the Turkish Constitution). However, a century of repression has only amplified Kurdish demands for recognition. It has turned what was once a suppressed movement into a substantial regional force.

Kurdistan: Turkey at a crossroads

Kurdistan has become a litmus test for Turkey’s adaptability. Continuing to deny Kurdish legitimacy may provide short-term security, but it risks long-term isolation and unrest. Iran also has a history of Kurdish repression and denial in the Rojhilat (east) region of Kurdistan. Iran’s internal fragile dynamics, numerous nationalities and ongoing domestic unrest add yet more layers of complexity.

The architects of modern Turkey and Iran are unlikely to have predicted that Kurdistan would threaten to destabilise the very states they sought to consolidate. Now, whichever way those involved turn, the double-edged sword of Kurdistan could strike deeply.