How internet speed shapes electoral preferences in Ukraine

In Ukraine, politics is deeply polarised, and elections have long reflected regional divides. Around the world, the internet has transformed political engagement, and digital access may be playing an increasingly important role in Ukrainian politics. Victoria Portnaya speculates on the effects of internet speed on voters’ electoral preferences

My research shows a striking pattern: in areas of Ukraine with slower internet, pro-Russian parties received significantly more votes. Meanwhile, regions with faster internet access were more likely to support centrist and pro-Ukrainian nationalist parties.

Does this mean that high-speed internet is directly influencing voter preferences? Not necessarily. Correlation is not causation, and lack of data means I did not control for factors like education, economic status, or media consumption habits. But the relationship between internet speed and political preference is real — and it suggests that how people access political information online might matter as much as what they access.

Why internet speed is different from internet access

Most political science research on the internet’s role in democracy focuses on whether people have access to the web at all. But speed changes the way people interact with information.

If your internet is slow, streaming live political debates, watching long-form investigative journalism, or engaging in interactive digital discussions becomes frustrating or even impossible. Instead, you may rely more on traditional TV, shorter news snippets, or social media platforms that require less bandwidth.

In Ukraine, domestic and foreign actors compete to shape public opinion. The quality of internet access could thus have an impact on what type of political content people consume — and, potentially, how they vote.

The political and digital divide in Ukraine

Ukraine’s elections are usually fought between three main political blocs.

Centrist parties such as Servant of the People, Holos, and Batkivshchyna generally support European integration. On domestic policies, they take a more moderate stance.

Pro-Ukrainian nationalist parties, including European Solidarity, Svoboda, and the Radical Party, emphasise national identity and advocate for distancing Ukraine from Russian influence.

While most large Ukrainian cities enjoy fast internet, many rural regions rely on slower connections. Could this influence how people vote?

Pro-Russian parties, before their recent bans, included Opposition Platform – For Life, Shariy’s Party, and Opposition Bloc. These parties have traditionally been strong in the east and south of the country.

At the same time, internet access in Ukraine is highly uneven. Fast internet speeds, often above 12 megabits per second (Mbps), are concentrated in large cities like Kyiv, Lviv, and Dnipro. Meanwhile, many rural and eastern regions rely on slower connections, often below 12 Mbps, where mobile internet is the only option.

This geographic overlap raises an interesting question: could internet speed influence how people vote?

What the data tells us

To explore this, I combined polling station-level election results, internet speed data, and geospatial mapping to link polling stations with their nearest internet speed measurement point.

I then compared voting patterns between fast- and slow-internet areas.

Polling stations in areas where internet speeds were below 12 Mbps saw pro-Russian parties receive an average of 21.3% of the vote. In areas with faster internet access, pro-Russian support dropped nearly seven percentage points, to 14.6%.

One explanation is that slower-internet regions may be more reliant on television and traditional media, where pro-Russian narratives have historically been stronger. Even after the banning of pro-Russian parties and media outlets, older, state-controlled networks continue to shape political discourse in these areas.

In fast-internet regions, votes for centrist and pro-Ukrainian nationalist parties increased. Pro-Ukrainian nationalist parties saw a 5% increase in high-speed internet areas. Centrist parties also performed better, though by a smaller margin.

This may be because such parties rely more heavily on digital campaigns and social media outreach, both of which are easier to access with faster, stable internet.

Internet speed is important, but other factors are at play

While the relationship between internet speed and voting behaviour is statistically significant, we must be cautious about what that means.

My study did not control for other variables such as education levels, which often correlate with more progressive voting. Nor did it control for economic conditions, which tend to be better in urban areas that also have high-speed internet.

My research found that digital access does indeed play a role in shaping political opinions, which may influence voter choice at the ballot box

Another major factor could be media consumption habits. People in low-speed internet areas may rely more on state TV. High-speed users, on the other hand, consume more independent digital news.

So, does faster internet cause people to vote differently? My findings suggest that digital access does indeed play a role in shaping the political information people receive, which in turn may influence their choices at the ballot box.

Why this matters for Ukraine’s democracy

Even before the war, Ukraine was a key target of Russian information warfare. Pro-Kremlin narratives spread through television, social media, and local networks, aiming to influence public opinion and electoral outcomes.

My findings suggest that better internet access might serve as a counterbalance. It would give voters access to more diverse sources of information, independent journalism, and online fact-checking.

Expanding high-speed internet in Ukraine is not just about modernisation, but strengthening democratic resilience

At the same time, regions with slow internet remain more reliant on traditional media, which has been dominated by oligarch-controlled or state-affiliated outlets.

For Ukrainian policymakers, expanding high-speed internet infrastructure is not just about economic modernisation. It is also about strengthening democratic resilience.

As Ukraine moves forward with its EU integration process, digital infrastructure investment could shape not just the economy, but the country’s political future.

This article presents the views of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the ECPR or the Editors of The Loop.

Author

photograph of Victoria Portnaya
Victoria Portnaya
Student and Youth Recovery Lab CEO, Kyiv School of Economics (KSE), Youth Fellow, International Youth Think Tank

Victoria's research focus is on social policy, postwar recovery, and democratisation.

She is also a Chatham House CFC member, a volunteer for the Center for Civil Liberties, and was a panel speaker at the Athens Democracy Forum 2023.

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