Michael Asiedu argues that in Guinea and Gabon, judges are doing more than routine certification. By validating post-coup elections, courts transform military rulers into constitutional presidents — without requiring genuine democracy
Military coups have surged across Africa since 2020, with nine successful takeovers creating a so-called coup belt stretching from West Africa to the Sahel. But consolidating power no longer relies on force alone. Courts have become crucial to how coup leaders convert unconstitutional seizures into legally recognised rule.
In Guinea and Gabon, recent elections weren't just organised by transitional authorities — they were formally certified by courts, closing transition periods and anchoring new regimes within constitutional frameworks. When judges validate elections designed by coup leaders, certification becomes a decisive moment in regime reconstruction, not a routine legal formality.
In many African constitutional systems, presidential election results only become final once confirmed by a supreme or constitutional court. This role is framed as technical and procedural; courts assess whether legal requirements were followed, not whether elections were substantively free or fair. In relatively stable political settings, certification helps resolve disputes and stabilise transfers of power.
In post-coup environments, transitional authorities rewrite constitutions, redesign electoral laws, and manage political competition under highly asymmetric conditions
Post-coup environments change everything. Transitional authorities rewrite constitutions, redesign electoral laws, and manage political competition under highly asymmetric conditions. When courts certify elections held under these arrangements, they signal that exceptional rule has ended and a new legal order has taken hold.
Guinea offers the clearest example. Following the 2021 coup that removed President Alpha Condé — who himself had controversially abolished term limits — General Mamady Doumbouya presided over a prolonged transition marked by repeated delays. The transition lasted over four years, far exceeding initial promises. Presidential elections were eventually held in December 2025.
Official results showed Doumbouya winning more than 86% of the vote. On 5 January 2026, Guinea's Supreme Court validated the outcome, confirming Doumbouya's victory and clearing him to assume office for seven years. The court did not assess the broader political environment or electoral competitiveness. Its task was narrower; certifying the vote complied with existing legal procedures.
Yet that certification was politically decisive. It transformed a military leader who seized power by force into a constitutionally recognised president, and formally ended the post-coup transition.
A similar dynamic unfolded in Gabon. In August 2023, the military removed President Ali Bongo Ondimba following contested elections, ending over five decades of Bongo family rule. Brice Oligui Nguema, the transitional president and former military leader, then embarked on systematic institutional preparation. He appointed loyalists to two-thirds of the Senate and National Assembly, and installed all nine members of the Constitutional Court. Nguema contested the April 2025 election and won by an overwhelming margin.
On 25 April 2025, Gabon's Constitutional Court confirmed Nguema's victory, completing the transition from military rule to constitutional presidency. As in Guinea, the ruling focused on procedural compliance rather than democratic quality. Certification closed the transitional chapter and normalised the new regime's authority.
What emerges from Guinea and Gabon is a common dynamic. Judicial certification performs three critical functions in post-coup settings. First, it embeds post-coup authority into law. By affirming elections held under transitional frameworks, courts signal that exceptional rule has ended and constitutional normalcy has been restored. Second, it provides a legal face to power. Judicial confirmation makes post-coup regimes legible to domestic institutions, foreign governments, and international organisations that rely on formal legality when deciding how to engage. Third, it allows courts to claim neutrality. By framing certification as technical rather than political, judges present themselves as apolitical actors even as their rulings facilitate regime consolidation. This veneer of neutrality can be as valuable to judges as it is to the regimes they certify.
Judicial certification embeds post-coup authority into law, provides a legal face to power, and allows courts to claim neutrality
But the central puzzle isn't whether courts are independent or captured. Rather, it is why judges choose to certify post-coup elections when refusing would be one of the few legal acts capable of disrupting consolidation. Yet in Guinea and Gabon, courts opted for validation. This reflects the political risks judges face in transitional authoritarian contexts.
Certification offers a way to preserve institutional relevance and personal security while framing compliance as adherence to legal duty. Refusing certification invites confrontation with executives who control coercive power and can restructure courts, remove judges, or bypass judicial institutions altogether. The courts that validate post-coup elections are operating within severe constraints, where the alternative to certification may be institutional irrelevance or worse.
These cases complicate conventional binaries depicting courts as either democratic guardians or authoritarian tools. In post-coup Africa, courts often occupy an uneasy middle ground. They neither initiate transitions nor openly resist them. Instead, they perform limited but consequential acts that shape how power is normalised and recognised. For comparative politics, this means post-coup elections cannot be analysed in isolation from the judicial institutions that certify them.
In post-coup Africa, courts neither imitate democratic transitions nor openly resist them — but they do shape how power is normalised and recognised
Courts aren't merely end-stage referees — they're central participants in constructing post-coup authority. Understanding their role explains why some transitions stabilise quickly despite weak democratic foundations, while others remain contested and fragile.
Judicial certification has long been part of electoral governance in Africa. In post-coup settings, however, it has acquired new political weight. Guinea and Gabon show that courts now play a decisive role in converting unconstitutional seizures into constitutionally recognised rule.
By certifying elections organised under transitional authority, courts act as brokers of legitimacy, closing transitions and stabilising new regimes without strengthening democratic accountability. Recognising this role is essential for understanding contemporary African politics, especially in post-coup contexts — and for rethinking how courts operate under authoritarian conditions more broadly.
