Global South states have long advocated for nuclear disarmament, from the Bandung Conference to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Yet recent abstentions and muted positions on conflicts suggest waning commitment. Shivani Singh examines how multipolar dependencies shape these states' responses, and what it means for the nuclear order
A feature of the global nuclear order since 1945 has been Global South advocacy for disarmament. The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) was formed in 1961, comprising developing states such as Brazil and India. Their advocacy drew attention to the rights and responsibilities of Global South actors as equal stakeholders — rather than passive bystanders — in the world nuclear order.
These eighteen members contributed significantly to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) agenda. Members emphasised the mutual rights and obligations of all states towards disarmament, democratisation, and the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Their ENDC participation dates back to the 1955 Bandung Conference, where newly independent African and Asian nations forged the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Indeed, the principle of ‘general and complete disarmament’, the bedrock of today's disarmament movement, was first discussed at the inaugural 1961 NAM summit in Belgrade.
Since then, Global South institutions and states have pursued this agenda tirelessly. Efforts have yielded dispersed, yet positive results, including Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones across Latin America, the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Africa, Central Asia and Southeast Asia. In 1998, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), comprising Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, and South Africa, revitalised the movement by publicly denouncing nuclear-armed states’ complacency towards disarmament, and proposing a new agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free world. More recently, the unwavering support provided by many Global South states drove the historic adoption of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).
The Global South encompasses nations that have historically endured the effects of nuclear weapons testing. It thus captures a meaningful, collective voice of resistance
As a taxonomical framework, the 'Global South' faces criticism for occluding the diverse preferences and distinct security and normative orientations of constituent states. Nonetheless, it captures a meaningful, collective voice of resistance. The Global South encompasses nations that have historically endured nuclear weapons testing and systematic exclusion from nuclear decision-making. These nations' shared legacy has fostered a tradition of disarmament advocacy.
Despite this storied legacy, allegations have recently surfaced regarding the lacklustre engagement of Global South states on issues of disarmament and violation of nuclear norms. Some contend that their silence suggests complicity in the erosion of the nuclear order. Such claims follow lukewarm responses to ongoing conflicts that have upended established understandings around deterrence and norms against nuclear use threats.
Regarding Russia’s targeting of nuclear power plants in Ukraine, the 2023 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference adopted a resolution on ‘nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine’ without much support from the Global South. South Africa and Brazil abstained from voting on certain paragraphs of the resolution that called for the immediate return of control of Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant to Ukrainian authorities. South Africa and Brazil claimed such a measure exceeded IAEA functions. At the 2025 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty refused to call out Russia’s blatant nuclear threats. Instead, they issued general statements encouraging states to refrain from the 'threat or use of force'.
Global South states remaining silent on issues of disarmament and violations of nuclear norms have faced allegations of complicity in the erosion of the nuclear order
Although it did not name specific states, Brazil highlighted 'escalated nuclear rhetoric' and 'explicit nuclear threats' in Europe and the Middle East. Similarly, without naming perpetrators, the latest BRICS summit in July 2025 condemned strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Security, economic and institutional conditions are driving these trends. The Cold War’s bipolar environment differs markedly from today’s multipolar context. Infrastructure and defence investments with major powers have created inevitable dependencies resulting in subdued, if not completely diminished, resistance patterns.
Brazil, for example, has an active naval nuclear propulsion submarine programme, supported by France. Simultaneously, it seeks to expand nuclear energy cooperation with Russia. Reportedly, Brazil plans to acquire Small Modular Reactors and fuel supplies for Angra reactors. Similarly, South Africa and Russia have signed an MoU for the manufacture and supply of nuclear fuel. Half of South Africa’s fuel enrichment services for its Koeberg nuclear power plant come from Russia. In pursuing its goal of 2.5 GW of new nuclear capacity by 2030 amid stalled progress on a US civil nuclear deal, South Africa has publicly expressed its willingness to enhance nuclear cooperation with Russia and Iran.
India, under US sanctions for ties with Russia, remains dependent on Moscow for oil and defence supplies. India's goal is to reach 100 GW nuclear power by 2047. To meet this goal, it requires fuel, equipment, and training from Rosatom for its Kudankulam reactors.
Given these growing interdependencies, expecting Global South states to rise above their very real security and developmental imperatives is unrealistic. This has induced institutional fatigue in platforms such as the NPT Review Conferences and the UN First Committee, leading to policy paralysis.
Unlike non-alignment during the Cold War, today’s multipolar climate requires balancing multi-alignment with multilateralism, especially on the nuclear issue. The Global South can fill the void left by a lack of leadership and consensus in the nuclear order. Innovative coalition-building — through forums like BRICS, NAM (member states not formally aligned with any major power blocs), NAC (middle-power countries advocating for nuclear disarmament), or the G20 (an intergovernmental forum comprising 19 member states and two regional organisations) — could break the deadlock and advance the disarmament and arms control currently being eroded amid acrimony between Russia and the West. Rising powers in the Global South can exploit their strategic autonomy, and vast markets in trade, to position themselves as leaders in promoting nuclear risk reduction, disarmament, and non-proliferation efforts.
Disarmament diplomacy must not become a bargaining chip for short-term developmental or geopolitical gains. The stakes are simply too high
In today's hyper-globalised, multipolar world, traditional non-alignment is no longer viable. Multi-alignment has become a more prudent strategy for the Global South, and balancing diverse interests remains crucial. However, disarmament diplomacy must not become a bargaining chip for short-term developmental or geopolitical gains. The stakes are simply too high. Whether states view the shift towards multipolarity as pressure, challenge, or an opportunity to step up remains to be seen. One certainty persists: complacency on nuclear weapons is a dangerous gamble.
