Georgia’s elections on 26 October highlighted its balancing act between cultivating ties with the West and managing a complex relationship with Russia. Dennis Shen explains how competing visions for the country’s future, challenging geopolitics, and escalating sanctions all threaten socio-political stability
On Saturday 26 October 2024, Georgia voted in parliamentary elections. With the results now in, the political landscape remains precarious. Back in June, the country passed a Russian-inspired 'foreign agents law', which forced stricter controls on international organisations, and, specifically, on pro-western civil society organisations. Enactment of this law prompted large-scale public protests by Georgians in favour of closer ties with the West. On polling day, according to central election commission figures, around 54% of the electorate cast their vote for the ruling pro-Russia Georgian Dream (GD) party, corresponding to around 89 of 150 parliamentary seats.
International observers argued that the election was rigged, although stopped just short of labelling the elections fraudulent
Referencing exit polls, which had suggested a majority for the four main opposition groups headed by the United National Movement, GD opponents promptly argued that the election was rigged. International observers, too, highlighted electoral shortcomings, from an uneven campaign playing field to ballot-stuffing, bribery and pressure campaigns. However, they stopped just short of labelling the elections fraudulent. Georgia’s president, the pro-European Salomé Zourabichvili, says she does not accept the results. Opposition members have announced boycotts of parliamentary mandates, calling on supporters to protest. Reports of Russian interference exacerbate the uncertainty yet further.
This year's elections are particularly important given Georgia's transition to a fully parliamentary system. The presidency – currently held by the directly-elected Zourabichvili – will later this year for the first time be elected indirectly by an electoral college comprising members of the new parliament alongside regional and local authorities. Parliament remains under GD control, so the presidency may well change hands.
GD had also announced that if it wins a so-called constitutional majority of parliamentary seats (113 of 150), it plans to ban the collective National Movement or the main pro-Western opposition groups from further political participation.
The party appears to have failed in securing such a parliamentary super-majority. Nevertheless, the threat to abolish political rivals inevitably heightens an already-polarising domestic discourse. It places the opposition and pro-West core of Georgian civil society in an existential fight.
Georgian Dream announced that if it won a constitutional majority, it would ban the main pro-Western opposition groups from further political participation
GD founder Bidzina Ivanishvili recently accused opposition groups of 'provoking' the 2008 Georgian war against Russia. In truth, it was Russia and linked separatist forces that were responsible. Ivanishvili also claims the opposition seeks to drag Georgia into fresh conflict with Russia, promising 'Nuremberg trials' for some members of opposition groups.
The line between large-scale demonstrations that bring global attention but not real change, and the scale of unrest required to overthrow a government, is a thin one. Suppression and disrespect for fundamental freedoms only bring such a tipping point nearer.
Post-Soviet states have experienced a series of so-called colour revolutions. In contemporary Georgia, political conditions are strikingly similar to those immediately preceding such revolutions. See the graphic below. Throughout these past events, there has been one political constant: a pro-Russian government facing a crisis of democratic legitimacy. Seeking to appease Moscow, these administrations have resorted to repression prior to being voted or forced out by a population determined to move nearer to the orbit of the EU and US.
The Georgian drift towards Russia's orbit has accelerated since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This drift exposes Georgia to institutional degradation – as in the foreign agents bill – and risks provoking further western sanctions.
The US has suspended US$95m in aid, and is contemplating curbs on longstanding defence cooperation. The EU suspended Georgia's accession negotiations, along with payment under the European Peace Facility of €30m for this year. Recognising the drift, this year's annual NATO summit declaration – for the first time since 2008 – failed to mention Georgian membership prospects.
Western sanctions thus far have been targeted, and deliberately restrained. The hope of the West is that Georgia will once again carve out its earlier role as a beacon of democratic transition among the post-Soviet republics. Georgia remains geopolitically crucial, and a too-forceful approach from the West might drive Georgia permanently back into the Russosphere.
In view of present geopolitics, Georgia would be well advised to commit to joining the EU only in the long run. In the interim, it should seek to ensure its near-term relations with Russia do not fray. The legacy of three wars against Russia, and Georgia's catastrophic military defeat in 2008, dominate national politics. In conducting an internal risk assessment, Georgia is acutely conscious that during the 2008 war, the US and its allies provided only limited military support. GD's commitments to return breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgia, however unrealistic, naturally require the government to cooperate closely with Russia.
In the long run, Georgia should commit to joining the EU. In the short term, however, it must also ensure its relations with Russia do not fray
Given the Kremlin's changing aspirations, the dangers for Georgia are numerous. They include the country's land border with Russia, latent tensions around the separatist regions, and the spectre of re-escalation of long-term conflict. If a pro-West electorate eventually ousted GD and reset Georgia on its constitutionally-enshrined path of EU and NATO accession, this could provoke tensions with Russian authorities.
Risks for Georgia have risen following Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine. Only if the war ends poorly for Russia do such dangers ease for Georgia.
The imminent US presidential elections may also prove consequential. The election of Kamala Harris might mean further drift towards Russia. Donald Trump, on the other hand, is claiming he will end the war in Ukraine but, at the same time, has threatened to withhold American budgetary support for Ukrainian military resistance. A second Trump presidency could thus mean an uncertain political future for Georgia.
