The EU and the Western Balkan countries view enlargement differently. Milica Uvalić argues that despite renewed EU engagement since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, misperceptions persist, hindering Western Balkan countries’ accession. Bridging these misunderstandings is crucial to revitalising the process and aligning expectations for a shared European future

Misperceptions in the Western Balkans

Misperceptions about European enlargement in the Western Balkans (WB) stem primarily from the protracted pace of EU integration. Following the wars of the 1990s, the EU offered WB countries credible prospects for membership, formalised at the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit. Its offer generated widespread optimism among WB citizens, with many anticipating accession within a decade. Of the WB countries, however, only Croatia joined the Union in 2013, leaving the remaining states mired in uncertainty. The resulting disillusionment has fostered a sense of injustice and betrayal, and has eroded trust among WB citizens in the EU's willingness to expand further.

In Serbia, 35% of citizens believe their country will never join the EU. While political elites remain rhetorically committed to accession, the process has lost its transformative momentum, leading to pervasive 'reform fatigue'. Although a majority of WB citizens (54%) still view EU membership positively, the distribution is uneven: optimism remains high in Albania and Kosovo (77% and 74%, respectively), but is markedly lower in Serbia (34%).

The accession process has lost its transformative momentum among political elites, leading to pervasive 'reform fatigue'

Many WB citizens have a distorted image of the EU. Limited transparency in accession negotiations exacerbates this disconnect, as does ambiguous messaging from political leaders, and persistent campaigns of disinformation. External actors like Russia and China, often portrayed as viable alternative allies to the EU, exploit these information gaps. Biased media narratives and insufficient public understanding of EU institutions, policies, and financial assistance amplify such misperceptions.

Economic stagnation and misguided narratives

Economic stagnation, too, has fuelled scepticism. While integration with the EU has driven post-2000 recovery, the region has become vulnerable to external shocks. Since 2009, GDP growth has been sluggish, and income convergence with the EU average remains elusive. Citizens frequently misattribute economic problems to EU policies rather than domestic structural weaknesses. This only reinforces their negative perception of the EU.

Compounding these challenges is the narrative of alternative partnerships. The EU remains the WBs' dominant economic partner — in 2023, it accounted for 67% of the region's trade in goods, 58% of foreign direct investment, and the lion's share of financial assistance. Yet, political discourse often romanticises ties with 'traditional allies' like Russia and China as a viable alternative to EU membership.

Political discourse often romanticises ties with 'traditional allies' like Russia and China as a viable alternative to EU membership

The EU's perceived leniency towards authoritarian tendencies in the region has strained trust even further. In November 2024, a railway station canopy in Serbia collapsed, killing 15 people. Mass protests followed, which morphed into nationwide demonstrations against corruption and governance failures. The EU was slow to respond — addressing the crisis only in February 2025. This only reinforced perceptions among ordinary citizens that the EU prioritises stability over democratic principles. Serbian officials, in turn, exploited the unrest by accusing foreign actors of orchestrating the protests, thereby deepening societal polarisation.

Misperceptions in the EU

Misperceptions are not confined to WB countries; they persist within the EU itself. Early misjudgements about Yugoslavia's disintegration and how to stop the armed conflicts left a legacy of caution and scepticism. The 1999 Stabilisation and Association Process marked a strategic shift toward supporting WB integration. Yet continued political instability in the region, even after 2001, and slow compliance with accession criteria, led to a more prudent approach. Subsequent crises — including the 2008 financial crash, the migration crisis, Brexit, and the Covid-19 pandemic — diverted the EU’s attention from enlargement.

The resulting 'enlargement fatigue' has been compounded by concerns over governance deficits and unresolved bilateral disputes. The Western Balkans have only a small demographic footprint; less than 4% of the EU's population. Despite this, some EU member states argue that admitting underdeveloped, war-torn countries would impose unsustainable costs. Yet, a recent study estimates that integrating the six WB states in 2030 would cost approximately €15 billion — a manageable sum given the geopolitical and economic benefits.

Ambiguous messaging

The EU's inconsistent messaging has further confounded perceptions. As Veronica Anghel argues in her foundational blog for this series, EU enlargement took on geostrategic importance after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. High-level officials frequently describe the Western Balkans as a 'geostrategic priority'. At the same time, they emphasise the stringent conditionality of accession. Praise for reform efforts often contradicts the more critical tone of the European Commission's annual reports, sowing confusion and frustration among WB policy-makers and citizens alike.

The prioritisation of stability over democratic principles — or 'stabilitocracy' — has also been met with scepticism. While EU leaders approve of certain governments for the sake of maintaining regional stability, domestic populations view them as obstacles to genuine reform. This dissonance undermines the credibility of the enlargement process, and perpetuates perceptions of EU hypocrisy.

Bridging the gap: a shared responsibility

With enlargement back on the EU's agenda, both sides must seize the moment to recalibrate their approaches.

Political elites in the Western Balkans must demonstrate renewed commitment to reform, focusing on the rule of law, democratic accountability, and institutional integrity. Public communication efforts should counter disinformation by providing clear, accessible, and reliable information about the benefits and responsibilities of EU integration.

The EU must deliver consistent, transparent messages about the benefits of integration, and address public concerns about the enlargement process

The European Union must align its rhetoric with action. This entails delivering consistent, transparent messages, and addressing public concerns about the enlargement process. Institutional reforms to streamline accession procedures should go hand-in-hand with more proactive support for civil society actors who champion democratic reforms.

Ultimately, the enlargement process should be reframed as a mutual endeavour to transform shared challenges into shared responsibilities. By prioritising engagement, transparency, and consistency, the EU and the WB countries can bridge the gap in perceptions and advance their common European future.

No.9 in a Loop series on 🧭 EU enlargement dilemmas