What motivates EU enlargement? Marius Ghincea and Laurențiu Pleșca argue that the Union’s approach has evolved through three overlapping logics: transformation, stabilisation, and demarcation. By unpacking how these priorities have shifted over time, they offer a more nuanced understanding of enlargement in a changing geopolitical context
Long celebrated as the EU’s most effective foreign policy tool, enlargement has been variously seen as driven by normative ideals, geopolitical strategy, or pragmatic stability. Yet Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine exposed how fluid — and contested — these motivations remain.
Scholars and media analysts generally assume stable motives guide the enlargement process — whether that's the EU exporting its democratic values as a normative power, or containing its rivals as a powerful geopolitical actor. Yet our research, based on content analysis of European Council conclusions 1990–2024, and comparative case studies, reveals a more dynamic picture. The EU’s enlargement policy, we find, has evolved through three dominant and overlapping 'policy logics': transformation, stabilisation, and demarcation. These logics have altered in salience across time and space, reflecting shifting geopolitical pressures and the changing nature of candidate states — and each has reshaped how the EU engages its neighbourhood.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, a transformative ambition drove enlargement. The EU sought not just to expand, but to remake post-communist societies in the image of liberal democracy. Conditionality was strict, reform incentives clear, and the EU’s normative appeal strong. This logic delivered: the 2004 and 2007 enlargements brought ten new members, many of which had undergone profound reform.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, transformation drove enlargement as the EU sought not just to expand, but to remake post-communist societies in the image of liberal democracy
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania — despite different starting points — aligned domestic institutions and policies with EU standards, often at high political cost. The EU played the role of teacher, gatekeeper, and aspirational model. While democratic backsliding later occurred, the transformative intent of the EU during accession was unmistakable.
By the 2010s, this transformative momentum slowed. Enlargement shifted to the Western Balkans — where domestic fragility, post-conflict legacies, and weak institutions made transformation more elusive. Meanwhile, the EU faced its own crises: the eurozone, migration, and democratic erosion within its ranks.
By the 2010s, stabilisation became the dominant logic, as the EU’s primary aim was to maintain order, avoid regional collapse, and limit the influence of external actors
During this phase, stabilisation became the dominant logic. The EU’s primary aim was to maintain order, avoid regional collapse, and limit the influence of external actors. Reform demands were softened, and enlargement became less about transformation and more about containment. This dynamic enabled the rise of so-called 'stabilitocracies' — regimes that offered rhetorical support for EU goals while stalling or reversing on democratic reform.
The EU’s credibility suffered. In the Balkans, citizens became increasingly sceptical of an accession process they saw as politically driven and strategically ambivalent.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a turning point. Enlargement took on a new logic: demarcation. No longer just a tool of transformation or stabilisation, enlargement became part of a broader geopolitical strategy to draw clear lines between the EU and its adversaries.
This shift is evident in the rapid granting of candidate status to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, despite those states having made limited progress on governance. Indeed, as Veronica Anghel and Richard Youngs point out in this blog series, geopolitical urgency now trumps traditional benchmarks. By this logic, enlargement serves to consolidate Europe’s security perimeter, reduce dependencies, and strengthen strategic autonomy.
After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Europe adopted a new logic — demarcation — as it sought to consolidate its security perimeter, reduce dependencies, and strengthen strategic autonomy
This reframing extends to the Western Balkans, where the EU increasingly frames accession as a counter to Russian, Chinese, and Turkish influence; see Magdalena König and Miruna Butnaru-Troncotă's contributions. Enlargement has become a means of geostrategic alignment, not just domestic reform. Whether this shift yields renewed momentum or reinforces instrumentalism remains to be seen.
Viewing enlargement through the lens of policy logics helps move beyond tired binaries of values versus interests. In reality, the EU always pursues a mix of goals — sometimes reinforcing, sometimes at odds.
For policy-makers, the challenge is to ensure that today's demarcation logic does not crowd out the EU’s normative ambitions or entrench double standards. Conditionality must remain credible, but so too must the offer of membership. Candidate countries need clarity, not ambiguity — especially when the EU’s own institutional reform remains incomplete.
To restore legitimacy, the EU should:
Enlargement remains a powerful strategic instrument. But to remain so, it must be governed by more than reactive geopolitics. Only by balancing transformation, stabilisation, and demarcation — rather than letting one logic dominate — can the EU sustain a credible, coherent enlargement policy fit for a turbulent world.
