Displaced again: forced mobility from Lebanon to Syria

The spectacular fall of the Syrian regime comes with high expectations on refugee return. But we should meet such expectations with caution. Only a week ago, secondary displacement from Lebanon to Syria was being framed – wrongly – as 'voluntary return'. Maissam Nimer and Nora Stel warn that uncertain times lie ahead for displaced Syrians

Escaping violence, not returning home

On 8 December 2024, Syrian rebels overthrew the decades-long regime of Bashar Al-Assad. Jubilant Syrians worldwide are now hoping and planning to return to their country. We should of course celebrate – and facilitate – such return whenever possible. Yet we should not forget that in various contexts, Syrian refugees have been coerced into returning to their home country. These latest events risk increasing the pressure on Syrians who cannot yet return safely. International policy should avoid the wishful thinking that has led to secondary displacement and expulsion being branded 'return'. The recent exodus from Lebanon into Syria shows just how risky such flight may be.

Israel's war on Lebanon continues despite the ceasefire. Since September alone, more than 425,000 people – primarily Syrian nationals who initially sought refuge in Lebanon from the Syrian civil war – have fled to Syria. Lebanese authorities were quick to describe this mass exodus as 'return migration'. But this distorts the reality: these people are not returning of their own free will. They are, once more, fleeing relentless bombing which has killed thousands and stripped displaced Syrians in Lebanon of crucial humanitarian aid.

Syria is by no means safe or stable. Indeed, we have recently seen a spectacular increase in violent conflict between opposition and regime forces. UN-OHCHR and the UN Syria Commission of Inquiry warn that conditions in Syria are not conducive to return. On top of the country's dire socioeconomic situation, under the Assad regime omnipresent state terror targeted returnees in particular. Nevertheless, driven more by domestic political agendas than on-the-ground realities, Lebanon has stepped up forced return. This 'return turn' in engagement with Syrian displacement is also occurring in Europe, where several countries operate a similar agenda.

Driven more by domestic political agendas than on-the-ground realities, Lebanon has stepped up the forced return of Syrian refugees

To understand what is driving the mass movement, we must dissociate the current exodus from such return fantasies, and acknowledge it instead as secondary displacement. Doing so also means we can prevent its misuse to justify politically motivated repatriation policies.

Lebanon’s de facto expulsion policy

For over a decade, Lebanon has pressurised Syrian refugees to leave through policies of marginalisation, criminalisation, and forced deportation. These strategies, designed to inflict 'self-deportation', have left refugees with little choice but to flee, regardless of the safety of their destination. This longstanding approach has only intensified in recent months. Even amid the current Israeli aggression against Lebanon, Lebanese authorities have continued to target Syrians for expulsion.

We conducted interviews with Lebanese officials, UN representatives, refugee rights groups, and EU diplomats. Our research results reveal how Lebanon’s policies have placed Syrians under extreme pressure to leave. Despite threats of physical deportation and increasing social hostility, however, the vast majority of Syrians in Lebanon have defied this pressure. Indeed, surveys indicate consistently that people will not return unless circumstances in Syria change. Clearly, Israel’s war on Lebanon is not conducive to return, only further displacement.

Despite threats of physical deportation, the vast majority of Syrians in Lebanon are defying Lebanese authorities' pressure to leave

While current developments in Syria offer hope that refugees might be able to make a safe return, such returns must be explicitly voluntary. Moreover, they should not prevent the reception of new refugees currently fleeing Syria, nor the re-entry of Syrians who fled Israeli violence on Lebanon but who now aim to go back to their country of first refuge.

How Europe is complicit in return narratives

Mislabelling displacement to Syria as 'return' is a political ploy in Lebanon, where lowering the number of Syrians 'by all possible means' has been official policy since 2014. It also suits European discourse that has misguidedly sought to claim that parts of Syria are safe. Presenting displacement as return only encourages increasingly anti-immigration sentiment among European citizens, and fuels their deportation fantasies.

In Europe, presenting the displacement of refugees as 'return' only fuels the deportation fantasies of those strongly opposed to immigration

This is especially pertinent considering that through funding agreements, diplomatic pressure, and partnership deals, the EU has indirectly supported Lebanon’s shift from being willing to host refugees to encouraging their return. This approach culminated in last year’s EU-Lebanon migration 'deal' that sought to guarantee Lebanon’s continued containment of refugees in return for not merely funding but implicit condonement of premature return. This so-called deal, however, has simply made the conditions Syrians in Lebanon face today even more precarious.

Despite fear and uncertainty, many Syrian refugees will now be hoping to make the journey home. But rather than focusing on short-term crisis management and rushing to suspend asylum applications, the EU must address the structural issues that drove their original displacement. EU influence should promote humane policies, ensuring that refugees are not pushed into unsafe conditions under the guise of 'return'.

Recognising displacement realities on the ground

To engage responsibly with suddenly peaking return prospects, Lebanese and European authorities must focus on assistance, protection, and accountability. They should provide humanitarian assistance and guarantee safe passage to all Syrian people on the move: those fleeing back to Lebanon, those remaining in Lebanon, and those returning to Syria. And they must closely monitor and ensure accountability for violations of the principle of non-refoulement. Above all, they must avoid premature pressure for unidirectional mobility.

This article presents the views of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the ECPR or the Editors of The Loop.

Contributing Authors

photograph of Maissam Nimer Maissam Nimer Senior Researcher, Özyeğin University More by this author
photograph of Nora Stel Nora Stel Assistant Professor in Conflict Studies, Radboud University More by this author

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